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81. The Importance of WTO Reform from a Transatlantic Perspective

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Trade is at the forefront of international tensions in 2019. Political developments in the United States and Europe, and the rise of China as a peer competitor to the transatlantic economies, have led many to question the fundamental assumptions and operations supporting the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chinese mercantilism, the Trump administration’s aggressive use of unilateral tariff measures, and the inability of WTO members to reach consensus on expanding its disciplines to important new sectors and forms of commerce in the modern economy reinforce the critique of the WTO. Expansion in global trade, one of the great engines of growth and progress in bringing billions of people out of poverty since 1945, has slowed considerably in the last two decades. In 2018, however, several constructive efforts to craft reforms for this successor institution of the Bretton Woods system are engendering some hope that the WTO can be adapted to meet the needs of the contemporary economy. The first basket of problems revolves around a lack of WTO disciplines for newer sectors like services, including those associated with the emerging digital economy; for state-owned enterprises; for intellectual property protection; and for cross-border investments. The other main issues concern the sometimes ineffective and bounded operations of the WTO itself. Questions have been raised, notably by the United States, over the slow and inconsistent enforcement of existing WTO rules, and over rulings by judges in the Appellate Body which overstep the limits of existing WTO rules, undertake interpretations of domestic laws, and reinterpret facts established by earlier dispute panel decisions. This is the biggest issue now dividing U.S. and EU thinking on the reform of the WTO. The EU, Canada, Japan, the United States and other members have begun offering concrete proposals for addressing these problems, and the G20 political leaders gave a strong endorsement to their efforts in the December 2018 communique of the Buenos Aires summit. Ideas for new rules are being tested in sub-global trade agreements like the new North American and Trans-Pacific pacts and EU free trade agreements with Canada and Japan. Incorporation of new rules into the global WTO is extremely difficult; full consensus among its 164 members is required for the adoption of any new disciplines or internal operations. To overcome that impediment, this paper suggests that plurilateral agreements, like the Information Technology Agreement of 1997, be employed to establish and test new rules needed for the 21st-century economy. Some use of supermajority decision making instead of the consensus rule may also help advance the creation of new rules and redress weaknesses in WTO operations. The role of transatlantic leadership, finally, is emphasized as a key to building broad political support needed to achieve substantive reform.
Topic:
International Relations, World Trade Organization, Reform, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

82. The Future of the European Union: Scenarios for the Start of the New Legislature

Author:
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
A few months after the European Parliament elections, and a few weeks before a new European Commission is fully operational, the European Union is facing old and new challenges, both domestic and international. Internally, the EU will soon be testing these new institutions. In the recently elected European Parliament, nationalist and Eurosceptic political forces are a minority, but pro-European mainstream parties, which have the numbers to control the proceedings of the Parliament, have not been able to consolidate a stable and comfortable majority. The new European Commission has encountered setbacks in the confirmation procedure of three of its members and will therefore fully assume its responsibilities with some delay on 1 December.
Topic:
Government, Nationalism, Politics, Elections, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and European Union

83. A Long-Term Perspective on NATO and the Multinational Order

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The evolving external threat environment is impacting the internal political dynamics of NATO nations and is accentuating a series of already existing trends – differences in threat perceptions, burden-sharing difficulties, challenges to respond to sub-threshold threats and the rise of populism – which altogether affect the cohesiveness and potentially the effectiveness of NATO as a political and military alliance. NATO’s operational future over the next decades will be shaped by the ingenuity of the transatlantic leadership in developing new arrangements of institutional cooperation between the Alliance and the burgeoning forms of the “coalition of the willing”. The Alliance should nonetheless remain the main transatlantic political forum, given Brexit as well as the rising need for a common political response to the many challenges ranging from migration to failed states. NATO has been relatively successful in adapting to the changing security environment. Its military capabilities remain unparalleled and unrivalled. The more interesting question is however the political one. Namely how the politics of sustaining this Alliance are being shaped by the underlying dynamics that are transforming the global political, economic and military context. The paper is divided in three chapters.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and European Union

84. The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Erik Brattberg and Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific are of paramount importance for the future of the rules-based international order. While the United States is redirecting strategic focus to the region as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe is also stepping up its role—leveraging a strong economic profile, long-standing bilateral ties, and active engagement in various regional multilateral forums. The European Union (EU) and its member states can make distinct contributions to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, though not necessarily always in lockstep with Washington. Though few European countries have formally acknowledged the new U.S. strategy, the concept’s emphasis on rules-based order and multilateralism bears many similarities to the EU’s own outlook. The EU and many of its member states are becoming more ambivalent about Chinese power and are seeking to counter certain problematic Chinese economic behaviors, and the Indo-Pacific offers opportunities for transatlantic cooperation, though U.S.-EU diplomatic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump are significantly strained. However, the U.S. administration’s fixation on short-term transactional diplomacy, lack of commitment to multilateralism, and strong emphasis on Chinese containment are putting a damper on such collaboration with EU members. Admittedly, Europe does not aspire to be a traditional hard power in Asia, lacks significant military capabilities in the region, and is reluctant to pick sides in the escalating U.S.-China competition. Only two European middle powers—France and the United Kingdom (UK)—can project serious military force in the region, as Europe has long underinvested in defense spending and needs to prioritize more immediate security threats. But Europe can amplify its political and security role in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the growing Franco-British presence and better utilizing the EU’s collective role. Key European countries have already expanded their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a more regular naval presence, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, arms sales, and various other forms of defense cooperation. Europe’s economic role is already considerable too, as the EU is a top trade and investment partner of most regional states. Washington should welcome greater European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. A greater European presence in the region advances the U.S. objective of promoting a tighter regional security architecture with vital partners like Japan and India. Similarly, the EU’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can help foster a more multilateral, cooperative Asian security architecture. As for economic and trade policy, U.S. and EU interests in the region largely overlap but do diverge in significant ways. While both Europe and the United States are keen on increasing trade flows and addressing unfair Chinese economic practices, the EU’s emphasis on free trade has allowed it to either complete trade agreements or launch new negotiations with regional partners like Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Despite the limitations constraining the transatlantic diplomatic agenda, meaningful joint and/or complementary European and U.S. action in the Indo-Pacific remains achievable, particularly between France, the UK, and the United States, though other European countries and the EU could get involved too. While the EU is not likely to formally endorse the U.S. slogan of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Europeans can still meaningfully advance its objectives, which are overwhelmingly consistent with the EU’s own interests and values. Washington should encourage this trend and simultaneously seek to do more to incorporate European players as key partners on the implementation of its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

85. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:
European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

86. Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East

Author:
Marc Lynch and Amaney Jamal
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
What is the current structure of international relations, and how does this shape the politics of the Middle East? For decades, the answer was clear: international structure was unipolar, and American predominance shaped the alliance choices of both its allies and its adversaries. In recent years, this clarity has been overtaken by confusion. American primacy has perhaps declined, or at least shifted in its application, but no rival power has yet risen to take its place. How has this perceived change in global structure affected regional politics in the Middle East? In October 2018, POMEPS, Princeton University’s Bobst Center, and the American University of Beirut brought together nearly two dozen scholars from the United States, Europe and the Middle East at AUB to discuss the impact of shifting global structure on regional dynamics. This collection features sixteen essays ranging across diverse perspectives on the evolving relationship between the global and the regional. Taken together, they offer a fascinating window into the relationship between the global and the regional, and the implications for contemporary regional politics.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Poverty, Power Politics, European Union, Partnerships, Inequality, Brexit, Arab Spring, Alliance, Conflict, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

