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41. American Families Plan

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
As the President indicated when he released his “American Jobs Plan” in March, he presented his “American Families Plan” on April 28, the day of his address to Congress. This new plan is additive with the previous one, and would spend (including through tax cuts—$1 trillion in spending strictly defined, and $800 billion in tax cuts) an additional $1.8 trillion, which is proposed to be financed by tax increases on upper-income individuals. (The $2 trillion American Jobs Plan was to be paid for by increased taxes on corporations.) Again, this plan is claimed to be fully paid for over 15 years, with continuing tax increases beyond that time providing net deficit reduction. The American Families Plan, as its name implies, focuses on expenditures and tax cuts for individuals and households, whereas most (but not all) of the American Jobs Plan financed either traditional infrastructure or private research or physical investment. Unless there is a new spirit of bipartisan cooperation, the American Jobs Plan and the American Families Plan will achieve enactment only if combined in a second and final reconciliation bill for the fiscal year 2022 budget enactment cycle, in a process that will surely take months.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Domestic Politics, Tax Systems, Investment, and Deficit
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN

Author:
East-West Center
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This project maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the national, state, and local levels. Part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, this publication, the one-page connections summaries for states, and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-ASEAN relationship.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Health, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

43. China’s Digital Silk Road: integration into national IT infrastructure and wider implications for Western defence industries

Author:
Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The geopolitical dispute between the United States and China is taking place on the fault line of global telecommunications infrastructure and digital technologies. As this competition grows, so too does the likelihood of a potential bifurcation in the global information and security technological ecosystems, split between US-allied liberal democracies on the one side and countries dependent on Chinese-based information and communications technology (ICT) on the other. The impact of this competition reaches beyond telecommunications companies and those involved in their supply chains. Indeed, second and third order of magnitude implications exist for the security and defence sectors. While this competition unfolds, the Chinese Government’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) continues apace and leverages the strengths of Chinese public- and private-sector giants to further integrate Chinese technologies and standards into the digital ecosystems of the least-developed, emerging and developed economies alike. The existing literature on the security and defence implications of the integration of Chinese ICT into national digital ecosystems is primarily concerned with the potential threats posed to intelligence and defence cooperation. However, the implication of China’s global digital investments for US and other Western defence industries is an understudied subject that deserves greater attention. To provide greater clarity to Western defence industries on these issues, this project has sought to answer four forward-looking questions. Firstly, what risks does the possibility of a bifurcated global digital ecosystem pose for the national and industrial security of key Asian, European and Middle Eastern states and economies? Secondly, to what extent does the integration of Chinese information technology and digital infrastructure create challenges for alliance intelligence and defence cooperation? Thirdly, what level of integration should be considered significant and how might security-cooperation efforts (e.g. Western arms exports) be affected? Lastly, can security risks to companies doing business abroad be mitigated when the integration of Chinese digital technology into national digital ecosystems is already high? This report has aimed to address this gap in current analysis by outlining the potential risks posed by China’s global digital and technological investments to defence industries. It follows with an analysis of the extent of Chinese DSR activity in five case-study countries across Asia, the Middle East and Europe that are of high security and defence importance to the US: Indonesia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Poland. In doing so, the report aims to provide greater insight into government decision-making and lessons learned for Western defence industries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Digital Economy, Conflict, Silk Road, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Will COVID Drive an Early Peak in Transportation Activity and Oil Demand?

