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1. "Fool Me Once . . . " Did U.S. Investors Play it Safer in the European Debt Crisis?

Author:
Carol C. Bertaut, Fang Cai, and Nyssa Kim
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper examines U.S. investors' portfolio investment patterns since the global financial crisis, particularly since the European debt crisis that began in late 2009. The global financial crisis during 2007-2009 was accompanied by an increase in U.S. investors' home bias. U.S. investors experienced significant valuation losses and pulled back notably from their foreign investment, especially from foreign debt. In contrast, while they have also incurred sizable losses on cross-border investment during the European debt crisis, U.S. investors so far have not shown any increase in home bias, and they have not even pulled back from their long-term investments in Europe. Holdings data show that U.S. investors have continued to invest in European securities, particularly in government debt, but have made little new investment in the financial sector. This continued interest in European securities could owe to the fact that most of U.S. holdings of European debt have been concentrated in dollar-denominated debt issued by core euro area countries and the United Kingdom, which are deemed relatively safe. Changes in the composition of holdings over the past couple years suggest that U.S. investors have behaved in a way that reflects their diversity and differing objectives: while investors reached for higher yields in government debt, there also appears to be some shift toward safer investment in the financial sector.
Topic:
Debt, Financial Crisis, Investment, Securities, and Stock Markets
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

2. International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007

Author:
Ben S. Bernanke, Carol C. Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco, and Steve Kamin
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
A broad array of domestic institutional factors--including problems with the originate-to-distribute model for mortgage loans, deteriorating lending standards, deficiencies in risk management, conflicting incentives for the GSEs, and shortcomings of supervision and regulation--were the primary sources of the U.S. housing boom and bust and the associated financial crisis. In addition, the extended rise in U.S. house prices was likely also supported by long-term interest rates (including mortgage rates) that were surprisingly low, given the level of short-term rates and other macro fundamentals--a development that Greenspan (2005) dubbed a "conundrum." The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) argues that increased capital inflows to the United States from countries in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment--including Asian emerging markets and commodity exporters--were an important reason that U.S. longer-term interest rates during this period were lower than expected. This essay investigates further the effects of capital inflows to the United States on U.S. longer-term interest rates; however, we look beyond the overall size of the inflows emphasized by the GSG hypothesis to examine the implications for U.S. yields of the portfolio preferences of foreign creditors. We present evidence that, in the spirit of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), foreign investors during this period tended to prefer U.S. assets perceived to be safe. In particular, foreign investors--especially the GSG countries--acquired a substantial share of the new issues of U.S. Treasuries, Agency debt, and Agency-sponsored mortgage-backed securities. The downward pressure on yields exerted by inflows from the GSG countries was reinforced by the portfolio preferences of other foreign investors. We focus particularly on the case of Europe: Although Europe did not run a large current account surplus as did the GSG countries, we show that it leveraged up its international balance sheet, issuing external liabilities to finance substantial purchases of apparently safe U.S. "private-label" mortgage-backed securities and other fixed-income products. The strong demand for apparently safe assets by both domestic and foreign investors not only served to reduce yields on these assets but also provided additional incentives for the U.S. financial services industry to develop structured investment products that "transformed" risky loans into highly-rated securities. Our findings do not challenge the view that domestic factors, including those listed above, were the primary sources of the housing boom and bust in the United States. However, examining how changes in the pattern of international capital flows affected yields on U.S. assets helps provide a deeper understanding of the origins and dynamics of the crisis.
Topic:
Finance, Capital Flows, Securities, and Capital
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis

Author:
Carol C. Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco, Steve Kamin, and Ralph Tryon
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis argues that the surge in capital inflows from emerging market economies to the United States led to significant declines in long-term interest rates in the United States and other industrial economies. In turn, these lower interest rates, when combined with both innovations and deficiencies of the U.S. credit market, are believed to have contributed to the U.S. housing bubble and to the buildup in financial vulnerabilities that led to the financial crisis. Because the GSG countries for the most part restricted their U.S. purchases to Treasuries and Agency debt, their provision of savings to ultimately risky subprime mortgage borrowers was necessarily indirect, pushing down yields on safe assets and increasing the appetite for alternative investments on the part of other investors. We present a more complete picture of how capital flows contributed to the crisis, drawing attention to the sizable inflows from European investors into U.S. private-label asset-backed securities (ABS), including mortgage-backed securities and other structured investment products. By adding to domestic demand for private-label ABS, substantial foreign acquisitions of these securities contributed to the decline in their spreads over Treasury yields. Through a combination of empirical estimation and model simulation, we verify that both GSG inflows into Treasuries and Agencies, as well as European acquisitions of ABS, played a role in contributing to downward pressures on U.S. interest rates.
Topic:
Finance, Interest Rates, Housing, Securities, and Capital
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America