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21. R2P Monitor, Issue 68, 1 March 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 68 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Cameroon, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, Central African Republic, and Global Focus

22. Houthi Motivations Driving the Red Sea Crisis: Understanding How Ansar Allah’s Strategic Culture Goes Beyond Gaza and Iran

Author:
Jonah Carlson
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Ansar Allah, known as the “Houthi movement,” has conducted attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea since October 2023. This event is now known as the “Red Sea Crisis.” Classifying Ansar Allah as merely an Iranian proxy, or categorizing its actions as a mere response to the conflict in Gaza and support for Hamas, inadequately explains these attacks. This article uses the cultural topography method to analyze the culture of the movement and provide alternative motivations for the attacks, such as consolidating domestic support and crafting a strong national appearance. The article concludes that Ansar Allah’s attacks on the Red Sea are more motivated by the belief they will yield pragmatic and material benefits for the movement rather than ideological or cultural overlap with Palestine or Iran.
Topic:
Houthis, Hamas, Shipping, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Ansar Allah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza

23. Red Sea Attacks and the International Response: An International Law Insight

Author:
Efthymios Papastavridis
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The ongoing crisis in the Red Sea, involving attacks by the Houthis to international shipping in the region as well as forcible measures by the US and its allies against Houthis’ targets in Yemen, entails a host of legal, political, financial challenges to the international community, as evinced, amongst others, by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2272 on 10th January 2024. Amongst others, it is evident that it gives rise to important questions under international law, including on the legal classification of the attacks in question and the legality of the measures that third States are taking. It is the purpose of this Insight to address these questions under international law. In so doing, the Insight avers that the proper qualification of the current situation in terms of the law of armed conflict is that of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Yemen and other States, including the US, and a non-state armed group, the Houthis. Under international law, Houthis’ attacks, depending on the means and against whom they have been committed, can be classified as: i) acts of piracy; ii) acts regulated by the laws governing NIACs at sea; and iii) acts of ‘maritime terrorism’, or more aptly, acts falling under the scope of the 1988 SUA Convention. Accordingly, States fighting Houthis and protecting the safety of navigation in the Red Sea may indeed take many measures in accordance with international law, including the UNCLOS Articles 105 and 110 vis-à-vis acts of piracy, or Article 92 in respect of the protection of vessels flying their flags, as well as the laws governing NIAC at sea, as applicable to the parties to the conflict in question.
Topic:
International Law, Trade, Houthis, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Yemen, United States of America, and Red Sea

24. Don’t Forget About the Red Sea

Author:
Burak Şakir Şeker
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
A widening of Israel’s War on Gaza could threaten the vital Red Sea waterway and lead to a global economic crisis
Topic:
Trade, Shipping, Economic Crisis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Red Sea

25. CTC Sentinel: February 2024 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, and Daisy Muibu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Long-range aerial attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group, including a ballistic missile that traveled at least a thousand miles toward Israel before being intercepted (reportedly in space) on October 31, 2023, are focusing minds on long-range stand-off terrorism. In this month’s feature article, which conceptualizes, outlines, and examines the implications of this emerging threat vector, Don Rassler argues that the notion that terrorists could strike the United States across the oceans with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is becoming increasingly less far-fetched. Rassler writes that “over the coming decade, hydrogen fuel cell and solar UAS technology will evolve and mature, and will also likely become more available and accessible to the average consumer, which will make longer ranges more accessible as well. Other disruptive technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, will also mature and will likely be used by extremists to help them optimize system performance and to overcome, or devise creative solutions to, technical long-range UAS challenges.” He warns that “long-range stand-off terrorism will be attractive to some extremists because it opens-up new attack pathways, can enable surprise, and has the potential to deliver a potent psychological, ‘we can strike you from afar’ punch. Over the next decade advancements in commercial technologies and systems will also make range, and extended range, more accessible for violent non-state-entities, making it likely that in the future long-range terrorism will become even more of a threat.” Rassler’s article is the first in a new recurring series in CTC Sentinel entitled “On the Horizon” that will examine emerging counterterrorism challenges. Our interview is with Christopher Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. “We need to have sustainable CT operations that prevent terrorists’ actions, principally al-Qa`ida and ISIS, to ensure we are not distracted by what we view as the longer-term strategic priorities, such as peer adversaries,” he says. “As the rest of the Department and other parts of the U.S. government are doing less CT, [this] means that those who are doing it have to do it better and, in many respects, do it more proportionally to the rest of the national security enterprise. This is why SOF is looked to as the lead for the CT fight in the Department.” Daisy Muibu examines the state of Somalia’s military campaign against al-Shabaab. She writes that: “A year and five months after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the initial optimism that characterized its first few months have diminished as the counterinsurgency’s momentum has stalled in the central regions of the country.” She adds that “with only a year left until African Union forces are mandated to fully draw down, significant obstacles remain that cast doubts over the government’s ambitious goals to defeat al-Shabaab and assume full responsibility for securing the country by December 31, 2024.”
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Houthis, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Somalia, Global Focus, and United States of America

26. CTC Sentinel: October 2024 Issue

Author:
Michel Wyss, Brian Dodwell, Michael Knights, and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
A year on from the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel, the Middle East is entering its most dangerous period in living memory. The unfolding events will have far-reaching consequences for the region and the international terror threat. In our feature article, Michel Wyss assesses the intelligence failings in the lead-up to October 7. He writes: “Israel’s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons,” adding that “failures and negligence hampered both Israel’s overall political assessment as well as collection, analysis, and dissemination at the intelligence level.” He argues that one lesson learned is the need for humility and that also includes “the recognition that even seasoned intelligence analysts can fall prey to their own blind spots.” Our interview is with Christopher O’Leary, former FBI Counterterrorism Senior Executive and Director of Hostage Recovery. He provides insights from his more than two decades of working on counterterrorism investigations for the FBI. Reflecting on the Israeli experience since October 7, he discusses key variables for a government to consider when faced with a hostage crisis. Michael Knights examines a year of Houthi attacks against Israel and shipping off the coast of Yemen. He writes: “Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.” Matthew Levitt assesses the threat posed by Iran’s weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs). He writes: “Today, with Iran’s proxies wreaking havoc throughout the region, officials worry Tehran may have already provided weaponized PBAs to several of its partners and proxies. Such a capability, tactically deployed on the battlefield, could enable further October 7-style cross-border raids or kidnapping operations.” This issue is my hundredth at the helm of CTC Sentinel. It is an ongoing privilege to feature the insights of the best and brightest in our field and to count as my colleagues the extraordinary group of leaders and thinkers at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.
Topic:
Terrorism, Houthis, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, and Palestine

27. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran

Author:
Mona Saif
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Yemen

28. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

29. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL FOR YEMEN

Author:
Marta Furlan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, Houthis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria

30. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen