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191. Unrest and Tests

Author:
Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
North Korea opened the final months of 2016 with a bang by conducting its fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9. It followed up with a series of rocket and missile tests, culminating the year with Kim Jong Un’s claim of an imminent long-range ballistic missile capability. Yet, political transition in South Korea and the United States proved the hallmarks of late 2016, suggesting potential shifts in the approaches on the Peninsula, while underscoring the firm commitment of the US and ROK to their alliance. The Park-Choi scandal led to massive protests the final two months of the year and an impeachment vote on Dec. 9 by the National Assembly, confusing political observers about the implications for South Korean political stability. Donald Trump’s surprise victory in the US raised questions among Koreans about US reliability as an alliance partner.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

192. Nuclear Test, Political Fallout, and Domestic Turmoil

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9 and the intensified test-firing of a range of missile types throughout 2016 underscored existing weaknesses in using dialogue and sanctions as a response. The timing of Pyongyang’s latest provocations coincided with the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and ASEAN-related meetings in Vientiane. President Park Geun-hye used the venues for sideline talks with President Xi Jinping and President Obama. The nuclear test directly challenged a nonproliferation statement adopted by East Asia Summit (EAS) members on Oct. 8, which urged North Korea to abandon its weapons programs. Following extended negotiations with the US, China finally joined the international community in adopting UN Security Council Resolution 2321 on Nov. 30. In addition to strains in the China-DPRK relationship, regional coordination on North Korea remains challenged by disputes between China and the ROK over THAAD and illegal Chinese fishing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

193. Replacing HEU in Naval Reactors

Author:
George M. Moore
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is the simplest nuclear material to use for an improvised nuclear device, making it a target for terrorist groups seeking to inflict mass destruction. This paper examines the current status of HEU in naval propulsion programs worldwide, with a specific focus on the U.S. Navy’s program. It includes a technical assessment of less risky low-enriched uranium (LEU) alternatives and recommendations to enable conversion to such alternate technologies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nuclear Power, Navy, and Uranium
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

194. A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

195. Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

Author:
Lawrence Korb and Adam Mount
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
n the next decade, the United States will have to make decisions that will shape its nuclear arsenal for much of the next century. Nearly every missile, submarine, aircraft, and warhead in the U.S. arsenal is nearing the end of its service life and must be replaced. As Congress and the Obama administration continue to wrestle with the effects of sequestration on projected levels of defense spending, the U.S. Department of Defense has begun a series of procurement programs that will nearly double the amount the country spends on its nuclear deterrent in the next decade compared to what it spent in the past decade. Over the next 30 years, the cost of the nuclear deterrent could pass $1 trillion and crowd out defense and domestic investments needed to keep the United States strong and competitive. In addition, it could undermine U.S. credibility on the issue of nuclear proliferation—especially when it comes to dealing with regimes such as Russia, China, and North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

196. China’s Uneven Response to THAAD and its Coercive Strategy Aimed at the ROK: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance has arrived at a critical juncture. In July 2016, the countries jointly decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula to defend against North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China has long opposed an American-led, regional missile defense system, persistently warning South Korea against deploying THAAD. Since the deciding to deploy THAAD, the political landscapes in the U.S. and the ROK have changed dramatically. The new Donald J. Trump administration has signaled a change from the previous administration’s “strategic patience” policy, but details of the new approach have yet to emerge. North Korea, meanwhile, continues to aggressively test ballistic missiles and promote its nuclear weapons program. In South Korea, the impeachment and subsequent removal of Park Geun-hye triggered the need for a snap election, and a left-leaning candidate, Moon Jae-in, is leading in the polls. The election could mark a return of previous liberal administration policies that favored cooperation with North Korea. Additionally, Moon has signaled his opposition to THAAD. Nonetheless, the U.S. began deploying THAAD to South Korea in March 2017. China retaliated, implementing a series of economic, political, and military measures to pressure South Korea. This paper provides background on THAAD, analyzes the decision by Washington and Seoul to deploy the system to Korea, and examines Beijing’s concerns and coercive counterstrategy
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Military Strategy, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

197. North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Threats and the Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Author:
Sam-man Chung
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten South Korea and its neighbors. Pyongyang’s engineers are likely capable of producing a warhead small enough to place it atop a missile. As its ability to engineer warheads for flight and reentry improves, North Korea increasingly endangers the United States. Deterring Pyongyang is extremely difficult given North Korea’s conventional, unconventional, and cyber capabilities. South Korean and American strategists have reponspded by developing a tailored deterrence strategy to address specific threats. At the operational level, this is supported by the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan. Ballistic missile defense, including the ability to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missiles, is critical to the success of the tailored deterrence strategy. South Korea opted to develop its Korean Air and Missile Defense and Kill Chain system. These systems are independent of American ballistic missile defense systems. The Korean systerms were conceived and developed amidst plans to transfer Wartime Operational Control from the U.S. to South Korea. Because transfer has been postponted, there is less rationale for maintaing separate systems. Despite the official desire to keep these systems independent, South Korea needs to develop options for enhancing interoperability with American missile defense systems to support the tailored deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

198. Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions

Author:
Kim Taewoo
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a longrange missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto "Nuclear-First Politics," thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea. However, the current international sanctions headed by the UNSCR 2270, along with unilateral sanctions, are unlikely to bear fruit in the foreseeable future due to China’s conflicting policies. Beijing’s attitude towards North Korean nuclear program has alternated between ‘pressure and connivance;’ its military relationship with the United States determining China’s position on sanctions. China’s alternating position prevents effective sanctions against North Korea. While the international community should endeavor to make sanctions concerted, strong and consistent, South Korea and the U.S. should think about a Plan B that includes presenting China the threat of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

199. North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yonho Kim
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD issue has become a political hot potato that could easily entrap major presidential candidates. To avoid any backlash, the candidates will refuse to choose between China and the U.S. while placing the alliance with the U.S. at the center of South Korea’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

200. An Appraisal of Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy during War on Terror

Author:
Muhammad Ilyas Ansari and Iram Khalid
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This paper seeks to analyze that why some nations to nuclear in the international structure for the sake of national security when nuclear is an expensive and hard option? Due to fragile geopolitical position of Pakistan,security concerns have always forced her to find balance of power in the south Asian region through different ways. Having fought three major wars with India in 1948, 1965 and 1971 in an asymmetric military environment, Pakistan had been in disadvantageous position. War of 1971 in which Pakistan lost its Eastern wing (now Bangladesh, as an independent state) and nuclear explosion by India in 1974 forced Pakistan to follow the nuclear path. This paper analyzes the results of nuclear policy in the form of economic sanctions imposed by US and its allies, and reversal of US policy after 9/11 regarding sanctions against Pakistan. In the wake of 9/11 incident for joining the US led Global War on Terror, General Musharraf had announced that his objective was to save the nuclear and missile assets of Pakistan. This paper analyses that how Pakistani governments of General Musharraf, and Zardari from 2001 to 2013, had been under immense pressure through different coercive tactics ( from Dr. A. Q khan’s network to safety of nuclear program) to ruin the Pakistani nuclear program which had proved to prevent wars between India and Pakistan since 1999 to 2013. What costs Pakistan had to pay and what benefits Pakistan gained due to nuclear program.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, War, History, Nuclear Power, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, Punjab, and United States of America