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81. The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis

Author:
Gregory Weaver
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible. In order to prevent war and escalation in war, US policymakers and military planners must take the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict seriously. The United States should communicate four focused deterrent messages to China and reassure its allies and partners that it can deter Chinese nuclear use. The United States should reevaluate its theater nuclear capability requirements for a Taiwan conflict and carefully analyze options to defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan with limited nuclear strikes if necessary. Finally, the United States must credibly address the potential for collaborative or opportunistic aggression by China and Russia in an environment in which both are peer nuclear adversaries. This requires determining what the US strategy should be to address the two-peer threat, optimizing US and allied conventional forces to address it, and reshaping US nuclear capabilities if necessary. The United States needs to know now whether it is going to require a nuclear force that is larger, or different, or both, because changing the current modernization program requires immediate action to address the threats in time.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

82. NATO and strategic competition: Time for Allies to step up

Author:
Mark Webber
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
2022 was marked by the publication of a string of high-level strategy documents by the NATO allies: the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in the United States, the National Strategic Review in France, the Dutch Defense White Paper, and the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy. In January 2023, Estonia updated its National Security Concept. A refresh of the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review is due in the spring of 2023. Germany’s first post-Cold War National Security Strategy is expected to be published around the same time. These documents all share a preoccupation with what NATO’s own 2022 Strategic Concept has referred to as “rising strategic competition” in a “contested and unpredictable” world.1 This strategic convergence indicates a strengthening of solidarity in view of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Chinese efforts to extend its global footprint. How NATO responds over the long haul will be shaped by American priorities. The United States, former German Defense Minister, Christine Lambrecht, noted in January 2023, “may not be able to guarantee the defense of Europe to the extent that it used to” as it turned its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. “[W]e Europeans”, would in consequence, need to do more to generate “military strength”.2 This is not a fringe opinion. German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and French President, Emmanuel Macron, have argued essentially the same.3 Actions, of course, speak louder than words. This Policy Brief shows that European commitment is still lagging. In view of the urgency of the challenge, greater effort and prioritization are required.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

83. Taiwan’s Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense

Author:
Eric Gomez
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Amid deteriorating US-China relations, senior US officials have begun suggesting that a Chinese attack against Taiwan could happen soon. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that this urgent threat requires an urgent response, but too much attention has focused on the US-China military balance and too little on Taiwan’s military efforts. Taiwan’s future would likely be determined in the opening days, if not hours, of a conflict. Taiwan must prevail in two critical military operations: surviving China’s conventional bombardment and preventing the first wave of amphibious ground forces from establishing a beachhead. Taiwan would be fighting these two operations alone, but Taiwan’s military does not have the right mix of equipment, manpower, and strategy to mount an effective defense, despite the fact that the results of these operations could prove decisive for the rest of the conflict. US policymakers must press Taipei to focus on improving Taiwan’s ability to execute this narrow set of military missions and to reorient its overall strategy to one of asymmetric defense to counter Chinese advantages. If Taiwan does not or cannot do so, it is unlikely that any amount of potential US assistance or intervention could salvage the island’s position in the event of a conflict. Because these shortfalls are so important, Washington should create a sense of urgency in Taipei through security assistance measures such as conditional arms sales and limited joint training. The United States should also take care not to back Beijing into a corner where it concludes that using force is its only viable option to achieve unification with Taiwan. American assurances to China are a tough sell given Washington’s bipartisan hawkishness on China, but keeping time on Taiwan’s side is essential for the success of Taipei’s self-defense transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

84. US land power in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities for the Australian army

Author:
Marcus Schultz
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The US Army is undergoing its most consequential period of transformation since the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of great power competition and a deteriorating strategic environment is forcing the US Army to rethink not just its approach to land warfare but also its future role alongside the US Marine Corps in key regions around the globe. In the Indo-Pacific, this doctrinal and structural transformation is informing a new approach to joint exercises and 'no gaps' defence collaboration to deter Chinese aggression. These developments hold important insights for key US allies and partners, including Australia and Japan. Australia’s new unifying strategic approach to national defence and the high degree of convergence this has with US defence strategy offers a timely window of opportunity for the Australian Army to explore the combined use of land power in a heighten threat environment. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risk and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence. This report aims to provide the Australian defence establishment and military leaders with well-considered options for engaging the US on matters of mutual interest. The report provides an overview of the US Army’s changing force posture and approach to land warfare, followed by a brief analysis of its evolving role as an essential enabler of joint force operations in a maritime environment. The report then explores the US Army’s ‘campaigning’ activities in the region and its efforts to increase allied and partner capacity for high-end military contingencies in all domains. Finally, the report highlights opportunities for the Australian Army to enhance interoperability with US land forces in a deepening US-Australia alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