Author:
Marianne Kah, Lew Fulton, Amy Myers Jaffe, Mark Schwartz, and Mark Finley
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
A critical question to emerge from the oil demand crash in 2020 caused by the global pandemic is whether it marked the beginning of an inexorable decline in consumption of the fossil fuel that could significantly speed up government efforts to meet net zero carbon targets. The changes in government policy, technology, consumer behavior, and shipping during COVID-19 have been profound. Electric vehicle sales increased in a number of countries, while overall automobile sales declined. The use of digital technology accelerated with a sharp rise in telecommuting, teleshopping, and teleconferencing, cutting into transportation oil use primarily in passenger and air travel. However, some aspects of the COVID experience increased oil use. There was significant substitution away from mass transit to greater use of personal vehicles and there is some evidence that people left large cities in the United States for the suburbs and smaller cities where there is less mass transit available and people drive more for non-commuting activities. There was also a large increase in e-commerce deliveries in the US and other nations that buoyed short-haul truck vehicle miles traveled. While unrelated to transportation, there was also an increase during COVID in petrochemicals used for personal protection equipment and packaging for take-out food and e-commerce deliveries. Because of fossil fuels’ greenhouse gas emissions, understanding how oil demand might return and when it could peak will be factors in governments’ strategies for addressing climate change. In the summer and fall of 2020, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and the University of California, Davis Institute for Transportation Studies (ITS-Davis) conducted an oil demand scenario study out to 2030. The goal was to understand how COVID, in combination with other political, economic, social, and technological drivers, may impact long-term transportation activity and global oil demand and to try to determine whether oil demand has already peaked. Forty-four leading energy and transportation experts developed four scenarios that varied by the pace of economic recovery, the level of government intervention in energy markets, and the stickiness in the mobility trends that were set in motion during the 2020 pandemic lockdowns. ITS-Davis then modeled the impacts of these scenarios on transportation energy and oil use. Other sectors less impacted by COVID were modeled with lesser detail. Global oil demand grows through 2030 in three out of the report’s four scenarios, which is generally in line with forecasts by agencies such as the International Energy Agency and others for that period. The one scenario that bucks the trend, named Forced Revitalization, is characterized by strong government intervention in green stimulus, acceleration of digital mobility technologies, and a slower economic recovery—the result being oil demand falling after 2025. The greater competitiveness of alternative fuels and the weaker economy in that scenario contribute to lower oil use overall. The study finds that while great uncertainty remains about the speed and strength of the world’s recovery from COVID, the current state of government climate policies and technology innovation are unlikely to reduce global oil demand fast enough to help the world keep within a 1.5°C temperature rise along the net zero carbon trajectory. Both government climate policies and technology innovation would need to move well beyond what was contemplated in this study’s scenarios.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Transportation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

45. Standards for a Secure 5G Infrastructure

Author:
Michel Girard
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Fifth-generation (5G) networks are the building blocks of the new digital economy; therefore, standardization of these networks is essential to building a strong foundation. A North American Technology Trust can help Canada, Mexico and the United States work together to develop common standards needed to build, maintain and operate a safe and reliable 5G infrastructure. These standards, guided by a 5G technology road map and safety code, will help maximize the benefits of 5G networks and related technologies for users across the continent. This policy brief is a contribution to a workshop focusing on the future of 5G in North America. The 5G Beyond Borders workshop, organized by the Wilson Center, CIGI and Tecnológico de Monterrey, discussed how strategic cooperation at the North American level can directly shape the future of 5G and lay the groundwork for expanded North American competitiveness in a range of emerging technologies.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, 5G, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

46. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

47. Building Back Better: A National Jobs Strategy

Author:
Mary Alive McCarthy, Carl Van Horn, and Michael Prebil
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The United States has a jobs problem. When the COVID-19 pandemic plunged the economy back into recession in early 2020, it laid bare a fragile and profoundly inequitable labor market. In the absence of a robust and coordinated recovery strategy focused on increasing the supply of good jobs, the same labor market pathologies that plagued the last recovery will re-emerge: the long-term unemployed will struggle to land jobs and many will give up; private sector job growth will be slow and uneven; many new jobs will be worse than those they replace; unemployment among Black and Latinx workers will remain elevated; and income and wealth gaps will widen. This recovery must be different. The Biden-Harris administration has an historic opportunity to lay the foundation for an economy built on good jobs, one that ensures the benefits of economic growth are broadly and fairly shared This publication provides a set of concrete recommendations to help guide an all-of-government jobs strategy, including three goals to guide a national jobs agenda, a suite of distinct but reinforcing strategies to achieve them, and a framework for coordinating activities across government.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Infrastructure, Governance, Job Creation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

48. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

49. How To Retain Election Officials To Secure Future Elections

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2020 presidential election was called the most secure in U.S. history, largely due to efforts to protect the nation’s different physical and cyber infrastructure. This was a triumph considering the physical, cyber, and even human assets that make up the election infrastructure have been and continue to be susceptible to threats. In 2020, many states adopted measures to mitigate threats to physical and cyber election assets like voting equipment, ballots, and facilities, as well as computer services and databases that store voter information. For example, states with close results in the 2020 presidential race had paper records of each vote, which gave them the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary. Other measures such as pre-election testing, state and federal certification of voting equipment, and increased collaboration between election officials and their security partners helped provide additional assurance that the 2020 election results were legitimate. Unfortunately, analogous measures were not in place to protect many of the people—from state and local election administrators to poll workers and vendor staff—who administered the elections. Due in large part to the incendiary rhetoric from former President Donald Trump and his followers, many election officials were threatened and harassed, and such behavior shows no signs of abating. Instead of taking steps to address this problem, many states have passed or are considering passing laws that could make this problem worse. Georgia’s new law removed the Georgia’s secretary of state—who rejected Donald Trump’s effort’s to overturn the state’s 2020 results—from decision-making power on the state election board and turned control of the board over to a politicized, less knowledgeable body: the state legislature. Iowa’s new law threatens election officials with criminal prosecution for failing to follow new voting rules. And Florida recently adopted a rule that subjects its local election officials to a civil penalty of $25,000 if a drop box at an early voting site is left accessible for the return of ballots outside of early voting hours. The unrelenting targeting of administrators—along with unfunded election mandates, threats, burn out, and fatigue—has pushed many election officials to leave or consider leaving their positions. According to a recent Democracy Fund/Reed College Survey of Local Election Officials, approximately one-third of chief local election officials will be eligible to retire before the 2024 election, including more than half of those in the largest jurisdictions, which each serve more than 250,000 registered voters. Considering what many of these election officials and their staffs endured during the 2020 election cycle, and continue to experience, it would be unwise to simply wait and hope that they decide to hang on. Instead, every effort should be made to create an environment that is as conducive as possible for retaining these unsung heroes of the 2020 elections. The ability of the United States to conduct future secure elections may well depend on it. This paper focuses on measures state and local governments can take in concert with their election offices to help retain as many of their high-performing election officials as possible. State and local governments should have support from the federal government and Congress to help address this national security issue, but if the fight over funding the 2020 election is any indication, they should begin taking steps to address this problem now. Below are ten suggestions for how state and local governments can retain their high-performing election officials. None is a “silver bullet,” not all of them will be relevant for each state and local government unit, and some governments have already taken many of these steps. But in addressing election official retention solutions, these suggestions provide remedies for some of the thorniest problems that election officials encounter.
Topic:
Politics, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

50. Foucauldian Panopticon: A Model for U.S. Cyber Surveillance

Author:
Nida Sheikh and Muhammad Usman Askari
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Unlike the conventional means of surveillance in the past, cyber surveillance has become a great security tactic due to being technologically advanced, ungoverned and holistic in scope. In context of contemporary international relations, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are using the components of information warfare to serve their strategic interests. The internationally competitive trends of information technology and surveillance make U.S. more concerned about its national security and defeating the information warfare threat. Being a global leader, U.S. is constantly developing its cyber capabilities to contain the rise of China.On account of persistent threat perception of cyber intrusions from China, U.S. has been using cyber surveillance as a counter measure. U.S has integrated its cyber capabilities with military operations in the form of aerial, land and naval surveillance to ensure its national security. The present research aims to explore that how cyber surveillance has become an indispensable component of U.S. defense strategy? Michel Foucault’s surveillance theory has been used as a foundation of the study to analyze the implication of surveillance and power in context of U.S. defense policy. The study used qualitative content analysis and furthermore, directed approach has been used. The research is mainly bifold; initially it endeavors to analyze U.S. national strategies within the timeframe of 2015-2020 and subsequently discusses U.S. cyber surveillance capabilities, using the lens of Foucauldian panopticon.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Surveillance, Cyberspace, Michel Foucault, Power, Panopticon, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America