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31. Strategic Stability in South Asia: Pakistan and the Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Muhammad Tehsin, Asif Ali, and Ghulam Qumber
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The protracted conflict between the US and the former USSR demonstrated that deterrence stability is improved by détente. South Asia‟s environment is characterized by mutual hostility; conventional military balance tilting in favor of India; and lack of a transparent and nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. The aforementioned factors are the missing components of détente. Both the provocative Indian expansion in its nuclear weapons programme, and Pakistani retaliatory notion of the short-range weapons option, is problematic not only in the South Asian context, but also contradictory to the decades-long experience acquired during the Cold War. Pakistan and India must move towards nuclear CBMs, doctrinal clarity, and risk-reduction measures in the light of new technological advancements, and changing US role in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, Nuclear Power, Political stability, Grand Strategy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, Punjab, and United States of America

32. Preventing an Israeli-Iran War

Author:
Alon Ben-Meir
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The EU is in a unique position to prevent the outbreak of a war between Israel and Iran that could engulf the Middle East in a war that no one can win.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

33. Comparative Nuclear Policy: A Case Study of U.S. Impact on India and Brazil Programs (1946-2018)

Author:
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo and Artur Cruz Bertolucci
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The knowledge regarding nuclear technology represented a new reality for the generation of energy and international security. The nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 represented the beginning of the so-called nuclear era and of the “balance of terror” as presented by many analysts such as Raymond Aron, deepened by the arms race in the US-Soviet bipolarity after 1947. Besides the superpowers, different countries had begun to develop their nuclear programs. The cases of Brazil and India stand out, since they develop their research agendas n the 1950s and 1960s, in the Cold War context, as a path to enhance their autonomy and bargaining power. The spread of the nuclear knowledge represented a challenge for the superpowers, and the talks for mechanisms of nuclear proliferation control such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started. This is the context in which Brazil and India develop their nuclear programs under the impact of its bilateral relations with the US. Although, these programs were convergent at first, in the search for nuclear autonomy, adjustments are going to be observed on both policies after the end of the Cold War. The article aims to understand the importance and history of Brazil and India nuclear programs and US weight on these agendas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
India, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

34. ‘Fix it or Nix it’ is the Wrong Approach

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
What needs “nixing” is not the JCPOA – a piece of paper – but the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

35. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

36. Epistemic frictions: radioactive fallout, health risk assessments, and the Eisenhower administration’s nuclear-test ban policy, 1954–1958

Author:
Toshihiro Higuchi
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:
Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:
The successful test of a US thermonuclear weapon in 1954 raised a compelling question as to the worldwide dispersion of radioactive fallout. This article reexamines the Eisenhower administration's test-ban policy in the context of global radioactive contamination. To explain the shifting public discourse of the global fallout hazards and its impact on the test-ban debate, the article focuses on epistemic frictions, seeking to demonstrate how a variety of expert bodies evaluated scientific uncertainty and moral ambiguity concerning the biological effects of fallout from different sets of concerns, and how the resulting incongruence both within and between the scientific advisory committees fueled the fallout controversy and affected the Eisenhower administration’s test-ban policy leading toward the test moratorium in 1958.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Japan, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

37. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

38. Going nowhere alone: US sanctions on Iran and the afterlife of the JCPOA

Author:
Fridtjof Falk
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
On November 5th, 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed severe sanctions on Iran. These sanctions, which President Obama called the “toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” were lifted by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal. The JCPOA was signed with a view to blocking Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, allowing international inspectors into Iran in return for sanctions relief. Withdrawing the United States (US) from the deal was a prominent promise of Donald Trump leading up to the presidential elections of 2016. In a May 2018 speech that described the deal as rooted in “fiction,” President Trump made good on his promise to leave the JCPOA and to move to unilaterally re-impose sanctions on Iran.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

39. National Security Update 5: The Trump 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).i This NPR addresses requirements for a U.S nuclear-force structure more attuned to 21st-century requirements in a world of additional nuclear states as well as other actors in possession of such weapons. The NPR focuses on the crucially important nuclear component of U.S national security strategy and capabilities and should be read in the broader context of the recently released National Security Strategyii and National Defense Strategyiii documents. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
National Security, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America