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101. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

102. Developments in U.S. Defence Spending: Implications for NATO

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
After a few years of increases, U.S. defence spending is likely to stagnate. At the same time, the needs related to the U.S. priority of deterring China will grow. The effect will be that the U.S. will continue to call for a greater contribution of NATO members to their own defence, even given the softening of transatlantic tensions and positive signals regarding the U.S. military presence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Spending, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

103. NATO on the Road to a New Strategy

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 2–3 December 2020, a group of experts presented the report “NATO 2030. United for a New Era” about strengthening the political dimension and consultation mechanisms of the Alliance. The report indicates a possible consensus on the expansion of the Alliance’s tasks, including on a common policy towards China. The document increases the chances that the allies will decide to start work on a new NATO strategy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

104. January 2021 Issue

Author:
Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware, Stephen Hummel, Paul Cruickshank, Don Rassler, Jonathan Schroden, and Nodirbek Soliev
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The violent storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, has heightened concerns about the threat posed by far-right extremism in the United States. In examining the wide range of terrorism and counterterrorism challenges facing the incoming Biden administration in this month’s feature commentary, Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware write that “the January 6 events at the U.S. Capitol offered a stark, frightening picture of the powerful forces fueling a conspiratorial mindset eschewing both the country’s foundational democratic values and the rule of law” and “serves as a salutary and timely reminder of the danger of potential violence to come.” Given the continued threat posed by “a stubbornly resilient Islamic State and an implacably determined al-Qa`ida,” they write that “it may be that as the United States and its allies enter the third decade of war against international salafi-jihadi terrorism, we need to recalibrate our immediate expectations away from ‘winning’ and ‘losing,’ toward ‘accepting’ and ‘managing’ this conflict. Such an admission would not be popular, but it would be a fairer reflection of the current state of the fight against terrorism, and a more honest prediction of what to expect over the next four, or more, years.” Our interview is with David Lasseter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. He notes that “advances in synthetic biology and other related biotechnologies hold the potential for both promise and peril in their application. And so we’ve got to be cognizant of how such technological shifts can alter the threat landscape [and] impose new defense and security challenges. We’ve heard it said that biological weapons are ‘a poor man’s nuke,’ given the potentially enormous impact of their usage. I think COVID-19 has further accelerated this mindset. The U.S. has had a watchful eye on bio threats and has elevated bio threats as a core national security priority over the past several years.” In an assessment that has far-reaching implications for the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, Jonathan Schroden finds that if the United States were to withdraw the remainder of its troops from the country, the Taliban would have “a slight military advantage” over Afghanistan’s security forces, “which would then likely grow in a compounding fashion.” Nodirbek Soliev examines the Tajik connection in an Islamic State plot against U.S. and NATO air bases in Germany thwarted in April 2020.
Topic:
NATO, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Joe Biden, and January 6
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, Tajikistan, Germany, and United States of America

105. A disavowed ambassador: José María de Areilza and Spain´s failed entry into NATO/Un embajador desautorizado: José María de Areilza y el fallido ingreso de España en la OTAN (1954-1960)

Author:
Pablo Guerrero
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This research article examines the diplomatic efforts at the highest level carried out by José María de Areilza (1909-1998), who served as a Spanish ambassador to the United States between 1954 and 1960, in order to advance Francoist Spain entry into NATO. Drawing on diplomatic documents, primarily letters and reports, the article outlines that from the very moment he took office, Ambassador Areilza openly advocated before the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the entry of Spain into the North Atlantic Alliance as a means to both strengthen military and economic ties with the United States and to foster the slow international rehabilitation of the Franco regime. However, the Spanish Government’s reluctance to push for NATO membership, which prompted a severe admonition from Minister Martín Artajo to his ambassador, along with the inability of US diplomacy to overcome the resistance of those allies which opposed the candidacy of Spain, ultimately led Areiza’s efforts to failure./Este artículo aborda las gestiones diplomáticas al más alto nivel efectuadas por José María de Areilza (1909-1998), quien se desempeñó como embajador español en los Estados Unidos entre 1954 y 1960, a fin de facilitar el ingreso de la España de Franco en la OTAN. Mediante el apoyo en documentos diplomáticos, primordialmente cartas e informes, se expone cómo desde el mismo momento en que tomó posesión de su puesto, el embajador Areilza propugnó abiertamente ante el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores la entrada de España en la Alianza Atlántica como medio para fortalecer los vínculos militares y económicos con los Estados Unidos y avanzar en la lenta rehabilitación internacional del régimen franquista. Sin embargo, las reticencias que el Gobierno español abrigaba a propósito del ingreso en la OTAN, las cuales motivaron una severa admonición del ministro Martín Artajo a su embajador, unidas a la incapacidad de la diplomacia estadounidense para vencer la resistencia de los aliados que se oponían a la candidatura española, condujeron las diligencias llevadas a cabo por Areilza al fracaso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and United States of America

106. Sea Change? The Impact of the US Presidential Election on Central and South-Eastern European Security and Defence

Author:
Corina Rebegea, Wojciech Michnik, and Ivan Vejvoda
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This LSE IDEAS report assesses the likely impact of the new Biden administration on security and defence in the Black Sea, Balkan and Central European regions. The report finds grounds for optimism but also for managing expectations. President Biden's support for multilateral security approaches is likely to strengthen NATO and regional cooperation, particularly on Russia, but the region cannot expect to be the US' top priority. A return to values-based diplomacy under Biden, too, may put pressure on democratically-backsliding allies to whom his predecessor turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

107. Renewing the U.S.-European Partnership in the Post-Trump Era

Author:
Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
In June, European leaders rolled out a plush (some have said “gush”) welcome mat for President Biden when he arrived for G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU meetings with his message that America was back to strengthen alliances. Broad smiles among participating leaders trumpeted similar world views and were in sharp contrast with the sour notes of unpredictable meetings with President Trump. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen conveyed the general warm embrace for the U.S. prodigal son: “Well, Mr. President, dear Joe, we are so pleased to welcome you in Brussels,” von der Leyen said. “You are back in Brussels and America is back on the global scene. It’s great news. It’s great news for our alliance. It’s also great news for the world. And we are really delighted to work with you to tackle together some global challenges.” Upbeat communiqués following the meetings with NATO and the EU outlined a staggering number of areas of transatlantic cooperation, from geopolitical engagement to trade, climate, and cybersecurity. Even the European Parliament expressed optimism in an opinion indicating great expectations for U.S.-EU cooperation with a detailed list of tasks, not least deliverables for the upcoming WTO ministerial meeting at the end of the year, such as “the green and digital transition; a fisheries agreement; a declaration on trade and health; work programmes for the reform of the Dispute Settlement Body for industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises; and negotiations on electronic commerce.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, Partnerships, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

