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11. THREE LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE

Author:
Melissa Willard-Foster
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
It took only minutes for the Trump Administration to support Venezuela’s opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, when he challenged the nation’s incumbent president, Nicolás Maduro, for power last week. Trump may have promised to “stop racing to topple foreign regimes,” but his choice to back Guaidó isn’t surprising. In fact, just about every American president since FDR has attempted foreign-imposed regime change, or FIRC, in one form or another. This history offers some lessons that shed light on the crisis unfolding in Venezuela.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Iraq, South America, Venezuela, Panama, and United States of America

12. The Culture of Political Instability and the Rapprochement of South America and United States

Author:
Henrique Carlos de Oliveira De Castro
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The article deals with the recent foreign policy of the Andean countries, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, considering the relationship with the United States and the situation of political crises in these countries. We discuss the national context of each country and the consequences for external relations and international politics of each and of the region. We address United States interests in the effects of the current crisis in the three countries and highlight the importance of political culture for understanding reality.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
United States, South America, Venezuela, North America, Ecuador, and Bolivia

13. Amérique latine Political Outlook 2013

Author:
Olivier Dabène, Gaspard Estrada, Damien Larrouqué, Nordin Lazreg, Delphine Lecombe, Frédéric Louault, Antoine Maillet, Frédéric Massé, Kevin Parthenay, Eduardo Rios, Darío Rodriguez, and Constantino Urcuyo-Fournier
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Amérique latine - L’Année politique is a publication by CERI-Sciences Po’s Political Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean (OPALC). The study extends the work presented on the Observatory’s website (www.sciencespo.fr/opalc) by offering tools for understanding a continent that is in the grip of deep transformations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Foreign Exchange, History, Reform, Transitional Justice, Political Prisoners, and Memory
Political Geography:
China, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, South America, Uruguay, Latin America, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile, and Guatemala

14. Reflections on Brazil's Global Rise

Author:
Celso Amorim
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Americas Quarterly
Institution:
Council of the Americas
Abstract:
The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
Topic:
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Brazil, and Venezuela

15. One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize

Author:
Matias Spektor
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Americas Quarterly
Institution:
Council of the Americas
Abstract:
Read any Brazilian foreign policy college textbook and you will be surprised. Global order since 1945 is not described as open, inclusive or rooted in multilateralism. Instead, you learn that big powers impose their will on the weak through force and rules that are strict and often arbitrary. In this world view, international institutions bend over backwards to please their most powerful masters. International law, when it is used by the strong, is less about binding great powers and self-restraint than about strong players controlling weaker ones. After finishing the book, you couldn't be blamed for believing that the liberal international order has never established the just, level playing field for world politics that its supporters claim. This intellectual approach is responsible for the ambiguity at the heart of Brazilian strategic thinking. On one hand, Brazil has benefited enormously from existing patterns of global order. It was transformed from a modest rural economy in the 1940s into an industrial powerhouse less than 50 years later, thanks to the twin forces of capitalism and an alliance system that kept it safe. On the other hand, the world has been a nasty place for Brazil. Today, it is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Millions still live in poverty and violence abounds. In 2009, there were more violent civilian deaths in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone than in the whole of Iraq. No doubt a fair share of the blame belongs to successive generations of Brazilian politicians and policymakers. But some of it is a function of the many inequities and distortions that recur when you are on the “periphery” of a very unequal international system. The result is a view of global order that vastly differs from perceptions held by the United States. Take, for instance, Brazilian perceptions of “international threats.” Polls show that the average Brazilian worries little about terrorism, radical Islam or a major international war. Instead, the primary fears concern climate change, poverty and infectious disease. Many Brazilians, in fact, fear the U.S., focusing in particular on the perceived threat it poses to the natural riches of the Amazon and the newfound oil fields under the Brazilian seabed. Perceptions matter enormously. It is no wonder that the Brazilian military spends a chunk of its time studying how Vietnamese guerrillas won a war against far superior forces in jungle battlefields. Nor should it be a surprise that Brazil is now investing heavily in the development of nuclear-propulsion submarines that its admirals think will facilitate the nation's ability to defend oil wells in open waters. But Brazil is nowhere near being a revolutionary state. While its leaders believe that a major transition of global power is currently underway, they want to be seen as smooth operators when new rules to the game emerge. Their designs are moderate because they have a stake in preserving the principles that underwrite Brazil's emergence as a major world player. They will not seek to radically overturn existing norms and practices but to adapt them to suit their own interests instead. Could Brazilian intentions change over time? No doubt. Notions of what constitutes the national interest will transform as the country rises. Brazil's international ambitions are likely to expand—no matter who runs the country. Three factors will shape the way national goals will evolve in the next few years: the relationship with the U.S., Brasilia's strategies for dealing with the rest of South America, and Brazil's ideas about how to produce global order. When it Comes to the U.S., Lie Low Brazilian officials are used to repeating that to be on the U.S. “radar screen” is not good. In their eyes, being the source of American attention poses two possible threats. It either raises expectations in Washington that Brazil will work as a “responsible stakeholder” according to some arbitrary criteria of what “responsible” means, or it turns Brazil into a target of U.S. pressure when interests don't coincide. As a result, there is a consensus among Brazilians that a policy of “ducking”—hiding your head underwater when the hegemonic eagle is around—has served them well. Whether this judgment is correct or not is for historians to explore. But the utility of a policy based on such a consensus is declining fast. You cannot flex your diplomatic muscle abroad and hope to go unnoticed. Furthermore, being a “rising state” is never a mere function of concrete things, such as a growing economy, skilled armies, mighty industries, a booming middle class, or a functional state that is effective in tax collection and the provision of public goods. The perception of other states matters just as much. And nobody's perception matters more than that of the most powerful state of all: the United States. Brazil's current rise is therefore deeply intertwined with the perception in Washington that Brazil is moving upwards in global hierarchies. Securing the acceptance or the implicit support of the U.S. while maintaining some distance will always be a fragile position to maintain. But as Brazil grows more powerful, it will be difficult to accomplish its global objectives without the complicity—and the tacit acceptance—of the United States. For Brazil this means that the “off the radar” option will become increasingly difficult. Not the Natural Regional Leader Brazil accounts for over 50 percent of South America's wealth, people and territory. If power were a product of relative material capabilities alone, Brazil would be more powerful in its own region than China, India, Turkey or South Africa are in theirs. But Brazil is not your typical regional power. It has sponsored layers of formal institutions and regional norms, but its leaders recoil at the thought of pooling sovereignty into supranational bodies. Yes, Brazil has modernized South American politics by promoting norms to protect democracy and to establish a regional zone of peace, but its efforts at promoting a regional sense of shared purposes have been mixed and, some say, halfhearted at best. Brazilian public opinion and private-sector business increasingly doubt the benefits of deep regional integration with neighbors, and plans for a South American Free Trade Zone have gone asunder. And yes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1998 to 2007, Brazil spent far more on its armed forces than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela combined. Yet, Brazil's ability to project military power abroad remains minimal. The end result is that many challenge the notion that Brazil is a regional leader. From the perspective of smaller neighboring countries, it remains a country that is too hard to follow sometimes. If you are sitting on its borders, as 10 South American nations do, you find it difficult to jump on its bandwagon. This is problematic for Brazil. As a major and growing regional creditor, investor, consumer, and exporter, its own economic fate is interconnected with that of its neighbors. Crises abroad impact its banks and companies at home as never before. Populism, ethnic nationalism, narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, deforestation, unlawful pasturing, economic decay, and political upheaval in neighbors will deeply harm Brazilian interests. Whether, when and how Brazil will develop the policy instruments to shape a regional order beneficial to itself remains to be seen. But curiously enough, Brazilian leaders do not normally think their interests in South America might converge with those of the United States. On the contrary, Brazil in the twenty-first century has geared its regional policies to deflect, hedge, bind, and restrain U.S. power in South America to the extent that it can. This is not to say that Brazil is a stubborn challenger of U.S. interests in the region. That would be silly for a country whose success depends on the perception of economic gain and regional stability. But it means that future generations of Brazilians might discover that if they want to unlock some of the most pressing problems in the region, perhaps they will have to reconsider their attitude towards the United States...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Law, and Islam
Political Geography:
United States, America, Washington, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, South America, Venezuela, and Chile

16. Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran

Author:
Michael Dodson and Manochehr Dorraj
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
The remarkable ascendance of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, has generated new interest in Latin America's recurrent populism. Like the charismatic populists that preceded him, Chávez rose to power rapidly and became a symbol of deepening social polarization. He is seen as a pivotal figure in promoting a sharp leftward shift in Latin American politics and has been criticized for his authoritarian tendencies. In the words of Jorge Castañeda, “Chavismo” is the “wrong left” for Latin America. Hugo Chávez has become a much discussed leader for all these reasons, but he is perhaps most notorious for his aggressive foreign policy and for the strongly confrontational posture he has adopted toward the United States. Chávez has pursued high profile efforts to check US influence in Latin America, assert his own leadership in the region, and demonstrate that developing countries can act more independently of Washington's wishes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Washington, Latin America, and Venezuela

17. Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

Author:
Max G. Manwaring
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Since his election as President of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to encourage his Venezuelan and other Latin American followers to pursue a confrontational “defensive,” populist, and nationalistic agenda that will supposedly liberate Latin America from the economic dependency and the political imperialism of the North American “Colossus” (the United States). Chavez argues that liberation, New Socialism, and Bolivarianismo (the dream of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. hegemony) will only be achieved by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state to that of “direct” (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony thoughout all of Latin America by (3) conducting an irregular and asymmetric “Super Insurgency,” or “Fourth-Generation Warfare” to depose the illegitimate external enemy; and, 4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning with Venezuela and extending to the whole of Latin America.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, Venezuela, and North America

18. Energy Security: Meeting the Growing Challenge of National Oil Companies

Author:
Matthew E. Chen and Amy Myers Jaffe
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Last February, Hugo Chavez decreed a staged nationalization in a drive to take over large segments of the Venezuelan economy as part of his revolutionary vision for the country. Specifically, the Chavez government set its sights on the oil industry, giving notice to foreign oil companies—including US firms—that they had until June 26 to reduce their ownership in Venezuelan Orinoco Belt heavy oil field projects so that the state could take at least a 60 percent share. This year alone, the Venezuelan government has already formed the Venezuelan Electricity Corporation, comprised of all state electricity utilities, to ensure state control of the electricity sector. It has also initiated the takeover of CANTV, the country’s biggest telecommunications operator. Chavez also has threatened to nationalize Venezuela’s banking sector unless banks “give priority to financing [the country’s] industrial sectors.”1 Commenting on his drive for “21st century socialism,” the president said that “I’m not deceiving anyone. I’m only governing the country, and the country has elected me various times. ...All of those who voted for me backed socialism, and that is where we are heading.”2 Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez threatened in early May that US oil giant ConocoPhillips would be kicked out of Venezuela altogether if it tried to drive a hard bargain for turning over shares in its fields in the Orinoco Belt. The official US reaction has been muted. On May 1, 2007, US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Venezuela’s negotiations with oil companies “will proceed as they will,” but that Chavez’s broader actions, including withdrawing from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, were “digging a hole for the Venezuelan people.”3 The US has a long tradition of circumspect responses to the moves of national oil companies. The US has responded tepidly to many moves since the 1930s when Mexico nationalized the oil field holdings of US oil companies. In the case of Mexico, the US had other foreign policy priorities at the time of these nationalizations, first the fight against Nazism and then the struggle to keep communism out of the hemisphere. Thus, despite lodging diplomatic protests and rebuking Mexico with mild economic penalties, the US did not allow the incident to damage bilateral relations in the face of greater strategic challenges.4 Similarly, the US government did not interfere with Venezuela’s 1976 nationalization, for which the international oil companies received compensation.5 The United States was even passive as recently as the 1980s, when Saudi Arabia implemented the gradual nationalization of the American oil company stakes in the Aramco Oil concession. US-Saudi relations were relatively strong in the 1980s and into the 1990s, and the US government made no objections whatsoever to Saudi Arabia’s nationalization of Aramco’s oil assets.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Nationalization, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
South America and Venezuela

19. La lucha por el futuro: El veneno del populismo y la cura de la democracia

Author:
Robert F. Noriega
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Mientras que la atención del mundo está centrada en la lucha contra Irak y el ascenso de China, se está librando una batalla por el alma de las Américas más cerca de nuestro país. En términos simplistas, esta confrontación podría describirse como una lucha de poder entre la visión del presidente de Estados Unidos, George W. Bush, y la visión de quien se autoproclamó su némesis, el presidente venezolano Hugo Chávez. Igualmente engañosas son las caracterizaciones que describen esta situación como un enfrentamiento entre la izquierda y la derecha, los ricos y los pobres, el norte y el sur. Pero ésta no es una batalla entre dos líderes poderosos o entre las ideologías de la izquierda y la derecha. La lucha que se está librando en el hemisferio occidental concierne a la democracia en sí: ¿puede satisfacer a un público impaciente? Por un lado, están los líderes de la izquierda y la derecha que consideran que las instituciones democráticas y el Estado de Derecho son indispensables para la prosperidad y la libertad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, and Hugo Chavez
Political Geography:
Latin America and Venezuela

20. U.S. Policy in the Andean Region

Author:
Michael Shifter
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Even within Latin America's generally gloomy economic and political outlook, the countries of the Andean region—Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia—stand out as especially problematic and unsettled. For the United States, this set of countries, with some 120 million citizens, poses enormous policy challenges. Fostering democracy, expanding trade, combating drugs, promoting stability, and advancing social development are just some of the challenges germane to this region which, in the context of globalization, post-September 11, become even more compelling.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Colombia, South America, Latin America, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia