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21. Warlord-Islamist Competition: A Comparison of Support Structures

Author:
Hamza Deniz Kobus
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Warlord armies and Islamist groups are two types of violent non-state actors that frequently compete against each other in situations of internal conflict. This article strives to compare these actor types with regards to their internal and external sources of support. Examination of the consistent conflicts in Somalia and Afghanistan suggests that different support structures assist the armed groups with various resources for divergent reasons. The most salient pattern identifiable in the case studies indicates that local populations tend to support Islamist groups due to shared religious identities and desires for lasting governance. The non-ideological and pragmatic orientation of warlords on the other hand seems to attract backing primarily by international actors seeking influence in internal conflicts. While further research has to corroborate the findings, they indicate possible implications for military interventions in situations that are shaped by warlord-Islamist competition.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Governance, Islamism, Armed Conflict, Competition, and Warlords
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Between cooperation and competition: The struggle of resistance groups in Myanmar

Author:
Su Mon
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Myanmar has been mired in conflict for decades, but its direction changed dramatically after the 2021 coup and the proliferation of new armed groups resisting military rule. ACLED records over 2,600 new non-state actors participating in Myanmar’s conflict since April 2021 — accounting for 21% of all ACLED-recorded non-state armed groups worldwide. Most of these groups or their forerunners were formed by anti-coup protesters who could no longer peacefully resist the military’s increasingly systematic detention, torture, sexual assault, and killings of protesters. While many individuals consciously fled the military’s subjugation for arms training in other parts of Myanmar, local defense forces also grew organically in communities at risk of military reprisals and attacks. These groups were formed by people from all walks of life: local politicians, national party members, public servants, students, farmers, and more. After six weeks of escalating military repression, including police snipers shooting unarmed youth in the head, the first battle between the military and an armed resistance group organized by civilians was reported in Sagaing region: On 26 March 2021, the residents of Tamu town defended their protest sites with single-shot hunting rifles. The subsequent proliferation of new armed groups formed by civilians under hundreds of different local banners is now often collectively termed the ‘Spring Revolution.’1 The revolution has led to a new, fragmented conflict landscape in which the Myanmar military has struggled to check the advance of both new and old armed groups, and only retains control of the country through its unrivaled air power.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Cooperation, Competition, and Armed Resistance
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Myanmar

23. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

24. Securing Europe’s Future: Strengthening ICT Competitiveness for Economic and National Security

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, including ICT manufacturing such as telecom equipment and electronic components, as well as ICT services such as software, telecommunication services, and data processing, is no longer merely an economic pillar but a strategic asset essential for national security and defence capabilities. This paper identifies two concerns linking technology and national security: the exploitation of ICT as a gateway to critical infrastructure and the weaponisation of trade and technological dependencies in ICT by foreign nations. Addressing these two challenges requires tailored approaches, as they involve distinct nations and contexts. First, the EU should reduce its reliance on Chinese telecom equipment within its networks and accelerate the deployment of 5G. While phasing out Chinese telecom equipment will take years, a faster rollout of 5G can be achieved in the short term. To accomplish this, the EU should promote the scale and profitability of its telecom operators. Secondly, the EU relies heavily on US companies for a substantial share of its cloud-based online services. However, it is unlikely that the US would impose restrictions on these exports to the EU. Furthermore, replicating the infrastructure needed to deliver cloud-based online services would entail significant costs. To achieve technological leadership, the EU must prioritise emerging technologies such as 6G, XG, AI, quantum computing, and edge and hybrid computing, which will form the foundation of future commercial and military innovations. Thirdly, the EU should strengthen its leadership position in the development of technologies for advanced mobile communication, including 5G, 6G, and XG. Through significant effort and investment in R&D, European companies have secured a leading role in developing technical standards for cellular communication and telecom equipment. Large European firms such as Ericsson and Nokia, as well as EU SMEs that are champions in their fields, are among the most significant contributors to the technological standards. This hard-won position is one that EU policymakers must do their utmost to protect and develop. However, complacency is a recipe for disaster. The EU has the potential to foster companies that could lead in the technologies of tomorrow. It possesses the necessary fundamentals to drive technological innovation in the ICT sector, including high levels of human capital, firms operating at the technological frontier, and a market economy underpinned by strong institutions, the rule of law, and robust intellectual property protections. These constitute Europe’s comparative advantages, and the EU must adopt policies that recognise and reinforce them, rather than undermine them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

25. Decarbonising for competitiveness: four ways to reduce European energy prices

Author:
Conall Heussaff
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Energy prices are higher in the European Union than in most other industrialised economies, presenting a fundamental competitiveness challenge. The price disparity stems from the EU’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, contrasting with the United States, which is a net exporter of energy. In 2024, EU gas wholesale prices were on average nearly five times those in the US. Average EU industrial electricity prices were roughly two and a half times higher than in the US. The transition to clean, domestically generated energy is therefore essential to reduce European energy costs. Despite rapid decarbonisation of the power sector, fossil fuels remain vital for electricity generation and continue to significantly influence final consumer costs. Additional factors influencing final prices include the fixed costs of supporting renewables and maintaining and expanding the energy networks, and consumption taxes and levies. However, the ongoing energy transition is reshaping cost dynamics. Renewables, with fixed capital costs and no fuel requirements, are increasingly transforming the electricity sector. The electrification of heating, transport and other energy services further reduces fossil-fuel demand, shifting overall energy costs from variable fuel expenses to fixed capital investments. As the energy transition progresses, EU energy costs can be expected to fall, but how far they fall and how they are shared will depend on policy choices in four main areas. In the short term, policymakers must allocate system costs fairly across energy consumers. Medium-term policies should encourage demand flexibility in electricity to improve system efficiency. In the long-term, coordinated investment at EU level and deeper cross-border interconnection will drive down final costs for all consumers.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Economy, Industrialization, Decarbonization, Energy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe