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51. Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States and Chinese governments, for the foreseeable future, will have the resources to keep each other’s societies vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction. If these governments are not self-destructive, they will want to keep their competition from escalating into armed conflict that could lead to nuclear war. The constructs of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability can help significantly if both governments embrace them and interpret them similarly or even if the leaders of the two countries accurately understand how they differ in their perspectives on them. Unfortunately, to date, on these issues the United States and China are like a quarrelling married couple who tried therapy for one or two appointments, found it dissatisfying, and then alternated in making excuses for not trying again, perhaps with a different therapist or format. Each says they have tried and the other doesn’t listen or understand. Both suspect that the other isn’t saying what they really feel or want; what they really feel is hostility and distrust and what they really want is to get richer and more powerful without being hassled or attacked. It would be easier if they could just go their separate ways, but the property and wealth they depend on will be lost (or at least severely diminished) if they split up or do each other harm. This paper suggests that U.S. and allied interests require persistence in inviting China to dialogue on strategic stability; to demonstrate goodwill, the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability as a fact and necessary policy. The need for both moves is reflected in the fact that neither government has defined what it might mean by stability or mutual vulnerability. To help test intentions and prompt harder thinking, the paper plays the role of therapist and offers definitions of both concepts—strategic stability and mutual vulnerability—so that the two sides can critique them more freely and without recrimination. These definitions are broader and deeper than usual, reflecting the growing problem of managing escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war, the scenario that drives U.S. and Chinese concerns and military posturing. Further, broader definitions are necessary to comprehend the dangers stemming from the entanglement of conventional, cyber, and nuclear weapons and command and control systems. The paper then sketches four benefits of declaring mutual vulnerability, contrary to opponents of the idea, before discussing steps that the United States and China could subsequently take to reflect and build each other’s confidence in such a policy. Finally, if perceived U.S. requirements in the future will be greater than the arsenal needed to deter or defeat Russia or China alone, how will Russia and China be persuaded not to try to build up to balance the additional U.S. force? In other words, if the United States is in two separate but interacting arms races (and deterrence relationships), how could each opponent (China and Russia) be persuaded to negotiate limits on their arsenal lower than the total the United States would insist on possessing to deter two nuclear opponents? Answers to these questions will affect strategic stability and mutual vulnerability of all parties but will take a long time to develop. To begin the process, the paper suggests asking Chinese leaders whether their silence on Putin’s nuclear first-use threats means that China has changed its own policy on nuclear use or that it never took a no-first-use policy seriously in the first place. Is China concerned that the capabilities that the United States and its allies may develop to strengthen defenses against Russia could be used against China too, and if so, might arms control be a wiser approach? Ultimately, the paper suggests that if China and the United States can sustain a process of serious dialogue, they will keep their relationship from worsening even if they cannot formally restrain their competition. And if dialogue leads one to ask the other for deeds to demonstrate goodwill, the paper has suggested some such deeds that could be undertaken with no security hazard and only slight political risk. No one should have the illusion that happiness is in this couple’s future. All this work would be to allow a nonviolent cohabitation that is better than the alternative of destitute divorce or murder-suicide.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

52. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

53. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:
Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

55. Tying Human Rights to U.S.-DPRK-ROK Negotiations

Author:
Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
For over three decades, the United States and the international community has been attempting to engage North Korea diplomatically, aiming for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. The Kim family regime has been committing crimes against humanity, but human rights concerns have been discounted by U.S. and other negotiators, fearing they would be an obstacle to a negotiated solution to the grave military and security challenges Pyongyang poses. North Korea has breached each and every one of the international obligations it has assumed, from imembership in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework to the Six Party Talks to the 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While its negotiating counterparts have neglected human rights concerns in multilateral and bilateral talks, North Korea has continued to develop and test its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It is time for a new paradigm, that brings human rights into the conversation, in a bilateral or multilateral setting.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

56. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

57. The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

58. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: A Conversation with Matthew Kroenig

Author:
Matthew Kroenig and Dylan Land
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Matthew Kroenig is Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China. Dr. Kroenig has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, including in the Strategy, Middle East, and Nuclear and Missile Defense offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group. Dr. Kroenig is also Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

59. Three Presidents, Three Flawed Iran Policies, and the Path Ahead

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
News reports of a nearing breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief, but the deal will likely prove disappointing on many fronts. With Russia’s horrific onslaught against Ukraine, news reports of a likely breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks will trigger sighs of relief. But sadly, that relief will be misplaced. U.S. negotiators have already admitted that the forthcoming deal will not match the nonproliferation achievements of the 2015 agreement, and no official has even hinted that the revised text will either penalize Iran for its flagrant violation of its commitments or address the range of problems that have emerged since the original deal was reached. In this Policy Note, Washington Institute executive director Robert Satloff delivers a powerful, bipartisan critique, assessing how and why three successive American presidents started their terms with sound ideas on Iran and leverage to advance them but accepted either flawed agreements or America’s own isolation. Looking beyond a new Iran deal, he proposes an urgent agenda: scrupulous enforcement; a renewed push for a “longer, stronger” agreement; early preparation for the day after restrictions expire; close coordination with regional partners to counter Iran’s rising influence; and outreach to the Iranian people, who will see little benefit from the windfall in sanctions relief likely coming to Tehran. American leadership, determination, and resilience, he notes, will be essential.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

60. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America