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11. Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms

Author:
Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
At a time of hot debate over possible military action against Iran's nuclear program, the need for a clear understanding of the issues and the controversial science and technology behind them has never been more acute. Toward that end, scholars from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs have copublished an interactive online glossary of terms used in the discussion about Iran. The report was prepared by proliferation expert Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen, former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Covering the jargon and history behind IAEA inspections, centrifuge enrichment, basic nuclear physics, and early nuclear weapons development in Pakistan and the United States, the glossary provides an indispensable guide to an increasingly complex problem.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, and Islam
Political Geography:
Iran, Washington, and Middle East

12. No Hedging in Canberra: The Australia-US Alliance in the "Asian Century"

Author:
Nick Bisley
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has just completed a lightning visit to Australia for formal discussions with newly installed Foreign Minister Bob Carr. In spite of the political turmoil that brought Carr to office, the Australia-US alliance is in the best shape of its 60-year history. Having begun as a Cold War convenience, about which the United States was not enthusiastic, it has become a key part of Washington's regional role and a cornerstone not only of Australia's defense and security policy, but of its broader engagement with the world. The arrival in early April of the US Marine Corps to begin six-month training rotations in Darwin is emblematic of the alliance's standing and its evolution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

13. C. Khaled Elgindy, "The Middle East Quartet: A Post-Mortem," Washington, D.C., February 2012 (excerpts)

Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
It has been ten years since the four most powerful players in the Middle East peace process-the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations-came together under the diplomatic umbrella known as the Quartet. Formed in response to the outbreak of the second intifada in late 2000 and the collapse of peace negotiations a few months later, the Quartet appeared ideally suited for dealing with the seemingly intractable con!ict between Israelis and Palestinians. Its small but powerful membership allowed it to act swiftly and decisively, while its informal structure gave it the !exibility needed to navigate crises and adapt to changing developments on the ground.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Washington, Middle East, and United Nations

14. Assessing the Asia Pivot

Author:
Walter Lohman
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
In the course of two months in the fall of 2011, the President and his administration—particularly the Secretary of State—conducted a political and diplomatic offensive to prove American staying power in Asia. It marked a 180-degree turn from where the White House had begun three years earlier. The fall offensive began with the long-awaited passage of the Korea-U.S. FTA (KORUS), an agreement of major economic importance. After years of accumulated opportunity costs, in October, the administration finally pushed the agreement forward and arranged for South Korean President Lee Myun-bak to be in Washington for the occasion of its passage. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton framed the new approach in her November “America's Pacific Century” speech, wherein she declared the Administration's “Asia Pivot.”1 President Obama gave the approach authority and economic substance at APEC, where the U.S. secured a game-changing commitment from Japan to join the Transpacific Partnership trade pact (TPP). The President then embarked on his third visit to the Asia Pacific. In Australia, he announced new training rotations of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines through Australia's northern shore, a move with obvious implications for the security of our allies and sea lanes, and in Indonesia, he became the first American president to participate in the East Asian Summit (EAS). At the EAS meeting of 18 regional leaders, President Obama raised the importance of maritime security and freedom of navigation and “expressed strong opposition to the threat or use of force by any party to advance its territorial or maritime claims or interfere in legitimate economic activity”—thereby tying American interests to regional concerns about China. For her part, Secretary Clinton headed to Manila to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)—and then on to America's other treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand. In Manila Bay, she signed a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Philippines MDT on the deck of a U.S. Navy destroyer and essentially declared America ready to “fight” for the Philippines. She also announced the dispatch to Manila of the second (of what will likely be four) refurbished coast guard cutters. En route to Indonesia, President Obama phoned long-suffering Burmese human rights icon Aung San Suu Kyi to get her blessing for a Burma visit from Secretary Clinton. Clinton arrived in Burma by the end of November, meeting Suu Kyi and the Burmese president and beginning a careful, “action for action” process of normalization that could have major implications for the U.S. strategic position in the region. The Chinese have long taken advantage of Burma's isolation from the U.S. If Burmese political reform proves to be real, it will offer an opportunity for the U.S. to reassert itself there. It will also remove a roadblock in America's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which it has long disagreed on Burma. A democratic Burma would tip the scales in ASEAN—a hodgepodge of governing systems—in favor of democracy, a state of play that improves the sustainability of American engagement.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Japan, America, Washington, Asia, Australia, and Korea

15. Rethinking the Development of Legitimate Party Opposition in the United States, 1793–1828

Author:
Jeffrey S. Selinger
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Writing in 1813 to his old friend and political adversary Thomas Jefferson, John Adams vividly described the scene in Philadelphia when the French Revolutionary Wars broke out: “You certainly never felt the Terrorism excited by Genêt, in 1793, when ten thousand People in the Streets of Philadelphia, day after day threatened to drag Washington out of his House, and effect a Revolution in the Government, or compell it to declare War in favour of the French Revolution and against England.”1 Adams andWashington had witnessed firsthand this “terrorism” incited by Edmond Genêt, Foreign Minister from France, and it powerfully influenced their appraisal of the risks political parties and other extra-constitutional amalgamations posed to the young Republic. Just a few years after the Genêt Affair, President George Washington issued his often-quoted Farewell Address, in which he admonished the American people to avoid foreign entanglements and be wary of the “baneful effects of the spirit of party.”2 These two recommendations went hand-in-hand: political parties, in Washingtonʼs view, would only continue to polarize a polity divided by foreign war.3 The first President was particularly suspicious of the Jeffersonian Republican Party, which he believed had encouraged Francophile partisans to take up arms in support of the French revolutionary struggle against Britain and other powers.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Washington, France, and England

16. Cyberspace Governance: The Next Step

Author:
Adam Segal
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
After years of dismissing the utility of international negotiations on cyberspace, U.S. officials now say that they will participate in talks to develop rules for the virtual world. But which norms should be pursued first and through which venues? As a start, the United States should issue two “cyber declaratory statements,” one about the thresholds of attacks that constitute an act of war and a second that promotes “digital safe havens”—civilian targets that the United States will consider off-limits when it conducts offensive operations. These substantive statements should emerge from a process of informal multilateralism rather than formal negotiations. Washington should engage allies and close partners such as India first and then reach out to other powers such as China and Russia with the goal that they also issue similar statements. Washington should also reach out to the private corporations that operate the Internet and nongovernmental organizations responsible for its maintenance and security.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, International Cooperation, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Washington

17. NATO's New Strategic Concept A Comprehensive Assessment

Author:
Jens Ringsmose(ed.) and Sten Rynning(ed.)
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
On 19 November 2010 NATO formally agreed to adopt a New Strategic Concept. After a long, tightly scheduled and generally speaking fairly transparent process the NATO family endorsed an updated understanding of what the core purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is at the Lisbon Summit. NATO's basic text – the Washington Treaty of 1949 – was, as it were, once again re-interpreted within a specific geopolitical context to fit an ever-changing strategic landscape. Or, put differently, with the adoption of the New Strategic Concept NATO sought to bring its basic interests and strategic thinking into line with the security environment as it has evolved since 1999 when the Alliance adopted its last Strategic Concept. Launched to great fanfare and amidst many high expectations this key text entitled 'Active Engagement, Modern Defence' is projected to confer a new strategic direction on NATO and to inform the world about why the Atlantic Alliance is still vital and vigorous.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Washington

18. US-Southeast Asia Relations: Dismay at Thai-Cambodian Skirmishes

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Both the US and ASEAN expressed dismay at border skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia around the Preah Vihear temple and two other ancient temples about 160 km to the west. Artillery exchanges and small arms fire call into question the two countries' commitment to the ASEAN rule of the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. Washington has promised to aid Philippine maritime capabilities to patrol both its South China and Sulu Seas' territorial waters as part of a larger US goal of keeping Asian sea lanes open. New ships and radar installations as well as navy and coast guard training are being provided by the US. In Indonesia, the US embassy inaugurated a new public diplomacy program, @america, an interactive information technology site designed to demonstrate the breadth of American life to Indonesia's tech-savvy young people. Wikileaks releases of US embassy cables published in the Australian press critical of President Yudhoyono caused some tension between Jakarta and Washington. As the current ASEAN chair, Indonesia seemed to follow Secretary of State Clinton's call for an ASEAN role in resolving the South China Sea islands dispute. US relations with Vietnam and Cambodia continue to be strained over human rights concerns. While ASEAN has called for the lifting of economic sanctions on Burma since its recent national election and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, Washington seems in no hurry to follow suit, labeling the election as fatally flawed and noting that political prisoners remain in jail. Finally, the US promised high-level participation in ASEAN-led regional organizations, including the ARF, the ADMM+, APEC, and the EAS.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and South China

19. The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda: Lessons in Post-September 11 Transnational Terrorism

Author:
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Al Qaeda rose and fell between 1989 and 2011. Ten years after it conducted its most lethal operation in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, it had mutated into a movement that no longer resembled what it started as. From a hierarchical and centralised group, led by the bicephalous leadership of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Dhawahiri, it had become a regionalised and decentralised organisation with several competing leaders following the death of Bin Laden in May 2011.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
New York and Washington

20. The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention

Author:
Benjamin A. Valentino
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As forces fighting Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi consolidated control of Tripoli in the last days of August 2011, many pundits began speaking of a victory not just for the rebels but also for the idea of humanitarian intervention. In Libya, advocates of intervention argued, U.S. President Barack Obama had found the formula for success: broad regional and international support, genuine burden sharing with allies, and a capable local fighting force to wage the war on the ground. Some even heralded the intervention as a sign of an emerging Obama doctrine. It is clearly too soon for this kind of triumphalism, since the final balance of the Libyan intervention has yet to be tallied. The country could still fall into civil war, and the new Libyan government could turn out to be little better than the last. As of this writing, troubling signs of infighting among the rebel ranks had begun to emerge, along with credible reports of serious human rights abuses by rebel forces. Yet even if the intervention does ultimately give birth to a stable and prosperous democracy, this outcome will not prove that intervention was the right choice in Libya or that similar interventions should be attempted elsewhere. To establish that requires comparing the full costs of intervention with its benefits and asking whether those benefits could be achieved at a lower cost. The evidence from the last two decades is not promising on this score. Although humanitarian intervention has undoubtedly saved lives, Americans have seriously underappreciated the moral, political, and economic price involved. This does not mean that the United States should stop trying to promote its values abroad, even when its national security is not at risk. It just needs a different strategy. Washington should replace its focus on military intervention with a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving lives by funding public health programs in the developing world, aiding victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict. Abandoning humanitarian intervention in most cases would not mean leaving victims of genocide and repression to their fate. Indeed, such a strategy could actually save far more people, at a far lower price.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
America, Washington, and Libya