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21. Fact Sheet: Anti-Protest Legislation and Demonstration Activity in the US

Author:
Sam Jones and Roudabeh Kishi
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the wave of demonstrations over the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020, state governments have proposed more than 90 “anti-protest” bills to restrict demonstration activity around the country (Al Jazeera, 22 April 2021). Republican lawmakers have introduced 81 bills in 34 states during the 2021 legislative session alone, more than double the number introduced in any other year, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (New York Times, 21 April 2021; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 22 April 2021). These bills have become law in states like Oklahoma and Florida, with new legislation increasing the penalties for “unlawful protesting” and “granting immunity to drivers whose vehicles strike and injure protesters in public streets” (New York Times, 21 April 2021). Although officials have cited instances of protest violence over the past year to justify this new legislative push — with Governor Ron DeSantis labelling Florida’s law “the strongest anti-looting, anti-rioting, pro-law-enforcement piece of legislation in the country” (New York Times, 21 April 2021) — most of these states have experienced low levels of violent or destructive demonstration activity. ACLED data show that, on average, the states in which strict “anti-protest” laws have been proposed are home to the same rate of peaceful protests — 97% of all events — as states that have not pursued such legislation, meaning that violent demonstrations do not feature more prominently in the former than the latter. States like Florida and Oklahoma, which have promulgated some of the most restrictive new laws, have actually seen a lower proportion of demonstrations involving violent or destructive activity than most other states in the country.
Topic:
Social Movement, Protests, Legislation, Black Lives Matter (BLM), and Racial Justice
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Taking Action on Cyber Enforcement: Assessing US Legislative Progress in the 116th Congress

Author:
Michael Garcia and Pat Shilo
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The 116th Congress experienced events like no other in American history, including unprecedented levels of malicious cyber activity. Global estimates say that ransomware attacks have increased by 148% since February 2020, with many US hospitals and schools falling victim and having their operations suspended.1 Leading up to and during the pandemic, Members of the 116th Congress responded and drafted cybersecurity legislation, introducing 316 bills to tackle the issue—a 40% increase from the previous Congress. This memo presents a comprehensive analysis of the cybersecurity legislation introduced in the 116th Congress and is a successor to our memo assessing the cybersecurity legislation in the previous Congress. Unlike the 115th Congress, the two chambers of the 116th were each under the control of a different party. Still, more than half of the introduced bills were bipartisan, including 85% of the bills signed into law. However, only 11% of the introduced bills focused on imposing consequences for the human actors behind cyberattacks, such as imposing sanctions or strengthening laws to prosecute criminals to hold them accountable for their actions. Following the trend of past congresses, most of the bills focused on protecting data and securing critical infrastructure. But while defending data and infrastructure is important, the lack of legislation to address the challenges of imposing consequences on the human actor suggests that Congress should prioritize introducing and passing bipartisan legislation that reduces the impunity with which malicious cyber actors, particularly cybercriminals, act. Here are the main takeaways from the bills introduced last Congress: Cybersecurity-related legislation increased by 40% since the 115th Congress. Of the 316 bills introduced, 14 became law, with nine related to appropriations or agency authorizations legislation. However, only 36 of the 316 bills introduced in the 116th Congress, and just three of the 14 provisions signed into law, focused on imposing consequences on the human actors behind cyberattacks. Cybersecurity remains a largely bipartisan issue. Over 50% of all legislation and 85% of all bills signed into law had a bipartisan co-sponsor.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

23. The Militarization of Cyberspace? Cyber-Related Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act

Author:
Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
With Congress struggling to pass stand-alone cybersecurity legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is now the primary vehicle to pass all matters of cybersecurity legislation. Because the annual defense bill typically requires provisions to have a tie to national security, other cyber issues, like those pertaining to criminal justice, tend to be excluded. As a result, the authorities and resources awarded to Department of Defense (DoD) cyber mission far outpace those provided to civilian agencies responsible for partnering with state, local, private, and international partners. With ransomware and cyber incidents at an all-time high, Congress should either include a new title in future Defense bills to bolster US cyber enforcement and civilian agencies’ capabilities or pass a cyber-omnibus bill to fix policy gaps and provide commensurate funds to federal and local agencies to combat malicious cyber activity. In this paper, we analyzed the last five NDAAs (2017-2021) to chronicle Washington’s reliance on the NDAA to shepherd through a wide swath of cybersecurity legislation. We found that: Members of Congress included 290 cyber-related provisions in the past five NDAAs, with the past two NDAAs accounting for 60% of those provisions. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA contained 380% more cyber-related provisions than the FY 2017 NDAA. The 179 cyber-provisions included in the past two NDAAs far outpace the 14 cybersecurity bills that the 116th Congress passed (two of which were those NDAAs). Across 13 categories, three of the top four were aimed at the DOD core cyber missions, such as changing organizational processes and structures, protecting DoD assets, and engaging with foreign partners while deterring nation-state adversaries. In FY 2020, the number of non-DoD-related cyber provisions began increasing, such as supply-chain security and industrial policy, critical infrastructure protection, and election security. The provisions in these NDAAs helped improve US offensive cyber capabilities, implement measures to deter cyber adversaries, and shore up our cybersecurity defenses, all of which are needed. But because cybersecurity is a multifaceted issue that expands beyond national security and touches on criminal justice, workforce development, private-sector collaboration, and privacy issues, Congress must ensure it takes a holistic approach when creating cybersecurity laws.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

24. Adversarial Avenues: Ten Bipartisan Ways to Make a Bill Like S. 1 Close Loopholes Autocrats Exploit to Meddle in U.S. Politics

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In his push for bipartisan efforts on voting rights legislation, Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) warned that “the lack of transparency in many campaign finance rules provides multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” These loopholes might be called the “adversarial avenues” of malign finance. Manchin went on to explain that this is why he supports two campaign finance provisions included within the For the People Act (S. 1): The DISCLOSE Act and the Honest Ads Act. Manchin is absolutely right. The most comprehensive research on covert foreign money classified by legal avenue more than 100 cases—adding up to more than $300 million over the past decade—of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China funneling money into democratic processes as a geopolitical weapon. Strikingly, 83 percent of this activity was enabled by seven legal loopholes that were identified in this research and are now being actively tackled by the European Parliament. Two of those seven vulnerabilities would be addressed by DISCLOSE and Honest Ads, which would impose financial transparency on “dark money” non-profits and online political ads, respectively. But foreign powers do not stop there. As President George Washington warned in his farewell address, they bring “insidious wiles” to their tradecraft of foreign influence. Autocrats invent and exploit cunning ways to secure political power, devising creative tricks to interfere in elections at home and abroad, often through some degree of legal participation by people within the target country. Indeed, a recent U.S. intelligence assessment found that in the 2020 election the Kremlin’s main innovation since 2016 was more collaboration with U.S.-based conduits. That is why, in addition to Thomas Morley’s and my year-long research project on malign finance, Jessica Brandt and I worked with a bipartisan team of legal experts to develop legislative proposals that would outlaw U.S. participation in foreign interference. Drawing from this extensive body of research developed over the past two years, 10 policy proposals would further address the “multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” The first five proposals offer ways to more thoroughly approach interference issues already under consideration in S. 1, while the second five proposals introduce new resilience measures for consideration.
Topic:
Politics, Finance, Legislation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

25. Factsheet: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to prohibit the federal government from burdening a person’s free exercise of religion. Currently, twenty-one states have also passed religious freedom restoration acts. The use of the RFRA in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) drew concerns about the law being used to permit discrimination against communities such as religious minorities, nonreligious people, people of color, women, and the LGBTQ community. In February 2019, Representative John Kennedy III and then-Senator Kamala Harris reintroduced the Do No Harm Act to ensure that the RFRA would not be used to permit discrimination.
Topic:
Discrimination, Legislation, and Freedom of Religion
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act

Author:
Rime Allaf, James Jeffrey, Lister, and Qutaba Idlibi
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying. How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Topic:
Human Rights, Sanctions, Syrian War, Legislation, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

