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771. Does the “Surge” Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?

Author:
Jon R. Lindsay
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Sen. John McCain has long advocated “sustained and substantial” troop increases,1 attacking Sen. Barack Obama’s position on drawing down forces. Obama for his part recently stated that the surge has “succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated” and “beyond our wildest dreams.”2 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi- National Corps Iraq during the surge, told a Heritage Foundation audience in March 2008, “I think it’s safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces—and how we employed those forces—have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.”3 While the surge was quite controversial in its inception,4 it now seems that “success has a thou- sand fathers.” Indeed, since the deployment starting in January 2007 of an additional 30,000 troops (five addi- tional Army brigades primarily in and around Baghdad and 4,000 Marines in Anbar Province, rising to a high-water mark of 171,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by October 2007), the drop in vio- lence has been remarkable. From December 2006 to August 2008, monthly insurgent-initiated attacks have dropped from over 5,600 to 800, U.S. troop fatalities from 112 to 23, and Iraqi civilian fatalities from 3,500 to 500. Even though we’re hardly out of the woods, the troop surge is clearly correlated with a major decrease in violence.5 Correlation, of course, is not causation. Lt. Gen. Odierno is right to highlight the employment of surge forces in addition to the increase in their numbers. The renewed focus on providing security to the Iraqi population—by pushing troops out of sprawling Forward Operating Bases and proactively controlling movement within major cities—has truly been a change for the bet- ter. Nevertheless, there are factors above and beyond additional troops and better counter-insur- gency tactics that may account for the drop in violence. These include the Sunni Awakening movements that emerged in Anbar province prior to the surge, the tragic efficacy of sectarian killing in 2006, the Shia Mahdi Army cease-fire announced and renewed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and operations by other U.S. organizations not associated with the surge.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

772. The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry

Author:
Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

773. The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia

Author:
Brian Carlson
Publication Date:
05-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
U.S. foreign policy has recently suffered setbacks in Central Asia, where its role had expanded dramatically following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Recent events appear to indicate growing Sino-Russian cooperation to limit U.S. influence in the region. Although Russia and China have grown closer together in recent years based on convergent strategic views, a number of factors will limit their strategic partnership at the global level. Likewise, their interests in Central Asia mix elements of cooperation with competition, reducing the likelihood of a Sino-Russian condominium in the region. Prudent U.S. foreign policy can prevent anti-American, Sino-Russian power balancing in Central Asia. In order to achieve its goal of a stable, independent Central Asia, the United States should seek to promote a regional concert with Russia, China, and the Central Asian states. If this is not fully achievable, the United States should promote maximum cooperation to address shared interests on issues of security and economic development.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Economic Development, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Asia, and United States of America

774. Iran’s Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
COLIN DUECK and RAY TAKEYH describe the political, ideological and security motivations behind Iran’s nuclear program and examine various strategic alternatives available to the United States. They conclude that the United States should pursue comprehensive, direct negotiations with Tehran on the nuclear issue, within an overarching framework of containment.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Negotiation, and Containment
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

775. Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?

Author:
Veronique de Rugy
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The most terrifying security threat to security experts and the public alike is nuclear proliferation. Once the figment of Hollywood imagination, the ultimate nightmare scenario that is dis- cussed by some as inevitable is the detonation of a nuclear device on American soil. The majority of experts believe that the most likely way weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would enter the United States is by sea, hence a focus on port security.1 Ports offer terrorists vast opportunities to inflict damages. As the primary mode of transpor- tation for world trade goods, maritime commerce is essential to America’s economic vital- ity.2 Every year approximately nine million cargo containers—26,000 a day—arrive at U.S. ports from all over the world.3 The U.S. maritime system includes more than 361 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than 1,000 harbor channels along thousands of miles of coastline.4 In FY 2007, President Bush requested $2.3 billion for port security out of a $57 billion government-wide budget for homeland security.5 However, the important question is not how much money is spent but rather whether the money is allocated toward the most cost- effective programs. In other words, is America getting the maximum level of protection in exchange for our tax dollars? A close look at port security allocation decisions indicates that spending occurs without regard for risk analysis let alone cost-benefit analysis, leading to a large array of misallocated spending. For instance, what should be the highest priorities—preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear devices and material—receive less money than much less cost-effective policies such as nuclear detection in the ports or post-disaster response activities.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, Trade, and Port
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

776. The U.S. and Iran After the NIE

Author:
Farideh Farhi
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The release of the National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities, intentions, and policies created shock waves as well as sighs of relief in Washington and elsewhere. The assessment that Iran stopped its weapons program in 2003, and that its declared enrichment program cannot be converted as easily or as quickly as assumed for use in a military program, immediately brought into question the notion that Iran’s nuclear program needs to be dealt with immediately and only through coercive mechanisms. Amid a notable amount of “spinning” the NIE’s conclusions, a slew of questions are in play regarding if and how the U.S. should alter its hard-edged policies toward the Islamic Republic. A consensus seems to have developed that the report has taken the military option off the table and made the sanctions process at play in the U.N. Security Council more difficult to pursue effectively. These dynamics gave longstanding proponents of direct and unconditional dialogue with Iran new opportunity to re-state their case.1 Calls for such negotiations also came from surprising new corners. In the words of Robert Kagan, co-founder of the hawkish Project for the New American Century, “it is hard to see what other policy options are available. This is the hand that has been dealt. The Bush administration needs to be smart and creative enough to play it well.”2
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

777. Playing the Field: Alleviating US Energy Dependency on the Persian Gulf with Alternative Partners

Author:
Michael Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Energy security is poised to become as contentious an issue in the 21st century as ideology was in the 20th. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for post-Soviet Russia to reclaim its great power status as an energy hegemon that doles out subsidized energy to friendly states and allies, implying that unfriendly states will find themselves short of such supplies in times of crisis. Chinese state-owned oil companies are on a procurement spree worldwide, as Beijing acquires oil and gas from rogue states otherwise ostracized by the world community, buying up stakes in future developments to ensure a long-term flow of energy. President George Bush committed the United States to energy independence (and even self-sufficiency) in his 2006 State of the Union address to Congress when he expressed a desire to make US reliance on Middle Eastern oil “a thing of the past.”1 Despite the president’s optimism, the goal of eliminating America’s dependency on Persian Gulf oil remains far-fetched. Energy independence for the United States will require as-yet undeveloped technologies and resources and, until these goals are realized, the United States must counterbalance current energy consumption trends by boosting supplies from non–Middle East producers. What follows is an assessment of countries outside of the Middle East that will have a direct impact on Washington’s energy security as the United States works to alleviate its Persian Gulf dependency. Some potential secondary producers of oil and gas that are expected to alleviate US dependency are illustrated in case studies on Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Trinidad & Tobago. Many of these energy partners share key aspects of insecurity common to developing states; they are often engaged in two of Charles Tilly’s four characteristic state activities.2 Extraction, primarily conducted through energy rents, allows these regimes to acquire the resources necessary to battle internal rivals. Eliminating internal threats, or state making, is a common preoccupation of developing states. The current international system usually obviates (or precludes) war making against external rivals. Thus, US security assistance to these countries can play a crucial role in supporting the state making process. Support for states that have a limited capacity to deal with internal threats, precisely because they are rentier states in a formative phase, will help the United States and its energy partners achieve their ultimate security goals.3 Development aid and military training in the Caucasus will likely prove beneficial to US interests; security/intelligence cooperation with Trinidad and Tobago will help safeguard energy in the Caribbean against terrorist threats; US policymakers will face tougher challenges in Venezuela and Nigeria, where President Hugo Chavez seems willing to cut off US oil and the resource-rich Niger River Delta region threatens secession.
Topic:
Security, Development, Oil, Energy, Dependency, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

778. Fixing Failing States: The New Security Agenda

Author:
Pauline H. Baker
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Weak and failing states rank among the world’s greatest threats to international peace and security today. While major threats to world peace used to come mainly from ideological, military, or economic competition among competing states, in modern times lethal threats are growing within states from communal tensions among rival factions, extremists groups with radical political agendas, and faltering regimes clinging to power and asserting militaristic ambitions. These are the driving forces of a growing world disorder.1 Recent events highlight this paradigm shift in the strategic environment. North Korea is a failing state with an inward-looking regime and a negative view of the world. Its own insecurities, including its fear of a US invasion, are motivating it to pursue nuclear capabilities that have increased its isolation further and exacerbated tensions.2 Lebanon is a weak state that successfully cast off fifteen years of Syrian military occupation, but was unable to assert its sovereignty and fill the vacuum left behind. Hezbollah used that opportunity to assert itself as a “state within a state,” with dual power bases in the government and in the south, where its autonomous security forces launched a devastating war with Israel in July 2006. Then there is Sudan, a country with the highest risk of internal violence that has stonewalled effective international action to stop the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, described by the US State Department as genocide. 3 Internal weaknesses within these states have increased the threat of nuclear proliferation, precipitated an interstate war, and worsened an ongoing humanitarian crisis, respectively. Though the origins of state weakness go back decades, the curtain was raised on the era of failing states—if one can call it that—by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One year after the biggest terrorist attack on the US in history, the 2002 US National Security Strategy stated that America is threatened more by failing states than it is by conquering states, overturning decades of US national security thinking. Overnight, we went from looking at security through a “big power” lens to seeing it from a “small power” lens. Much of the rest of the world has come to see security challenges from that perspective as well.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Fragile/Failed State, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

779. Combating Proliferation: Addressing the Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Amy M. Seward
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Fifteen years after the initiation of U.S. threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union and some four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more than half of Russia’s vast stockpile of weapons-usable fissile materials remains to be secured, and is thus vulnerable to diversion by terrorists for use in a nuclear device. This paper assesses the state of fissile material security in Russia today, taking as a case study the security of nuclear materials involved in the operations of the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet. Recommendations are made drawing on the successes and shortcomings of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Material Protection Control and Accounting Program at the Fleet’s naval facilities. This analysis leads into a broader examination of the effectiveness and adequacy of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

780. Outsourcing Post-Conflict Operations: Designing a System for Contract Management and Oversight

Author:
Blake W. Mobley
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Over the past ten years the United States has relied on private contractors to support military forces and rehabilitate national infrastructures in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Though contractors are essential to such post-conflict operations, the U.S. government’s management and oversight of outsourced support remains critically deficient. As the United States builds its institutional capacity for long-term post-conflict reconstruction, it will need to outsource tasks to specialized private firms and non-profit organizations more strategically, efficiently, and transparently. This paper assesses the ramifications of post-conflict outsourcing in four sections. The first section provides a brief history of outsourcing in military and reconstruction operations. The second analyzes the benefits of private contracting arrangements. The third considers pitfalls of the current U.S. outsourcing system, which include inefficiencies as well as more serious security threats. The final section concludes with policy recommendations to improve management systems in the context of post-conflict operations.
Topic:
Security, Management, Outsourcing, Military Contractors, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America