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1. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

2. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The danger of armed confrontation over Taiwan is growing, raising the spectre of a direct conflict between China and the U.S. that would have severe global repercussions. Managing this risk will require the parties to rebuild trust by shoring up decades-old understandings.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Risk, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Taiwan Strait

3. Risk and Responsibility: Managing Future Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

Author:
Becca Wasser and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Washington is reimagining its global role, leading the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult choices about priorities, resources, and risk to better address the long-term “pacing challenge” posed by China. To do so, the United States plans to accept risks in the Middle East and against future Iran threats. Iran’s possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—specifically, its nuclear program, chemical weapons, and biological agents—pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and Washington’s ability to accept risk in the region. But how Iran might leverage WMDs to threaten U.S. interests and upend Washington’s plans to make trade-offs in global responsibilities is unclear, while the risks of failing to address these challenges remain high. As a result, the DoD and its component organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), must enhance their understanding of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and the escalation dynamics surrounding Iranian WMDs during crisis and conflict. By doing so, the United States can better accept risk in the Middle East and revise its global priorities while still protecting core U.S. interests. To improve the DoD’s understanding of future Iranian WMD-related threats and escalation dynamics, the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a series of three virtual strategic-operational tabletop exercises (TTXs) exploring future Iranian nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use. The TTXs indicated that even if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the likelihood the regime will use it is low. Instead, the regime may be more likely to use chemical and biological weapons to escalate conflict. Moreover, there are significant asymmetries between American and Iranian views of conflict timelines, escalation redlines, and risk tolerance, all of which make it difficult to offer and signal credible ways to de-escalate a crisis. Differences between Washington’s risk acceptance and that of its regional partners—Israel, in particular—further complicate U.S.-Iran interactions. The TTXs aimed to enable the United States to identify where and how it might mitigate the risk it must accept to better marshal resources in support of the department’s strategic guidance. Accepting greater risk against Iran and in the Middle East more broadly means shifting U.S. strategic priorities in the region. This shift has the potential to unsettle allies and partners, and may possibly embolden Iran in the near term, but such tough choices must be made if the United States wishes to prioritize other long-term threats that may be of greater impact to U.S. security, such as China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Risk
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

4. Espionage, Espionage‐​Related Crimes, and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 1990–2019

Author:
Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A cost‐​benefit analysis finds that the hazards posed by foreign‐​born spies are not large enough to warrant broad and costly actions such as a ban on travel and immigration from China, but they do warrant the continued exclusion of potential spies under current laws. Espionage poses a threat to national security and the private property rights of Americans. The government should address the threat of espionage in a manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to reduce it outweigh the costs of those actions. To aid in that goal, this policy analysis presents the first combined database of all identified spies who targeted both the U.S. government and private organizations on U.S. soil. This analysis identifies 1,485 spies on American soil who, from 1990 through the end of 2019, conducted state or commercial espionage. Of those, 890 were foreign‐​born, 583 were native‐​born Americans, and 12 had unknown origins. The scale and scope of espionage have major implications for immigration policy, as a disproportionate number of the identified spies were foreign‐​born. Native‐​born Americans accounted for 39.3 percent of all spies, foreign‐​born spies accounted for 59.9 percent, and spies of unknown origins accounted for 0.8 percent. Spies who were born in China, Mexico, Iran, Taiwan, and Russia account for 34.7 percent of all spies. The chance that a native‐​born American committed espionage or an espionage‐​related crime and was identified was about 1 in 13.1 million per year from 1990 to 2019. The annual chance that a foreign‐​born person in the United States committed an espionage‐​related crime and was discovered doing so was about 1 in 2.2 million during that time. The government was the victim in 83.3 percent of espionage cases, firms were the victims of commercial espionage in 16.3 percent of the cases, and hospitals and universities were the victims of espionage in 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent of the cases, respectively. The federal government should continue to exclude foreign‐​born individuals from entering the United States if they pose a threat to the national security and private property rights of Americans through espionage. A cost‐​benefit analysis finds that the hazards posed by foreign‐​born spies are not large enough to warrant broad and costly actions such as a ban on travel and immigration from China, but they do warrant the continued exclusion of potential spies under current laws.
Topic:
Crime, Immigration, Risk, and Espionage
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

6. The Logic (and Grammar) of US Grand Strategy: Implications for Germany and Europe

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Although President Biden has made US foreign policy more predictable, its medium- and long-term direction and concomitant implications for transatlantic relations are less certain. This report presents three scenarios of how US strategy might evolve. They provide insight into how the United States behaves in the spheres of security and international economy under different conditions and why, suggesting ways for the EU and Germany to preemptively mitigate risks and positively influence future policy.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Grand Strategy, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

