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21. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

22. Defending Europe with less America

Author:
Camille Grand
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has revealed the sorry state of European militaries and defence industries after decades of peace dividends, as well as their deep reliance on the US. A second Trump presidency could drastically reduce US defence support for Europe. But regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, the degradation of the European security environment and the shifting priorities of the US mean that Europe needs to be prepared to take more responsibility for its own defence. Europeans require a sustained plan over the next decade that combines immediate efforts to support Ukraine and rebuild readiness, and longer-term goals to develop a “full force package”, including the combat support capabilities and key enablers that are currently provided primarily by the US. Paradoxically, such a deliberate approach to overcoming institutional challenges and strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities may be the best way to preserve a strong transatlantic relationship and a degree of US commitment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

23. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:
Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

24. Has NATO Enlargement Enhanced US National Security?

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
What effect has NATO enlargement had on US national security? Few issues have been as central to US foreign policy over the last three decades. Since the mid 1990s, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus has held that enlarging the alliance was critical to US national security and the only practical manner of consolidating what President Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” This position is so well-established in the United States’ political culture that several rounds of NATO expansion proceeded without meaningful debate in the US Senate. Indeed, occasional efforts by some policymakers to question the merits of enlargement have been met with accusations of isolationism, or of “working for Vladimir Putin”. By this logic, not only does US national security benefit from an enlarged NATO, but were the United States to stop expanding NATO the sky would be likely to fall. In contrast, this paper makes the case that NATO expansion has been a net loss to US national security and ought not to continue. Note that I focus on US national security, not whether enlargement may have benefitted other actors. Drawing on over a decade of archival research into the origins and consequences of enlargement, I advance three specific arguments. First, claims that NATO benefitted US national security by anchoring the alliance, ensuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and promoting democracy are almost certainly overstated. Instead – second – the alliance has generated a host of problems for the United States by encouraging allied cheap riding and reckless driving, limiting US strategic flexibility, and contributing to the collapse of relations with Moscow. As a result, future enlargement to states such as Ukraine is not in the United States’ interest. The remainder of this essay proceeds in three sections. First, I review and critically evaluate the purported benefits of NATO enlargement. From there, I discuss the variety of problems enlargement has posed to US national security. In both of these sections, I pay particular attention to the consequences of enlargement itself and to how alternative policy options may have affected US interests. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of enlargement at a time when Ukrainian accession in particular dominates policy debates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

25. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

26. El futuro de la OTAN en su 75 aniversario

Author:
Gustavo Palomares
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
El 75 aniversario de la OTAN coincide con su mayor transformación a consecuencia del momento que atraviesa Europa ante el conflicto de Ucrania, los nuevos riesgos y amenazas, o las próximas elecciones en EEUU. El nuevo concepto estratégico aprobado en la Cumbre de Madrid en 2022 supone una ampliación de objetivos y escenarios, que se extienden a Oriente Medio, Mediterráneo, Sahel o el Sur Global. La Fundación Alternativas y la Secretaría General de Política de Defensa del Ministerio de Defensa de España presentaron el informe “El futuro de la OTAN en su 75 aniversario. Guerra en Europa y escenario internacional en transformación”. Este documento pone de manifiesto la necesidad de reaccionar a la agresión rusa en Ucrania fortaleciendo los mecanismos de coordinación e inter-operabilidad entre la Alianza y los socios de la UE desde una perspectiva de complementariedad.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

27. Artillery in Present and Future High-Intensity Operations

Author:
Elio Calcagno, Bryan Clark, Sam Cranny-Evans, Alessandro Marrone, Nicolò Murgia, and Eugenio Po
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has highlighted among NATO allies the importance of planning for protracted, large-scale, and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, artillery capabilities have regained significance, with a clear emphasis on survivability, quality, quantity, range, but also on adequate munition stocks and production capacity. However, successful integration into a wider array of capabilities (including long range precision fires) and advanced Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities are crucial for an effective artillery force. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, recent events in the Red Sea have shown how naval artillery is gaining a prominent role as a cost-effective solution to defence from drone and swarming threats.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Procurement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Italy, and United States of America

28. US-Germany Missile Agreement: Deterrence or Escalation?

Author:
Polina Sinovets
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
This October was marked by a statement by the Head of the German Foreign Service Intelligence, Bruno Kahl, who claimed that by the end of this decade at the latest, Russian troops could “carry out an attack” against NATO.[1] The defence chief could hardly be accused of hyperbole. His comments took place at the time of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the Kremlin’s growing nuclear blackmail of the West and regular threats to use some measures[2] against any NATO country whose military deployments might potentially affect Russian missiles’ striking capabilities. Against this backdrop and with the new US administration coming to power in 2025 under the slogan of turning all its attention to China, Europe will have to care much more about its defence and security than before 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the weak spots of the European NATO pillar in terms of arms production, military budgeting and general preparedness for a large-scale war in European territory, which turns out to be critical for the security of the continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

29. The Role of America’s European Allies in the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–24

Author:
John R. Deni and Lisa A. Aronsson
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
What more can US allies in Europe do to assist Ukraine militarily? More broadly, what can the United States expect from its closest allies in Europe in strategic competition with Russia and China? In this monograph, John R. Deni and Lisa A. Aronsson assess whether US allies and partners in Europe can continue providing military assistance to Ukraine or expand assistance, while preserving their own national security and fulfilling their NATO commitments. They also explore what the Russia-Ukraine War reveals about the role of European allies in future iterations of strategic competition. Their findings indicate European allies remain firmly in support of assisting Ukraine politically, even if the reasons for allied support vary across Europe. Despite agreeing support is necessary, European allies face several hurdles on the path toward scaling up military assistance to Ukraine. The reasons for the hurdles vary, and some exceptions exist, but Deni and Aronsson find without continued, sustained US engagement, leadership, and presence in Europe, Washington may find itself with few European allies by its side. To facilitate and sustain continued success in transatlantic burden sharing, the authors provide several practical recommendations for US policymakers to consider.
Topic:
NATO, Military Aid, Allies, Russia-Ukraine War, Security Cooperation, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

30. Is There Life After NATO?

Author:
Marc Trachtenberg
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
It is often claimed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 requires the United States to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. The historical evidence, however, shows that this is not the case at all. It is also commonly claimed that until Donald Trump came along, no American president would have dreamed of threatening not to defend the European allies. This too, it turns out, is not supported by the evidence. But it is not just a question of getting the history right. Those historical claims are important because they support the more fundamental claim that the NATO system is so obviously in America’s interest that it needs to be treated as sacrosanct. But has it been such a phenomenal success?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America