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42. A US Workforce Training Plan for the Postpandemic Economy
- Author:
- Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Conference Board
- Abstract:
- Though the US economy is expected to recover to its prepandemic level of production (gross domestic product or GDP) by the second quarter of 2021, the postpandemic economy will be different in many important ways. The pandemic’s acceleration of trends toward remote work, digital transformation, and automation could permanently reduce demand for low-skill jobs. To build a large and fully competitive US workforce and reduce inequality, aggressive reskilling will be needed. Even before the global pandemic’s onslaught, preparing the future workforce to drive rapidly advancing technology in an increasingly competitive global economy—and minimize the adverse fallout from these trends—was one of the nation’s greatest challenges. COVID-19 has made this challenge more urgent. Now, an estimated 40 percent of workers will need short-term training and reskilling by 2025.1 American leadership, prosperity, and competitiveness will hinge on maximizing the skills of our nation’s workers. The pandemic has disproportionately displaced minority workers, women, youth, and workers with lower educational attainment, many of whom are among the near-record 40-plus percent of the jobless who have been unemployed more than six months. Such displaced workers, or the “long-term unemployed,” typically find it hard to get a new job the longer they are without one. For many of them, securing a new job will require training for skills that are in demand.
- Topic:
- Partnerships, Economy, Business, Training, COVID-19, and Workforce
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
43. The way forward for Turkish-American relations: Partnership à la carte?
- Author:
- Selin Nasi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In this issue of Turkeyscope, Selin Nasi analyzes how Turkish and American foreign policies have reached an impasse on a number of issues. Despite these differences, she highlights several areas of mutual interest where cooperation can, nevertheless, improve the relationship going forward.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and United States of America
44. Renewing the U.S.-European Partnership in the Post-Trump Era
- Author:
- Renee M. Earle
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- In June, European leaders rolled out a plush (some have said “gush”) welcome mat for President Biden when he arrived for G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU meetings with his message that America was back to strengthen alliances. Broad smiles among participating leaders trumpeted similar world views and were in sharp contrast with the sour notes of unpredictable meetings with President Trump. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen conveyed the general warm embrace for the U.S. prodigal son: “Well, Mr. President, dear Joe, we are so pleased to welcome you in Brussels,” von der Leyen said. “You are back in Brussels and America is back on the global scene. It’s great news. It’s great news for our alliance. It’s also great news for the world. And we are really delighted to work with you to tackle together some global challenges.” Upbeat communiqués following the meetings with NATO and the EU outlined a staggering number of areas of transatlantic cooperation, from geopolitical engagement to trade, climate, and cybersecurity. Even the European Parliament expressed optimism in an opinion indicating great expectations for U.S.-EU cooperation with a detailed list of tasks, not least deliverables for the upcoming WTO ministerial meeting at the end of the year, such as “the green and digital transition; a fisheries agreement; a declaration on trade and health; work programmes for the reform of the Dispute Settlement Body for industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises; and negotiations on electronic commerce.”
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, Partnerships, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
45. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
46. The Australia–India Strategic Partnership: Accelerating Security Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific
- Author:
- Dhruva Jaishankar
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- India and Australia have successfully managed to overcome prior inhibitions about security cooperation. Since 2000, the two countries have significantly improved their strategic coordination, military interoperability, and maritime cooperation, motivated by China’s rise and behaviour, faltering regional security institutions, and uncertainty about the United States’ role. Today, India–Australia security relations comprise regular military exercises, professional exchanges, operational coordination, and nascent defence technology cooperation. But the two countries’ different capabilities, priorities, and strategic circumstances will have to be overcome if relations are to deepen. Future priorities should include institutionalising bilateral and multilateral coordination mechanisms, improving military interoperability, deepening defence technology collaboration, and broadening relations to give ballast to the security relationship.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, India, Australia, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
47. US Experts Consider China a Shifting and India a Stable Friend to Russia
- Author:
- Arik Burakovsky, Dina Smeltz, and Brendan Helm
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- With both Russia and China facing increasingly confrontational relations with the United States, the two countries have increased ties with each other and have pursued similar approaches in opposition to the US government concerning Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Steve Biegun, US Deputy Secretary of State, recently characterized the developing relationship between Russia and China as one built on “mutual determination to challenge the United States.” To better understand how experts think about Russia’s relations with the other great powers, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs recently conducted a survey of 201 American experts on Russia. The survey finds that a majority describe the relationship between Russia and China today as one of mostly partnership. They also describe India as primarily a partner to Russia, both today and in the future. By contrast, they say that Russian relations with the United States and the European Union are mostly competitive. But they anticipate that in 20 years, rivalry between Russia and China will grow, perhaps creating space for reducing tensions with the United States.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Power Politics, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
48. Broadening the Transatlantic Partnership to Address the China Challenge
- Author:
- Carisa Nietsche
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic has been a turning point in Europe’s calculus regarding China. Beijing’s ham-fisted mask diplomacy, attempt to rewrite the pandemic’s origins and use of the World Health Organisation to advance the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underscored for Europe the nature of Beijing’s objectives. Europe has grown more attuned to the “strategic challenge” China poses in the economic, technology and global governance realms as a result. The growing convergence between US and European perspectives on China provides a solid foundation for future cooperation between the transatlantic partners. Yet, addressing the China challenge will require broadening beyond the transatlantic partnership and bringing Indo-Pacific partners to the table.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Communications, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, Transatlantic Relations, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
49. Challenges and Prospects for the CPTPP in a Changing Global Economy: Taiwanese Accession and Canada’s Role
- Author:
- Hugh Stephens
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
- Abstract:
- In the past, Canada has had to deal with the matter of Taiwan very delicately. China considers Taiwan to be an integral part of the nation: a rogue province that must eventually be reunified with the mainland. Since Canada relies much more on trade with China than with Taiwan, the stakes have favoured policies that avoid engaging with Taiwan in ways that would unnecessarily irritate China. As a result, there has been little appetite here for negotiating a bilateral trade deal with Taiwan. That attitude is finally changing. One main reason is because China is already angry with Canada, and vice versa. Relations between the two countries are at an all-time low, and domestic support for accommodating China is minimal. As a result, Canada is freer than before to consider negotiating a trade agreement with Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan is interested in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which Canada is already a party. By supporting Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP, Canada can achieve a free-trade agreement with Taiwan without having to negotiate one bilaterally. The ability to do so under the aegis of a multilateral agreement should serve to mitigate any remaining concerns that China might further retaliate against Canada directly. However, striking back at China is not a reason for Canada to support Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP. We should do so because it is in the interest of Canada and the other members of the CPTPP to add to the strength of the organization by welcoming an economy that is an important global trader and a key player in global supply chains. In addition, Taiwan is a country that is clearly willing and able to accept CPTPP disciplines. Canada should move quickly and enthusiastically to support Taiwan’s accession. The benefits of having Taiwan join Canada in a free-trade agreement are obvious. The opportunity to make it a reality is finally here. The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which entered into force on Dec.30, 2018 for six of the 11 signatories that had completed ratification at that time (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore),1 is a beacon of hope in a dark, protectionist landscape. Along with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, which was signed on Nov. 15, 2020, the CPTPP advances the trade and investment liberalization agenda at a time when protectionist measures by some major trading countries are threatening to undo decades of progress. The commitments and new disciplines of the CPTPP are particularly important because of malaise infecting the World Trade Organization, where the work of the Appellate Body has now ground to a halt because of actions by the United States, and to offset the negative impact of the U.S.-China trade war now underway.
- Topic:
- Government, International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Canada, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America
50. Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in India-South Korea Ties
- Author:
- Jagannath P. Panda
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- Both India’s and South Korea’s strategic choices are deeply influenced by the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific construct, particularly amid a mounting U.S.-China rivalry. With India’s “Look/Act East” policy and South Korea’s “New Southern Policy” offering a perfect stage for deepened mutual cooperation, both nations need to further their relations to build Asia’s future while advancing their respective national interests. With both countries following stringent foreign policies as a result of the actions of their immediate neighbors, they present a geopolitically strategic complementarity for their relationship to prosper and emerge as one of the most important relationships in the region. Seoul’s hesitation to overtly embrace the “Indo-Pacific” concept is not really a barrier; rather a geo-political overture to discard the balance of power politics and pursue an autonomous foreign policy. India’s preference for the “Indo-Pacific” is equally based on strategic autonomy, imbibing universal values and an inclusive regional order. Both countries emphasize a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific and have immense potential to establish security and connectivity partnerships as the keystone of their bilateral ties. With India and South Korea understanding the economic importance versus security ramifications of China, and with Japan’s reemergence as a key regional, if not global actor, both countries need to bring serious strategic intent to their relationship. Making use of the ASEAN platform and bilateral dialogues, South Korea and India have the potential to become one of the strongest Indo-Pacific partners of the 21st century
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, Asia, South Korea, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific