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1. Is the United States undergoing a manufacturing renaissance that will boost the middle class?

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. made the goal of his economic policies to “build back better.” He emphasized helping workers without college degrees in order “to grow the economy from the bottom up and the middle out.” The emphasis on a manufacturing renaissance is reflected in the special incentives for US manufacturing in President Biden’s programs: the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. Lawrence finds little evidence of a renaissance in US manufacturing as of July 2024: US manufacturing employment was barely above its pre-COVID levels. Manufacturing output has grown more slowly than GDP since the pandemic, and productivity in manufacturing has not increased since 2017. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that over the next decade, manufacturing employment will decline and manufacturing output will grow more slowly than GDP. However, Lawrence says, additional manufacturing employment growth could be in the pipeline because of investment projects that have been announced but not yet completed. Lawrence estimates the additional manufacturing employment potential of announcements compiled by the White House as of mid-2024, finding that these projects could boost demand for 1.7 million manufacturing workers—a growth of 13.3 percent above 2022 manufacturing employment levels. It should be noted, however, that these are not estimates of net overall manufacturing employment growth. Some of the increased demand will be offset by losses of fossil fuel–related jobs displaced by the investments as well as declines in manufacturing employment for other reasons. Moreover, the impact of all the projects is just over 1 percent of overall US employment and in most states far too small to significantly change the opportunities for most non-college-educated workers and disadvantaged communities.
Topic:
Economic Policy, Inflation, Manufacturing, and Middle Class
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Strategies of Multinational Companies Entering China in the Era of U.S.-China Competition and Implications for Korea

Author:
Sang Baek Hyun, Ji Young Moon, Min-suk Park, Jonghyuk Oh, and Yunmi Oh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
With the integration of resources and markets around the world sparked by the trend of globalization, multinational companies have continued to grow at a rapid pace. In particular, global manufacturers have maintained their competitiveness by distributing resources more efficiently while establishing a global value chain with China as their main production hub. However, measures taken by the U.S. to block China’s access to technology and supply chains in some high-tech industries have prompted discussions on reorganization of the global supply chain, placing these multinational companies in an uncertain situation concerning their operations in China. At a time when competition between the U.S. and China is intensifying, it is necessary to look at the response strategies of global companies that have entered China and seek effective countermeasures for Korean companies.
Topic:
Economics, Multinational Corporations, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

3. How US chip controls on China benefit and cost Korean firms

Author:
Martin Chorzempa
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Export controls have become one of the most contentious battlegrounds in US-China technology competition. US semiconductor export controls aimed at China, however, have also embroiled allies such as South Korea. These controls largely do not affect Korean firms' chip sales to China, but Korean firms are vulnerable because they have large chip production facilities in China, which make around 40 percent of the memory chips for these firms. Those facilities in China rely on access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) or servicing from not only the United States but also other countries that have imposed controls on exporting advanced SME to China. Although the United States is unlikely to shut off access to the technology needed to keep the plants running for the foreseeable future, it has signaled that it will not allow new technology needed to upgrade those facilities, so they will become uncompetitive over the next few years and will need to be shuttered or sold off. For future production, Korean firms will need to build new facilities at great (albeit subsidized) expense, amortizing the sunk costs of operations in China over the coming years. At the same time, the controls have created significant benefits for Korean firms by shutting off Chinese competition for their memory businesses. Yet benefiting from the tensions between superpowers comes with serious risks. Firms and governments must deal with much greater uncertainty and evaluate the risk of their dependence on both the United States and China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Business, Exports, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and United States of America

4. Chipping Away: Assessing and addressing the labor market gap facing the US semiconductor industry

Author:
Dan Martin and Hamilton Galloway
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Thanks in large part to enactment of the landmark 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, a significant share of expected new chip manufacturing capacity and R&D is expected to be located in the US. We project the semiconductor industry’s US-based workforce will grow by nearly 115,000 jobs by 2030, from approximately 345,000 jobs today to approximately 460,000 jobs by the end of the decade. We estimate that roughly 67,000, or 58%, of these new jobs risk going unfilled at current degree completion rates. Of the unfilled jobs: 39% will be technicians, most of whom have two-year degrees or less; 35% will be computer scientists, or engineers with four-year degrees; and 26% will be engineers at the master’s or PhD level. For the US economy as a whole, we estimate that 3.85 million additional jobs in these three technical fields will be created by the end of 2030. Of those, 1.4 million jobs risk going unfilled unless the pipeline for such workers is expanded. To address the skills gap facing the broader economy and the semiconductor industry, we present three core recommendations to strengthen the US technical workforce: Strengthen support for regional partnerships and programs aimed at growing the pipeline for skilled technicians for semiconductor manufacturing and other advanced manufacturing sectors. Grow the domestic STEM pipeline for engineers and computer scientists vital to the semiconductor industry and other sectors that are critical to the future economy. Retain and attract more international advanced degree students within the US economy.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Regulation, Manufacturing, Labor Market, Workforce, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Semiconductors Are Not a Reason to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could cause a major disruption of the global semiconductor supply chain. This has led some to claim that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in order to maintain its supply of advanced chips. Fears that China could seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically are overblown. Interdependence cuts both ways; if China invaded Taiwan, it would be cut off from the vital inputs controlled by the U.S. or its allies, and therefore unable to resume chip production under new management. Others fear Taiwanese chips could be disrupted during a Chinese blockade or a protracted conflict and tend to recommend bolstering U.S. capabilities to deter China. However, there are strong reasons to doubt the U.S. can ultimately deter Beijing if it feels that force is its only option for national reunification. Further efforts by the U.S. to deter China may only present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen, and precipitating the very conflict the U.S. seeks to prevent; a war between the U.S. and China would be exponentially costlier than any potential semiconductor supply shock resulting from a cross-strait invasion. Instead, the U.S. should seek to dial down the temperature with Beijing in order to maintain the political and territorial status quo and buy the time needed to diversify its own semiconductor supplies by onshoring or “allyshoring” chip manufacturing. The U.S. should therefore avoid provoking Beijing unnecessarily, and reaffirm the substance of the One China Policy while seeking to develop a longer-term settlement with Beijing over the future of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

6. Reshoring Semiconductor Manufacturing: Addressing the Workforce Challenge

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, sweeping legislation that seeks to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, encourage investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the United States, stimulate semiconductor research and development (R&D), and disincentivize U.S. investments in chip-making plants in China. Among other things, the legislation will provide $52.7 billion in federal outlays over five years for loans, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial support for domestic chip-making investments, as well as a 25 percent tax credit for semiconductor investments in the United States. Bolstered by this unprecedented level of federal support, six major chip makers are investing in new wafer fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States: Intel, Samsung, TSMC, GlobalFoundries, Texas Instruments, and Micron Technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Securing Medical Supply Chains with Trusted Trade Partners

Author:
Meredith Broadbent
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
There is bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill and in the Biden administration regarding excessive dependence on Chinese manufacturing and production. An extension of this is that diversification of supply chains for certain medical products will make U.S. citizens more secure in fighting future infectious diseases. The highly disrupted international economic environment, reeling from supply and demand dislocations unleashed by the pandemic, U.S.-China trade conflicts, and war in Eastern Europe, is prompting certain countries in the Western Hemisphere to seize the occasion to aggressively market themselves as attractive hosts for foreign direct investment looking to move closer to the U.S. market. It is an opportune time for the United States to shape some of the larger forces of global economic disruption, including the movement of investment and production capital. It is time to forge enhanced trade links and diversified supply chains with friends and allies to promote health security, stronger economic and diplomatic engagement, commitments to exchange of data on production, and best practices in fighting disease. This paper breaks down CSIS’s analyses on the capacity for nearshoring in Canada, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Manufacturing, Medicine, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. The Impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Nayantara D. Hensel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed a number of challenges on countries and industries, some of which have been partially mitigated by government efforts, medical developments, and corporate strategies. Nevertheless, COVID-19, which, in March 2020, was identified as a pandemic by the World Health Organization and was declared by the U.S. government as a national emergency,1 will likely continue to have after-effects in the coming years. The defense sector, as has been the case with many other sectors, has faced challenges in declining production at manufacturing plants, difficulties with key inputs from sole source suppliers, concerns regarding the financial viability of small businesses within the supply chains, and the impact of different variants of COVID-19 within the global supply chains. Companies which had diversified between commercial and military clients often faced a greater negative impact on their financial strength than companies with largely defense-focused products. This was partially due to the decline in demand within the commercial aerospace sector as a result of COVID-19. The financial health of companies across industries suffered due to COVID-19; indeed, this was reflected in the almost 30 percent increase in commercial chapter 11 filings in 2020 compared to 2019, with bankruptcies reaching their highest levels since 2012.2 The sectors with the greatest number of bankruptcies in 2020 were real estate, oil and gas, restaurants, entertainment, and retail.3 While bankruptcies were lower among firms in the defense sector due to stability in multi-year contracts with the government, as well as support of smaller suppliers by larger suppliers and by the government, defense firms with a greater focus on commercial clients suffered more. Consequently, although funding from the federal government under the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, as well as funding from the Department of Defense (DOD), provided support for companies within the defense sector and other sectors, defense firms continue to face challenges in the short-term and, potentially, in the longer-term. Moreover, the impact of COVID-19 relief funding could have long-term effects on government deficits and debt, which may reduce defense spending in future years. Indeed, the potential atrophy in the defense industrial base due to the impact of COVID-19 on the financial health of defense companies and on future government spending could lead to national security risks. Production of key defense products—aircraft, ships, tanks, cybersecurity technology, etc.—is vital in supporting national security strategies in various regions and through various types of warfare.
Topic:
Economy, Manufacturing, Pandemic, Industry, Defense Industry, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers have again embraced “industrial policy.” Both President Biden and his predecessor, as well as legislators from both parties, have advocated a range of federal support for American manufacturers to fix perceived weaknesses in the U.S. economy and to counter China’s growing economic clout. These and other industrial policy advocates, however, routinely leave unanswered important questions about U.S. industrial policy’s efficacy and necessity: What is “Industrial Policy”? Advocates of “industrial policy” often fail to define the term, thus permitting them to ignore past failures and embrace false successes while preventing a legitimate assessment of industrial policies’ costs and benefits. Yet U.S. industrial policy’s history of debate and implementation establishes several requisite elements – elements that reveal most “industrial policy successes” not to be “industrial policy” at all. What are the common obstacles to effective U.S. industrial policy? Several obstacles have prevented U.S. industrial policies from generating better outcomes than the market. This includes legislators’ and bureaucrats’ inability to “pick winners” and efficiently allocate public resources (Hayek’s “Knowledge Problem”); factors inherent in the U.S. political system (Public Choice Theory); lack of discipline regarding scope, duration, and budgetary costs; interaction with other government policies that distort the market at issue; and substantial unseen costs. What “problem” will industrial policy solve? The most common problems purportedly solved by industrial policy proposals are less serious than advocates claim or unfixable via industrial policy. This includes allegations of widespread U.S. “deindustrialization” and a broader decline in American innovation; the disappearance of “good jobs”; the erosion of middle‐​class living standards; and the destruction of American communities. Do other countries’ industrial policies demand U.S. industrial policy? The experiences of other countries generally cannot justify U.S. industrial policy because countries have different economic and political systems. Regardless, industrial policy successes abroad – for example, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – are exaggerated. Also, China’s economic growth and industrial policies do not justify similar U.S. policies, considering the market‐​based reasons for China’s rise, the Chinese policies’ immense costs, and the systemic challenges that could derail China’s future growth and geopolitical influence. These answers argue strongly against a new U.S. embrace of industrial policy. The United States undoubtedly faces economic and geopolitical challenges, including ones related to China, but the solution lies not in copying China’s top‐​down economic planning. Reality, in fact, argues much the opposite.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. Will the Biden Administration Support Global US Leadership in the Innovative Medicines Industry?

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Given the historically unprecedented speed with which the US pharmaceutical industry has developed COVID-19 vaccines—3 of the 4 first products likely to be approved for marketing are almost certainly from US firms—it would seem appropriate for a renewed sense of confidence, support and even acclaim for the economic model that lies behind this success. Instead, the sector remains under pressure to lower prices and protections for its patented products, both in the United States and globally. It is worth noting that the entire world benefits from the new medical advances in treating the worst pandemic in at least 50 years. Instead, President Trump has continued to criticize the industry for its pricing model for newly developed drugs, while countries such as India, Pakistan, and Brazil call for breaching of the patent shield for the new vaccines (and recent treatments such as those for HIV and Hepatitis C), and developed countries in Europe, East Asia, as well as Canada, persist in questioning the medical value of the new medicines to their citizens.1 To add to the current uncertainty about US leadership, there is ever-increasing competition from China in terms of basic science and pharmaceutical products. The Chinese national goal of self-sufficiency in these two fields has resulted in a huge increase in research and development funding and purchases of leading biotechnology firms in the United States and Europe. At the same time, China’s global market share in generic drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) is steadily growing. Chinese government funding for research in these fields has grown by 20 percent annually since 2008. The incoming Biden administration is calling for new pricing models and the use of compulsory licensing for some new products, especially those related to the new virus pandemics. Compulsory licensing allows a government to license entities other than the patent holder to produce and sell patented products without the patent holder’s permission. If the economic and scientific model which promotes constant advances in medicines and new treatments is to survive, the current domestic ecosystem for research and development ought to be strengthened, instead of being undermined by reducing private sector incentives and weakening the protection of intellectual property (IP). Additionally, ways to address the problem with other countries enjoying a “free ride” at the expense of US consumers and public health systems, need to be considered.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Manufacturing, Innovation, Vaccine, COVID-19, Medicine, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America