7. "Systemic Risks": A Conversation on Nuclear Technology and Deterrence with Dr. Vipin Narang

Author:
Dylan Land
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): What do you perceive as the greatest threat to global nuclear security? Where do you see the greatest potential for the outbreak of nuclear war? ​ Vipin Narang (VN): Rather than focusing on regions, I see three trends which I think we should be concerned about. One is the return of a great power arms race, and a lot of this was exacerbated in the Trump administration. Even as we head into the Biden administration—which extended the New START Treaty with Russia for five years—Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces at breakneck speed. They are worried primarily about U.S. missile defenses, which at this point are unconstrained. The United States has a variety of missile defense systems at the regional level which work pretty well, as well as the national missile defense system, which doesn’t…yet. You will often hear that the national missile defense system does not work very well and that is true—the success rate is around 60 percent in simulated tests. It may be difficult to ever get it to work perfectly or even well, but it is the prospect that the United States might get it to work that really drives modernization efforts in Russia and China..... ​
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Risk, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Global Focus, and United States of America

8. Special Commentary: COVID-19 and the Ethics of Military Readiness

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As is well known, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly fired Captain Brett Crozier, captain of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, after he wrote a letter arguing that all but ten percent of the crew should disembark the ship to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Doing so, he acknowledged, would diminish the carrier’s readiness and slow its response time in a crisis. Justifying that decision, however, he argued, “We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die. If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take care of our most trusted asset — our Sailors.”1 The problem for the captain, of course, was not the content of the letter as much as it was the subsequent leak to the San Francisco Chronicle. Setting aside the fiasco that resulted in his firing, and led to Modly’s sudden resignation, 2 the captain raises some important concerns regarding what the risks sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines3 should be required to take in peacetime. Because it is peacetime, he argues, “[W]e … cannot allow a single Sailor to perish as a result of this pandemic unnecessarily.”4 Of course, even in war no one should die unnecessarily; however, the captain raises a good question: “what risks are necessary in peacetime?” To answer that question it is first important to understand what risks are necessary in wartime
Topic:
War, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Risk, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States of America

9. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume I, Euro-Atlantic perspectives

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, S. M. Amadae, Jean-Marc Rickli, Shahar Avin, Frank Sauer, John Borrie, Dimitri Scheftelowitsch, Justin Bronk, Page O. Stoutland, Magnus Hagström, Petr Topychkanov, Michael Horowitz, Anja Kaspersen, and Chris King
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This edited volume focuses on the impact on artificial intelligence (AI) on nuclear strategy. It is the first instalment of a trilogy that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in AI could have nuclear weapons and doctrines, strategic stability and nuclear risk. It assembles the views of 14 experts from the Euro-Atlantic community on why and how machine learning and autonomy might become the focus of an armed race among nuclear-armed states; and how the adoption of these technologies might impact their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional level and trans-regional level.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Risk, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

10. The Rise of Global Innovation by US Multinationals Poses Risks and Opportunities

Author:
Lee G. Branstetter, Britta Glennon, and J. Bradford Jensen
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
For decades, US multinational corporations (MNCs) conducted nearly all their research and development (R&D) within the United States. Their focus on R&D at home helped establish the United States as the unrivaled leader of innovation and technology advances in the world economy. Since the late 1990s, however, the amount of R&D conducted overseas by US MNCs has grown nearly fourfold and its geographic distribution has expanded from a few advanced industrial countries to many parts of the developing world, creating an innovation system that spans the globe. Like many aspects of globalization, including the offshoring of manufacturing over recent decades, the globalization of R&D raises concerns about US competitiveness and loss of technological leadership. At the same time, the spreading geographic location of innovation presents opportunities for US-based companies if the right policies are adopted to seize them. The research presented in this Policy Brief demonstrates that US innovators continue to remain involved in important ways in US MNCs' global R&D activities, and fears of a hollowing out of US capacity to innovate—based probably on previous fears about the hollowing out of US-based manufacturing—may be overstated. Indeed, the large and growing pool of highly educated scientists and engineers in the developing world could increase the rate of global productivity growth, to the advantage of US-based companies and the world in general. The authors conclude that a productive way to capitalize on the globalization of MNC R&D is not to oppose it but to combine emerging-market talent with MNC experience so that innovation can flourish to improve global living standards and fuel economic progress.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, Multinational Corporations, Risk, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America