87. After the West? A Positive Transatlantic Agenda in a Post-Atlantic Age

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The golden age of transatlantic relations is behind us. It is tempting to reduce the reasons for this change down to the personalities of the leaders involved, and particularly to the peculiarities of U.S. President Donald Trump, but such an approach would ignore the deeper trends that have been affecting both the European and American sides for years. The relationship between the United States and Europe does not have the centrality it once had for policymakers on either side, and matters ever less to their publics. Part of the reason for the diminution of the relationship’s importance should be cause for celebration: the main strategic adversary that justified America’s deep commitment to the European continent—the Soviet Union (USSR)—has collapsed. Despite divisions and setbacks, most of Europe is reunited and the past two decades have seen a tremendous expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to new members. The Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas have given new impetus to NATO and underscored the willingness of allies to stand together. Setbacks in the rule of law in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and divisions over the management of the Eurozone and the refugee crisis, should not obscure the tremendous success the last three decades have seen for the transatlantic alliance and European unity. Yet there is much that is sobering in the current diminution of ties and cooperation. Other challenges and threats have emerged to demand attention: terrorism, instability in the Middle East, and the rise of China all present new challenges. The financial crisis and failed foreign interventions have fueled skepticism over the role of the United States on the international stage. Internal divisions in Europe and the euro crises have turned European attention inward even as the past two American presidents have pressed Europeans to do more externally and spend more on their own security. Leaders on both sides have pursued different priorities, occasionally differing in their worldviews. The American withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) on May 8th has sparked yet another “crisis of transatlantic relations,” but focusing on specific decisions obscures the deeper trends. Successive American presidents have paid but lip service to their European allies in making decisions beyond the transatlantic sphere and examples of potential cooperation on crises such as Libya or Syria have ended in failure.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

88. “Pax Americana”: the United States and the transformation of the 20th century’s global order

Author:
Patrick O. Cohrs
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
This article seeks to re-appraise the transformation of America’s international role and its influence on the transformation of the 20th century’s global order. It focuses on a re-appraisal of US aspirations to construct a “Pax Americana” and their impact on an unprecedented peace system that was first conceptualised after 1918 but only consolidated after 1945: the cold war’s transatlantic peace order. Yet my analysis also highlights important distinctions between American conceptions and behaviour vis-à-vis Europe and the superpower’s more hierarchical and often neo-imperialist approaches to “global order” and other regions during the cold war, including East Asia and Latin America.
Topic:
Cold War, History, Peace, Transatlantic Relations, International Order, and Pax Americana
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

89. Europe and Iran: The Economic and Commercial Dimensions of a Strained Relationship

Author:
Cornelius Adebahr
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Europe and Iran had begun to invest in a closer commercial relationship just when the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018. Since then, Washington has re-imposed its stringent economic sanctions, targeting Iran’s oil exports as a major source of government revenue but also banning financial transactions with the country. This poses an enormous challenge for the EU, which had intended to use the 2015 agreement as a stepping stone to promote regional cooperation and, ultimately, a more comprehensive relationship with Iran. Paper produced in the framework of the IAI-FEPS project entitled “Europe and Iran in a fast-changing Middle East: Confidence-building measures, security dialogue and regional cooperation”, December 2018.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and European Union

90. Russia as Spoiler: Projecting Division in Transatlantic Societies

Author:
Brittany Beaulieu and Steven Keil
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The Kremlin’s political and military aggressions over recent years have put Putin’s rejection of the international liberal order and post-Cold War balance of power on full display. Increasingly paranoid about regime survival — which it directly links to its waning influence in the post-Soviet space — Russia has gone on the offensive to undermine the democratic institutions and societies that underpin the system it sees incongruent with hits own interests. Russia’s incursions in Georgia and Ukraine are one particularly violent manifestation of this reality, while its influence operations and meddling in various democratic societies across Europe and the Americas indicate just how far Moscow is going to undermine the current international system and disrupt transatlantic cohesion. Given this, it is critical for both Europe and the United States to examine the various drivers of Russian foreign policy, as well as the unconventional toolkit that Russia is relying upon to understand how best to combat the Kremlin’s efforts. As such, this paper looks at Russia’s influence operations and activities in 2016 and 2017 to demonstrate just how the Putin regime and its operatives are advancing anti-democratic efforts. Then, the paper turns to a three-country case study analysis of Sweden, Latvia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, specifically looking at efforts to influence various issues that will likely be in-play during the elections each of these countries will face later this year. Fitting with the Kremlin’s operationally opportunist approach, each of these countries has a distinct context and set of issues that the Russia continuously exploits. Whether the Kremlin will choose to turn up the volume on these issues and realities prior or during the election remains to be seen. However, understanding and countering these vulnerabilities is a first step in creating resilience that can weather Moscow’s efforts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and International System
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America