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92. Strategic Implications of the Damage at the Natanz Enrichment Facility
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran’s breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a “longer, stronger” agreement.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
93. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
94. After Soleimani: Maintain the Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Project
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump’s regional allies, including Israel.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Denuclearization, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
95. Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review
- Author:
- George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Ever since the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, every U.S. presidential administration has published a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that explains the rationales behind its nuclear strategy, doctrine, and requested forces. These reviews have helped inform U.S. government personnel, citizens, allies, and adversaries of the country’s intentions and planned capabilities for conducting nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, war. The administration that takes office in January 2021 may or may not conduct a new NPR, but it will assess and update nuclear policies as part of its overall recalibration of national security strategy and policies. Nongovernmental analysts can contribute to sound policymaking by being less constrained than officials often are in exploring the difficulties of achieving nuclear deterrence with prudently tolerable risks. Accordingly, the review envisioned and summarized here explicitly elucidates the dilemmas, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that come with current and possible alternative nuclear policies and forces. In the body of this review, we analyze extant declaratory policy, unclassified employment policy, and plans for offensive and defensive force postures, and then propose changes to several of them. We also will emphasize the need for innovative approaches to arms control.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
96. Getting the Balance Right: Refining the Strategic Application of Nonproliferation Sanctions
- Author:
- Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, David Cortright, and Linda Gerber
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Fourth Freedom Forum
- Abstract:
- This paper argues for a greater commitment to sanctions that fit the reality of each discrete case of proliferation, nimble diplomacy that includes incentives-based bargaining, and strategies for reciprocal threat reduction to reduce nuclear dangers and enhance international cooperation for peace and security.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and United States of America
97. Russian New and Experimental Nuclear-Capable Missiles: A Short Primer
- Author:
- Christopher Mihal
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Russia has tested a wide variety of new weapon systems in an effort to modernize and upgrade its nuclear forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been shy about publicly discussing these new weapon systems or the capabilities of several of them, though a few are not currently feasible for any sort of deployment. More of a threat, however, are the two weapons that Putin did not boast about: the SSC8 and SSC-X-31, both of which were almost certainly in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. While these missiles represent a threat in and of themselves, a far greater threat is the indication that Russia does not feel bound by international agreements. These missiles have already had their first successful casualty in the death of the INF Treaty, and they may have also dealt a mortal blow to the New START Treaty. To adequately understand Russia’s new nuclear arsenal, one must simultaneously look at the weapon systems themselves as well as the context in which they are being developed. Russia continues to view both the U.S. and NATO as supreme existential threats. Unfortunately for Russia, both the U.S. and NATO have greater military, political, and economic power, and so Russia has long sought avenues to achieve its national objectives without conventional military confrontation.386 Russia has turned to two primary means of ensuring supremacy: enhancing its nuclear arsenal, which it views as a powerful deterrent that is cheaper to maintain than a large conventional military, as well as ‘hybrid’ war, which encompasses a number of techniques just shy of war including cyber warfare, informatsionaya voyna (information warfare) and a large amount of maskirovka (deception) in both military and non-military realms.387 Putin has emphasized information control and manipulation since coming to power, ranging from direct methods such as election interference and masking the identity of irregular forces in Ukraine, to more subtle methods of dezinformatsiya (disinformation), of which the exaggerated capabilities of Russia’s new nuclear weapons are prime examples. Dezinformatsiya is using false or misleading information and disseminating it to credible news outlets. This causes opponents to either act upon the incorrect information, thus wasting time and resources, or it undermines the credibility of the news outlet when it is proven false.388 Both of these goals of dezinformatsiya are being met with the current furor regarding Russia’s new nuclear weapons. This primer aims to dispel some of the false or misleading claims regarding these weapons and present a factual foundation from which to react to Russia’s new weapon developments and how they fit into Russia’s strategic vision.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America
98. "Systemic Risks": A Conversation on Nuclear Technology and Deterrence with Dr. Vipin Narang
- Author:
- Dylan Land
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Fletcher Security Review (FSR): What do you perceive as the greatest threat to global nuclear security? Where do you see the greatest potential for the outbreak of nuclear war? Vipin Narang (VN): Rather than focusing on regions, I see three trends which I think we should be concerned about. One is the return of a great power arms race, and a lot of this was exacerbated in the Trump administration. Even as we head into the Biden administration—which extended the New START Treaty with Russia for five years—Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces at breakneck speed. They are worried primarily about U.S. missile defenses, which at this point are unconstrained. The United States has a variety of missile defense systems at the regional level which work pretty well, as well as the national missile defense system, which doesn’t…yet. You will often hear that the national missile defense system does not work very well and that is true—the success rate is around 60 percent in simulated tests. It may be difficult to ever get it to work perfectly or even well, but it is the prospect that the United States might get it to work that really drives modernization efforts in Russia and China.....
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Risk, Deterrence, and Interview
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Global Focus, and United States of America
99. At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
- Author:
- Yang Gyu Kim and Félix E. Martín
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
- Institution:
- Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
- Abstract:
- Recent studies in nuclear deterrence show that nuclear punishment is infeasible in most cases due to the opponent’s second-strike capability, tactical redundancy, and the logic of self-deterrence. However, if the challenge against nuclear deterrence is expected to go unpunished, the deterrent policy is not credible and will likely fail. Can the defender violently punish the challenger possessing nuclear weapons? If it can, under what conditions? Thanks to President Kennedy’s tape recordings, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various theories on the defender’s policy choices after deterrence failure. This article derives a research hypothesis and its competing counterpart and examines their respective explanatory power via a process-tracing analysis of key members within the Executive Committee during the crisis. The study finds that the challenger’s feasibility of retaliating with atomic weapons is a crucial predictor for the defender’s policy choices.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, History, Deterrence, Credibility, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Feasibility
- Political Geography:
- Cuba and United States of America
100. Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks
- Author:
- Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- RESEARCH & REPORTS The debate concerning hypersonic weapons has gained increased attention in recent years as the United States has poured billions of dollars—and plans to pour billions more—into accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons and as China and Russia make headway in developing and deploying their own such weapons. The Pentagon is funding no less than eight prototype hypersonic weapons programs with the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least some of those by 2022. The U.S. rush to field hypersonic weapons merits a more critical examination by the Biden administration and Congress given the many unanswered questions about their rationale, technical viability, cost-effectiveness, and escalatory risks. It is past time for Congress to demand these answers before the military begins fielding the weapons in great numbers. This new report outlines the scope of the unanswered questions about the case for hypersonic weapons, details the underappreciated risks to stability posed by the weapons, assesses the viability of arms control as a tool to reduce these risks, and suggests recommended action items for Congress to better its understanding about the Pentagon’s plans for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in weapons capabilities, and mitigate stability risks.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Hypersonic Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America