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211. What Is Iran Up To in Deir al-Zour?

Author:
Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran and its proxies have been exerting hard and soft power in northeast Syria, combining military consolidation with economic, social, and religious outreach in order to cement their long-term influence. On September 30, Syria and Iraq reopened their main border crossing between al-Bukamal and al-Qaim, which had been formally closed for five years. The circumstances surrounding the event were telling—the ceremony was delayed by a couple weeks because of unclaimed foreign airstrikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in east Syria following the Iranian attack against Saudi oil facilities earlier that month. What exactly have the IRGC and its local proxies been doing in Deir al-Zour province? And what does this activity tell us about Iran’s wider plans there?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Education, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

212. Turkey Pivots to Tripoli: Implications for Libya’s Civil War and U.S. Policy

Author:
Soner Cagaptay and Ben Fishman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Facing pressure from General Haftar and his foreign military backers, the Tripoli government has welcomed the helping hand extended by Ankara, whose own lack of regional options has drawn it into the middle of another conflict. On December 10, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he was willing to deploy troops in Libya if the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli requested it. He reiterated the offer during a December 15 meeting with GNA prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj in Ankara—a visit that arose after Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who heads the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and seeks to replace the GNA, renewed his push to take Tripoli by force. Meanwhile, Turkey signed two controversial agreements with Tripoli over the past month: a memorandum of understanding on providing the GNA with arms, training, and military personnel, formally ratified by Tripoli earlier today; and a November 28 maritime agreement delineating exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean waters separating the two countries. The latter move drew protests from Greece and Egypt and was condemned “unequivocally” by the European Council. These and other developments indicate Libya’s emerging status as a focal point of Ankara’s foreign policy, which seemingly regards the country as an arena for Turkish proxy competition with rivals old (Greece) and new (Egypt and the United Arab Emirates). At the same time, Libya’s GNA has become increasingly dependent on Ankara for military reasons—namely, a lack of other allies willing to provide arms capable of countering the LNA’s Emiratisupplied drones, and the arrival of Russian mercenaries who have added new technology and precision to Haftar’s war against Tripoli. Unless Washington invests more diplomatic energy and fully backs the German-led initiative to implement a ceasefire and return to peace negotiations, the proxy war in Libya will only escalate. In that scenario, Turkey and Russia—not the United States or its European partners—could be become the arbiters of Libya’s future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and United States of America

213. China as a Military Power: Strategic Vision and Global Action

Author:
Marcos Azambuja, Monica Herz, Tatiana Rosito, Andy Mok, Durval Durães Neto, and Rafael Almeida
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
At its 14th meeting, the China Analysis Group promoted insightful discussions on the goals and priorities of Chinese security and defense strategy, considering its regional and global implications – as well as opportunities for cooperation with Latin America and Brazil. Against the backdrop of China-US geopolitical rivalry, China’s more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping has often been perceived as a threat by other nations. However, one of the key messages conveyed by Chinese official documents and narrative is the peaceful nature of China’s military ascent, based on a defensive modernization of its armed forces – even though a less conciliatory tone is adopted in regard to Chinese core interests, especially concerning territorial integrity. The speakers at the meeting were Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) Andy Mok; the Brazilian Army Attaché to People’s Republic of China for bilateral exchange Col. Durval Durães Neto; and CEBRI's Trustee Emeritus Marcos Azambuja. The event had as commentators Professor at the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio) Monica Herz and Chief of Staff of the Sixth Army Division, Col. Rafael Almeida. CEBRI's Senior Fellow, Tatiana Rosito, coordinated the meeting.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and United States of America

214. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

215. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

216. Recent U.S. and International Assessment of Baltic Security Developments

Author:
Bert Chapman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Objectives: Examining analysis of Baltic security developments from U.S. government and military resources, scholarly journal articles, and multinational public policy research institute assessments. Methods: Analyzing content and rhetoric within these resources to learn how those producing these materials view Baltic security developments and their viewpoints on how the U.S. and its allies should respond to these developments focusing on increasing Russian regional assertiveness. Results: Provides interpretations of Baltic security developments, Russian Baltic policy, and U.S. and NATO responses ot these developments in materials produced by U.S. civilian and military policymakers and multinational scholarly analysis. Includes performance assessments of U.S. programs including the European Deterrence Initiative and potential Russian military activity in the Baltics as reflected in varying reports by the U.S. Government, military, and multinational public policy research institutions. Conclusions: Recommends U.S. and NATO countries recognize a new Cold War exists with a revisionist Russia. Advocates continuing NATO military exercise, upgrading civilian and military infrastructure protection, and enhancing U.S. and allied preparedness. Urges ongoing and candid dialogue between NATO and Russia to keep this situation from erupting into war. Insists the U.S. and its allies adroitly respond to Russian attempts to influence and manipulate public opinion toward Moscow. Expresses concern that U.S. partisan division over 2016 Russian interference in U.S. presidential election makes achieving greater Baltic policy cohesion difficult. Advocates warning Russia of devastating consequences of attempts to militarily invade or subvert Baltic countries.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

217. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

218. NATO and Postmodernity. An Organization not too well Understood and Geopolitically Necessary / La OTAN y la postmodernidad. Una organización poco comprendida y geopolíticamente necesaria

Author:
Federico Aznar Fernández-Montesinos
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
NATO is an organization hindered by its 20th century success; in addition, it is not well understood in a postmodern world despite having been transformed by increasing its political aspect and reduced its military weight through the simple re-reading of its founding treaty. A "Hard" power institution in a postmodern and "Soft” world. However, risks and threats have only faded and, although they have lost some of their intensity, they have gained in specter. Paradoxically, NATO dissolution with the end of the Cold War would have led to the disappearance of a forum for dialogue, to the unraveling of the security space and, thus, to the rearming of Europe. Russia is the continent nation heir to the USSR, the reason for the creation of NATO. But Russia is not the USSR in geopolitical or ideological terms, even though its recent action has brought back the shadows of the Cold War. The complexity of the approach to the problem of its relationship with the West cannot be reduced to the dichotomous and exclusive enemy friend key (it is a partner, supplier, supplier ... more than a strategic rival). Its correct definition comes from the resolution of the problem of its identity. In this context, NATO remains a geopolitically necessary organization, not in vain is today the only bridge that links exclusively Europe and the United States while contributing to the stability and structure of the West. And it serves to find a place for Russia too. His eventual tensing is a proof of the vigor of his health and the need to find channels of understanding among its members. In general, it is not good to blow up bridges already built despite it is legitimate to want to change them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

219. The Chinese Perception of the U.S.-China-ROK Triangle

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since being applied to U.S.-Soviet-China trilateral relations after the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the notion/theory of “strategic triangles” has been widely used to examine many trilateral relations. The model of “U.S.-China plus one” is popular among students of U.S.-China relations and, consequently, the policy community has witnessed an increasing amount of scholarship on triangles among U.S.-China-India, U.S.-China-Japan, U.S.-China-Russia, and even U.S.-China-Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, this begs the question whether a strategic triangle could be construed and constructed among the United States, China, and South Korea. Generally speaking, despite the trilateral nature of U.S.-China-ROK relations, the Chinese policy community rarely subscribes to the existence of a strategic triangle among the U.S., China, and South Korea. This is not necessarily because South Korea does not carry the same strategic weight as the two great powers, but more importantly is because China does not see South Korea as possessing the strategic autonomy to act as an independent player in the trilateral relations. Although arguably such autonomy might exist in economic and trade relations, on key political and security issues, the Chinese see South Korea as invariably constrained by the U.S.-ROK military alliance and unable to form its own independent national security policy. In writing about the post-Cold War period with an emphasis on geopolitics, Chinese authors do not often treat South Korean policy or Sino-ROK relations as autonomous. Given the great weight given to the U.S. role, it is important, therefore, to take a triangular approach in assessing these writings centered on South Korea. I do so first explaining in more detail why the “strategic triangle” framework does not apply, then examining views on how this triangle has evolved in a period of rising Chinese power relative to U.S. power and fluctuating U.S.-ROK relations as the leadership in Seoul changed hands, and finally returning to the triangular theme to grasp how this shapes China’s understanding of Seoul’s policies with emphasis on the ongoing Moon Jae-in era.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

220. An American strategy for Southeast Asia

Author:
Michael Mazza
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is no mere strategic sideshow. For centuries, it has been geopolitically important due to the sea lanes that pass through it, its proximity to and abutment of India and China, and the resources to which it plays host. The United States should strive to shape a Southeast Asia that is at peace with itself and its neighbors; is characterized by states that are strong, independent, and prosperous; and is home to governments that are resilient, responsive, and accountable. Washington should adopt a comprehensive strategy—with security, economic, and governance pillars—to achieve those ends. Should the United States succeed, it will ensure a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its friends and allies, shore up the liberal international order, deepen prosperity at home and in Southeast Asia, and advance freedom in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America