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231. New START Verification: Fitting the Means to the Ends

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) promises to lock in significant reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by establishing lower ceilings on deployed weapons. The treaty’s verification provisions are means to that end--providing confidence that the sides are complying with those lower limits. Although the goal is to establish the high confidence levels maintained during the 15 years of the original START (1994-2009), the successor agreement will achieve that goal with more focused and up-to-date methods, including innovative verification provisions for deployed warhead ceilings. START’s multilayered limits and the elaborate verification measures flowing out of them were born of the Cold War. New START verification can be streamlined in accordance with the new, simplified limits and in response to post-Cold War realities. In assessing the new treaty, it is critical that verification provisions be judged by how well they fulfill their core function.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

232. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2009-2010 Report Card

Author:
Peter Crail
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The study, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2009-2010 Report Card gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan—each of which possess nuclear weapons—and North Korea—which maintains a nuclear weapons capability—as well as Iran and Syria, which are under investigation for possible nuclear weapons-related activity.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America

233. The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Author:
Tom Z. Collina and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) reduces the bloated Russian and American nuclear arsenals, while ensuring the ability of the U.S. to inspect and monitor Russian strategic nuclear forces. This report lays out the arguments in favor of New START ratification, and addresses the arguments of New START critics.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

234. To Curtail the Iranian Nuclear Threat, Change Tehran's Threat Perceptions

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear weapons, stems from its complicated threat environment and the historical grievances it harbors concerning the United States. Tehran now faces large numbers of U.S. troops in its neighbors to the west and east with few regional allies. The most productive path for averting nuclear weapons development in Iran is for Washington to seek to alter Iran’s threat perceptions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

235. Strategic Missile Defense: A Reality Check

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Strategic Missile Defense offers no real disincentive for rogue regimes such as North Korea or Iran to develop or use ballistic missiles, nor does it offer any protection against the more acute threat of terrorist groups smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States. Instead, the aggressive pursuit of strategic missile defense makes it more difficult to constrain the potential offensive nuclear threat from Russia and China.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

236. Preventive Military Action: The Worst Way to Deal With Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Although the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons is a major concern for Israel and the United States, leaving the "military option" on the table is counterproductive. Preventive military action by either country against Iran's nuclear facilities would only delay, rather than halt, Tehran's nuclear program, and it would cause Iran to retaliate against the United States as well as Israel. The aftermath of such an attack would be disastrous for the U.S. position in the region-particularly for relations with Israel and with Iraq-and its position in the wider world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

237. Is There Time to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Obama administration has identified September as a time for reassessing its approach to negotiation with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. It is imperative that this reassessment is based on a realistic appraisal of Iran's weaponization capabilities and limitations and not fall prey to politically motivated hyperbole. Iran's nuclear program is undeniably bringing that country closer to an ability to construct nuclear weapons-bad news for the region, the United States, and the world. Yet, a nuclear-armed Iran is years, not months, away, which is ample time for negotiating an outcome that prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state while strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

238. Dealing With Long-Range Missile Threats: It's All About Russia

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads on Russian ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles constitute the sole near-term existential threat to the United States. The U.S. response to this threat has been to maintain the nuclear war-fighting posture adopted during the Cold War. Yet, this posture does not lead toward an improvement in U.S. security; it merely reinforces Russia’s incentive to persist in its own anachronistic security calculus. The New START and a transformational post-Cold War Nuclear Posture Review would clear the path for major U.S. and Russian arms reductions, laying the foundation for a rejuvenated effort to halt nuclear nonproliferation and for engaging other nuclear-weapon states in arms control.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

239. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

240. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff

Author:
William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America