108. Russian New and Experimental Nuclear-Capable Missiles: A Short Primer

Author:
Christopher Mihal
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Russia has tested a wide variety of new weapon systems in an effort to modernize and upgrade its nuclear forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been shy about publicly discussing these new weapon systems or the capabilities of several of them, though a few are not currently feasible for any sort of deployment. More of a threat, however, are the two weapons that Putin did not boast about: the SSC8 and SSC-X-31, both of which were almost certainly in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. While these missiles represent a threat in and of themselves, a far greater threat is the indication that Russia does not feel bound by international agreements. These missiles have already had their first successful casualty in the death of the INF Treaty, and they may have also dealt a mortal blow to the New START Treaty. To adequately understand Russia’s new nuclear arsenal, one must simultaneously look at the weapon systems themselves as well as the context in which they are being developed. Russia continues to view both the U.S. and NATO as supreme existential threats. Unfortunately for Russia, both the U.S. and NATO have greater military, political, and economic power, and so Russia has long sought avenues to achieve its national objectives without conventional military confrontation.386 Russia has turned to two primary means of ensuring supremacy: enhancing its nuclear arsenal, which it views as a powerful deterrent that is cheaper to maintain than a large conventional military, as well as ‘hybrid’ war, which encompasses a number of techniques just shy of war including cyber warfare, informatsionaya voyna (information warfare) and a large amount of maskirovka (deception) in both military and non-military realms.387 Putin has emphasized information control and manipulation since coming to power, ranging from direct methods such as election interference and masking the identity of irregular forces in Ukraine, to more subtle methods of dezinformatsiya (disinformation), of which the exaggerated capabilities of Russia’s new nuclear weapons are prime examples. Dezinformatsiya is using false or misleading information and disseminating it to credible news outlets. This causes opponents to either act upon the incorrect information, thus wasting time and resources, or it undermines the credibility of the news outlet when it is proven false.388 Both of these goals of dezinformatsiya are being met with the current furor regarding Russia’s new nuclear weapons. This primer aims to dispel some of the false or misleading claims regarding these weapons and present a factual foundation from which to react to Russia’s new weapon developments and how they fit into Russia’s strategic vision.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

109. The Case for EU Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Siena Cicarelli, and James Lamond
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
U.S. opposition to EU defense efforts since the 1990s has been a strategic mistake that has undermined both the EU and NATO. It’s time for a new U.S. approach that encourages ambitious EU defense strategies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

110. The Origins of Russian Conduct

Author:
Clint Reach
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1947 George Kennan argued for a policy of U.S. containment of the Soviet Union based on his assessment of the origins of Soviet conduct. Because the Kremlin was ideologically bent on global domination through a zero-sum competition with the West, political accommodation was not an appropriate strategy. Fifty years after the “X” article appeared, Kennan saw in the Russian Federation a wholly different animal than its Soviet predecessor. Russia was in the early stages of democracy, and its development should be shepherded by a magnanimous West. Based on this updated view of Russia, Kennan asserted that the enlargement of NATO would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”1 Implicit in Kennan’s argument was that the nature of the new Russian regime was not inherently antagonistic toward the United States and the West. There was not an underlying ideology or feature of the new political and economic system that led him to conclude that confrontation with Russia was unavoidable or that cooperation was impossible. This assumption turned out to be one of the critical dividing lines in the debate on how to deal with the Russians after the Cold War, and it is implicitly found in discourse on Russia policy that continues to this day.2 What are the origins of Russian conduct? Has Russian domestic and foreign policy predominantly been the result of misguided U.S. and European actions? Would the Kremlin have behaved differently if these policies had been more accommodating to Russia as a separate but equal partner in European integration? As in 1947, the answers to these questions are directly tied to current and future U.S. policy toward Russia. Those who believe Russian conduct is largely a reaction to Western actions that threaten Russia’s core strategic interests are likely to promote policies guided by a sense of compromise.3 Those who believe Russia would have acted similarly even if NATO had been disbanded or if the West had been more sensitive to Russian interests likely support a tougher military and diplomatic line with Russia and will be less interested in engagement. Yet there is rarely a full examination of the underlying reasons for promoting a particular approach.4 It is often taken as a given that we can do business with Russia or we cannot. To develop an optimal strategy toward Russia, it is important to clearly articulate a reasoning for coming to one conclusion or the other. Kennan’s reasoning was that Russia in the 1990s was on a path toward becoming a member of the European project. Russian embrace of Western political norms would mitigate the potential for the reemergence of dividing lines and the need for American security guarantees in areas of historical Russian influence. The United States, however, was considering actions that would derail this process by fomenting nationalist and militaristic sentiments within Russia that might otherwise be marginalized due to the lack of a legitimate Western threat. The extent to which this turned out to be the case is difficult to determine. Since the late 1990s, there have been a number of U.S. and Russian actions outside the NATO enlargement dispute that have muddied the analytical waters. But, as Kennan said, “The attempt must be made if [Russian] conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.”5
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, History, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America