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1. Alignment or Misalignment? US and EU High-Tech Trade and Sanctions Policies toward China

Author:
Antonio Calcara and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
This Policy Brief focuses on the alignment or misalignment of the European Union and the United States on high-technology trade and sanctions vis-à-vis China. The Trump administration is likely to continue the aggressive US stance toward China in the technological realm, putting increasing pressure on its European allies to align with US policy. The Europeans, for their part, are in a difficult position: On the one hand, they are under pressure from the US government; on the other hand, the more Washington restricts Chinese trade, the more Chinese exporters will look to the European market to sell their manufactured goods. Increased competition from Chinese imports in Europe, especially in the automotive sector, could in turn trigger a political backlash that weakens support for transatlantic coordination on China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, European Union, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and European Union

2. ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans

Author:
William Tobin
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment. A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following: Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure. The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests. To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, Venezuela, and United States of America

3. Sanctions have become a tool of first resort. But enforcement needs upgraded and updated resources.

Author:
David Mortlock and Alex Zerden
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Enforcement remains a critical but underresourced element of economic sanctions. The US Congress and the Department of the Treasury should consider updates to its resources, public guidance, and policies to ensure the efficacy of sanctions enforcement as the use of the sanctions policy tool continues to expand. Economic sanctions are often described as the foreign policy tool of first resort. The Department of the Treasury acknowledged this reality in its “2021 Sanctions Review.” Through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Treasury Department administers thirty-eight different, albeit overlapping, economic sanctions programs. With only a few hundred employees, OFAC has a nearly unparalleled national security mandate with oversight of the US economy and many other facets of global economic activities. OFAC develops policies for the use of sanctions, designates sanctions targets like individuals, entities, and jurisdictions, engages with the private sector to promote compliance, and civilly enforces apparent violations by US persons and others. This latter enforcement role represents a critical but often overlooked capability. For instance, the same “2021 Sanctions Review” does not even mention the enforcement function in its assessment. (However, it did seek to ensure that sanctions are “enforceable” in the context of sanctions implementation.) Resource constraints, a lack of attention, and the prioritization of policy crises hamper this enforcement function. In 2023, OFAC only undertook seventeen public enforcement actions, including its largest settlement to date with Binance, a global cryptocurrency exchange. For perspective, the Department of Justice terminated 63,419 civil cases in fiscal year 2022, according to the most recent public data. As the wider interagency continues to rely on sanctions as a critical tool and the United States seeks to expand partner sanctions capacity, US policymakers must fully support the sanctions enforcement function. Strengthening the internal controls for OFAC enforcement improves the rule of law through improved due process and protects OFAC from legal challenges that could existentially undermine its national security mission. OFAC enforcement urgently requires increased budgetary resources and an upskilled workforce from Congress, stronger internal procedures to avoid litigation risks, improved public guidance, and revised enforcement guidelines to promote consistency and improve compliance by industry.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Sanctions, Transparency, and Enforcement
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. How Huawei Weathered the Storm: Resilience, Market Conditions or Failed Sanctions?

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robin Baker
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Huawei is exhibiting stoic resilience in the face of US sanctions, economic downturns, and the slow pace of 5G investments. There is a narrative that the company has been propped up by the Chinese government, but the key to Huawei’s resilience is multifaceted. Through pre-emptive stockpiling and ingenuity, the company has continued to fulfil its base station orders and defend its market shares abroad. Concurrently, Huawei has made an autonomous business decision to reinvest its earnings and intensify R&D to secure its supply chains against political risks and diversify into new business areas. Successful forays into semiconductors, cloud services and energy grids have also been facilitated by a capital structure that lends itself to long-term planning. Huawei’s survival is not necessarily a lesson in the futility of sanctions to stifle technological progress. However, it does show that muddled political objectives and inconsistent implementation will yield potentially contrary outcomes. At the same time, factors that contribute to Huawei’s resilience also highlight the infighting and vulnerabilities of listed firms like Mavenir, Ericsson and Nokia.
Topic:
Markets, Sanctions, Digital Economy, Resilience, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

5. US Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and Roles for Partners

Author:
Rebecca Pincus
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center, explains that "The development of Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons is dependent on foreign investment and advanced technologies; as the West has withdrawn from Russia, China is an important, if imperfect, substitute..."
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

6. The Evolution and Ethics of Accountability Sanctions

Author:
Mark Ferullo
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
When Yahya Jammeh seized power in The Gambia in 1994 in a bloodless coup d’état, the young army colonel’s promise to eliminate corruption seemed disin- genuous. At the time, few Gambians could have anticipated how corrupt and cruel his rule would be. His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al-haji Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Babili Mansa, as he titled himself, brutalized his country for over two decades. In 2022, The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Com- mission exposed the extent of his violence, revealing that he commanded a hit squad that crushed dissent through murder, torture, and rape. His claim that he could cure AIDS with herbs might have been dismissed as the delusions of an out-of-touch autocrat were it not for the loss of life this lie caused during the medical trials.1 When the United States placed economic sanctions on Jammeh in 2017, most Gambians had little sympathy for their former leader, and few denied he deserved punishment.2 By then, Jammeh had fled the country, but the United States sanctioned him anyway. Jammeh joined 12 other individuals—including an organ-trafficking surgeon from Pakistan, a Guatemalan Congressman who ordered the killing of a journalist, and a Ukrainian police commander who oversaw the shooting of peaceful protestors in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity three years prior—as the first designations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. “There is a steep price to pay for their mis- deeds,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin at the time.3
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

7. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

9. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

10. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America