27. Tailpipe Wars: The Presidential Politics of U.S. Auto Emissions

Author:
Ryan Warsing
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite growing consensus that climate change is real, manmade, and pernicious, the U.S. Congress has failed to update old laws – to say nothing of passing new ones – that might mitigate the crisis. State governments have attempted to fill the void, with California setting de facto national policy using powers delegated under the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA). The Trump administration’s 2019 bid to revoke these powers rejects the process of “iterative federalism” and leads one to believe Trump’s agenda is both vindictive in nature and impervious to broad support for environmental regulation. Yet this support (even in electorally pivotal states like Pennsylvania) proves a weak motivating factor next to the needs of vulnerable constituencies, notably autoworkers. Trump’s agenda is rationally set by his need to attract support in states like Michigan where votes are precious and regulatory exposure is high. Long a means for the federal government to enjoy environmental progress at a safe political distance, the “California carve-out” seems to have exhausted its utility with the Trump administration, which deems all environmental regulation anathema to growth and the happiness of its base. Trump’s rationale is best understood using Conditional Pandering Theory (CPT), which predicts that presidents with middling approval numbers are apt to be led by the public as Election Day draws near and policy outcomes can be delayed. In the case of emissions, policy outcomes are immaterial so long as targeted marginal voters deliver the president a second term.
Topic:
Climate Change, Legislation, Pollution, Domestic Policy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

28. Could Congress’ latest Syria sanctions bill backfire?

Author:
Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The congressional bill will exacerbate the economic situation in Syria and ultimately increase Syria’s dependency on Iran.
Topic:
Economics, Military Strategy, Sanctions, Legislation, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

29. Creating an Accountability Framework that Serves the Global Fragility Act’s Mission

Author:
Susanna Campbell, Dan Hoing, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
In the final days of 2019, Congress passed the Global Fragility Act, an ambitious bill that aims to im- prove how the US government approaches stabilizing conflict-affected states and preventing the es- calation of violence in other fragile contexts. Introduced by a coalition of lawmakers from both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate—led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Eliot Engel (D- NY) and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)—a version of the legislation was passed by the House this spring and boasted 26 cosponsors in the Senate. The Global Fragility Act’s final passage, as part of a large FY2020 spending bill, is a testament to bipartisan commitment and cooperation. The Global Fragility Act asks the State Department to create—jointly with USAID, the Department of Defense, and other agencies—a coordinated, coherent strategy to help prevent violence in fragile states and stabilize conflict-affected areas. As overseers of the taxpayer funds that will be used to implement the act, Congress also included several provisions to hold these agencies to account for achieving results. Accountability for results is important, especially when overseers are far removed from implementation. But how accountability is structured matters quite a bit. When accountability frameworks revolve largely around tight controls and reporting against targets, their good intentions can backfire and contribute to ineffective programming, especially in fragile states. To ensure that the Global Fragility Act’s accountability requirements support rather than undermine the act’s laudable goals, the monitoring, evaluation, and learning processes that accompany the act’s implementation must accomplish two linked but fundamentally distinct things. They must be able to satisfy Washington-based overseers’ reporting needs while also providing projects the space needed for locally informed adaptive management and learning (or continuous adjustment aimed at achiev- ing transformative aims in a dynamic context), which is associated with better outcomes in fragile states. The Global Fragility Act offers an opportunity to rethink the tools through which aid agencies pursue accountability. This note explains how tight controls and target-oriented reporting can nega- tively affect outcomes in fragile states and offers some initial recommendations for creating a stron- ger, outcome-oriented accountability framework.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Leadership, Fragile States, Legislation, and Accountability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Current law constraining the President: a series on Congress’s options to limit arms sales and aid to Saudi Arabia, part 2

Author:
Jacques Singer-Emery
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the second of a three-part essay series on the different paths the U.S. Congress might take to limit Washington’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. As explained in Part 1 of this series, the Trump administration’s continued support for the Saudi coalition’s war in Yemen has triggered a range of Congressional responses. Although Congress faces challenges in passing new legislation to denounce Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen and its killing of Jamal Khashoggi, the White House’s Saudi policy implicates at least four pieces of existing legislation: the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the War Powers Resolution, the Foreign Assistance Control Act (FAA), and the Leahy Laws. These laws were all passed during the Cold War to curtail the executive’s increasing ability to unilaterally sell arms, supply military aid, and order U.S. troops to assist allies in a theater of war. The executive must abide by these laws. If the President refuses or cuts corners, Congress can bring him to heel directly via impeachment, or indirectly through court orders that force executive branch agencies to halt the restricted activity.
Topic:
Government, War, Law, Courts, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations