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31. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

32. Hurricane Ian Highlights the Devastating Effects of the U.S. Blockade on Cuba

Author:
Mikael Wolfe
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
As Cuba reels from the ongoing effects of Hurricane Ian, a Havana-based Cuban scholar explains how the U.S. blockade has hampered Cuba’s recovery from Hurricane Ian and fuels ongoing mass emigration.
Topic:
Migration, Natural Disasters, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Hurricane, and Blockade
Political Geography:
Cuba, Latin America, Caribbean, and United States of America

33. CONTAINMENT 2.0: SANCTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL

Author:
David A. Lake
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The West is not imposing coercive sanctions on Russia to stop its current aggression. No one seriously expects that the sanctions will cause President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. NATO made clear before the war that its members will not defend Ukraine with military force. The European members have also, as expected, carved out exceptions to the sanctions regime for oil and gas so as not to impose too much pain on their own economies. Putin anticipated the general scope of the sanctions likely to be imposed on Russia and decided it was worth invading Ukraine anyways. While he may have been surprised by the extent of the sanctions and unity of NATO so far, this is not enough to alter his calculus. Indeed, he is doubling down on the original plan. He also knows that he has other weapons and forms of coercion against the West up his sleeve. Rather, we are seeing the birth of a possible Containment 2.0, a forced decoupling of Russia from the Western international economy. This is a long-term, not a short-term, strategy. The point is to undermine the Russian economy, stifle its technological progress, deny Russians a standard of living comparable to that of the West, and break support for the regime over time. In doing so, the West undermines Russia’s ability to compete militarily, aiming to forestall further Ukraines, and weakens Putin’s hand at home and abroad.
Topic:
NATO, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Containment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

34. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:
Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

35. The Inflation Weapon: How American Sanctions Harm Iranian Households

Author:
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This study examines the humanitarian harms of U.S. sanctions on Iranian citizens by focusing on their principal economic impact—high rates of inflation. Although nonexperimental, the study draws upon various data to present a cohesive, if not comprehensive, narrative of the economic shocks that followed the imposition of U.S. sanctions in 2012 and 2018.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

36. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:
Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

37. Sanctions, Economic Statecraft, and Venezuela’s Crisis

Author:
César Rodríguez
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This case study summarizes the evidence on the effect on Venezuela’s economic and social conditions of economic sanctions and other actions of economic statecraft taken by the United States and its allies in response to the country’s political crisis. The preponderance of evidence indicates that sanctions and other statecraft measures—including the formal recognition of a government with no de facto control over the territory—have had a strong and significant negative effect on the Venezuelan economy. These actions have made a sizable contribution to declining oil production, exacerbating the country’s fiscal crisis, and contributing to one of the largest documented peacetime economic contractions in modern history. Many arguments commonly voiced to dispute the effects of sanctions, such as those that appeal to temporal precedence of other causes of the country’s crisis, are either factually incorrect or premised on fallacious logic. Reforming the sanctions regime will be a complex task, given the interaction with other statecraft measures and a broader toxification of the country’s economic relations. Reform attempts should include the introduction of an oil-for-essentials program, support for political humanitarian agreements, issuance of clearer compliance guidelines, introducing an explicit differentiation between strategic and nonstrategic sanctions, and seeking multilateral alignment with international actors on key strategic issues including that of government recognition.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

38. Promoting the Euro – Countering Secondary Sanctions: Germany Should Push to Complete Monetary Union

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
US-Chinese rivalry will increasingly play out in the geo-economic realm. The use of secondary sanctions – especially secondary dollar sanctions – negatively affects German economic interests. The new German government should therefore intensify efforts to promote the euro as an international currency coequal to the dollar in addition to lending its qualified support to EU anti-coercion policies.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, European Union, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

39. Strategic Patience: Sustainable Engagement with a Changed Afghanistan

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
One year after the United States withdrew its military from Afghanistan, relations between the two countries are stuck in a holding pattern. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian donor to the people of Afghanistan, with over $774 million USD distributed since the Taliban takeover, but the United States maintains no diplomatic presence in the country — nor does it send official diplomatic envoys.1 U.S. sanctions have not altered the Taliban’s calculus on human rights or ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban has proved intransigent and unrealistic in its relations not only with Washington but with neighboring countries like Pakistan. Its senior leaders lack a coherent vision for the country and its emir remains reclusive.2 Future U.S. policymakers might be tempted to disengage diplomatically and economically from Afghanistan and instead rely primarily on “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism.3 The most likely consequence of this approach would be a more isolated and unstable Afghanistan, which in turn could foster an even more permissive environment for transnational terrorists. Consistent diplomacy tied to long-term U.S. security objectives is likely to produce incremental results at best, but is still preferable to diplomatic disengagement or military intervention. This brief provides a concise background and analysis of the most pressing issues affecting U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It draws on open source data; interviews with government officials — including from the de facto Taliban government; and interviews with private analysts that were conducted remotely or in person — in the United States, Pakistan, and Qatar. Broad policy recommendations • The United States should work closely with regional countries, including Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to ensure they are prepared to handle security challenges as they emerge. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is revived, opportunities may emerge to engage Iran on Afghanistan. These should include routine dialogue, intelligence sharing, and capacity building, such as policing and border security. Washington should engage separately with India and Pakistan to bolster humanitarian aid and limited commerce to Afghanistan. • The United States should reiterate mutual responsibilities under the 2020 agreement it signed with the Taliban in Doha, but recognize that it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and therefore is better understood as an aspirational framework. • Formal recognition of the de facto Taliban government should be withheld until it demonstrates a clear commitment to its counterterrorism responsibilities and respect for basic human rights, including for women. But Washington should place diplomats in Afghanistan either through the creation of an in-country Afghanistan affairs unit, whether based in the prior U.S. Embassy or inside a friendly third country’s diplomatic mission, or by sending temporary delegations to Kabul, as our allies have. This should be coupled with multilateral steps to remove the leadership’s travel privileges. It is important that U.S. officials interact with Taliban cabinet members in Kabul and other Taliban stakeholders based in Kandahar.4 Direct outreach by U.S. military officials and the intelligence community may have utility but it is not a replacement for a coherent civilian-led diplomatic strategy. • Sanctions intended to target the Taliban as a non-state actor now extend far beyond their original scope, since they became the de facto government of Afghanistan. If not yet determined, the U.S. government should communicate what steps the Taliban must take to be de-listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

40. Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Sanctions, Alliance, and Embargo
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America