85. Action on AI: Unpacking the Executive Order’s Security Implications and the Road Ahead

Author:
Janet Egan and Diletta Milana
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On October 30, 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order (14110) on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.[1] Directing agencies to take action within existing resources and authorities, this order seeks to empower the U.S. to realize the full benefits of AI, while still mitigating critical risks. Alongside a focus on civil rights, consumers, workers, competition and privacy, the Executive Order also aims to promote national security by addressing AI safety and security risks, bolstering U.S. technology leadership, enhancing government AI capacity, and leading international cooperation efforts. This article provides an overview of key national security initiatives contained in the new Executive Order and explores issues relevant to their implementation, including: Ensuring Safe and Secure AI; Maintaining U.S. Tech Leadership; Building Government Capacity.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Executive Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

86. Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
David Santoro and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific security architecture is undergoing fundamental transformation to address rising challenges, most notably those posed by an increasingly confident, assertive, and capable China. Pacific Forum has started a multi-year unofficial dialogue with experts and officials from the United States and key allies and partners to share views of this evolving regional security environment and identify common interests and concerns as well as areas of divergence. The inaugural Pacific Forum Defense and Deterrence Dialogue, which included participants from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tokyo on February 2-3, 2023. It was run at the Track 2 level, although diplomatic officials and military officers from each country also attended as observers. Pacific Forum’s goal is to identify ways to shape this evolution to ensure that it meets U.S. national security needs, particularly integrated deterrence of, and defense against, regional adversaries—with China as the foremost concern. Responses to these changes have taken several forms. Bilateral alliances are being modernized. Other security relationships are being strengthened, such as those between Japan and Australia and Japan and the United Kingdom. There is also talk of new coordination among Five Eyes and other partners. In other cases, new initiatives have been launched, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States “enhanced trilateral security partnership” (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Recent developments, such as the election of conservative Yoon Yuk-soul as president in South Korea, are hopeful signs of the revitalization of currently moribund defense and security arrangements, notably U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. There is also reportedly talk of renewed interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue that includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. All these initiatives are designed to better compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defend against adversaries determined to rewrite the regional order in ways that align with their interests. While the notion of an Asian equivalent to NATO is out of sync with regional needs (and there is broad recognition of that fact among key allies), current momentum could herald the emergence of an Indo-Pacific defense community reminiscent of the one created by trans-Atlantic nations after the Second World War. That community was forged to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the nascent group in the Indo-Pacific is focused on China, although it is not the only threat. Understanding how regional governments see and rank those diverse threats is a critical step in ensuring that the new arrangements are most effective. One thing is certain: the current situation—in which there is no coordination mechanism among the existing and emerging arrangements—is not tenable in view of the mounting China challenge. To succeed, this process must be nurtured. The United States must better understand the forces at play and the views driving national action, and it must work to ensure that those changes are effective to counter China and other challenges. Work is needed to understand how all these pieces fit together in a coherent regional deterrence and defense architecture, particularly to deal with strategic conflict. This is not easy. The above- mentioned initiatives and relationships are new and evolving. It is difficult to appreciate each on its own, much less the overlap between them, and their convergences and divergences. Plus, in some cases, governments are also focused on other ways to deter. DTRA’s chief concern is the warfighter, who must be prepared to address a range of threats that extends from “strategic” military problems (including those related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other domains) to gray zone issues, but some regional initiatives also address other issues, notably climate change, vaccine diplomacy, and emerging technologies. It is critical that the United States understand how allies and partners see this menu of items and their goals and priorities, even as the focus of our proposed effort is strengthening regional deterrence and defense. Plainly, a cumulative, comparative assessment is critical because effective deterrence and defense demand a comprehensive analysis and there needs to be shared understanding of how these mechanisms can be coordinated to ensure that needs are met and that participating governments maximize and make the most efficient contributions. From a U.S. perspective, building a collective deterrence and defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific is urgent and the only realistic way to compete effectively against China. As a landmark report from the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney has found, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”1 Failure to build an effective Indo-Pacific deterrence and defense architecture would shift the regional balance of forces to the detriment of the United States as it addresses the China challenge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

87. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

88. Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly for the 3,400 personnel in Syria and Iraq. Since October 7, 2023, dozens of U.S. troops have been injured in attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed Shia militias in both countries, at times resulting in U.S. retaliatory strikes. Defensive measures and luck have prevented U.S. fatalities thus far. But U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq are at significant risk as long as they remain deployed there. If a U.S. ground presence served a core security interest, that risk might be reasonable. But there is no good reason to risk U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the group’s remnants, and the United States can still strike from long distance, if necessary, without local bases. Instead of enhancing U.S. security, the U.S. force presence in Syria and Iraq pointlessly risks war with Iran. Sending additional troops to the Middle East compounds the problem and grants U.S. adversaries in the region added leverage by giving them the ability to threaten U.S. forces. The added danger to U.S. forces is one more reason to withdraw from Syria and Iraq as a step toward de-prioritizing the Middle East more generally.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

89. Keeping Secrets

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans have had a ringside seat at one of the most unusual of presidential shows: President Joe Biden publicly divulging some of our nation’s most protected, secret insights on what Vladimir Putin and his military might be planning. Some have criticized this; most think it has prevented Putin from controlling the war’s narrative. If we are lucky, it could be part of a more important movement toward liberalizing the use and sharing of intelligence. America and its allies could finally be progressing from a vision of war first theorized a hundred years ago. That violent and indiscriminate vision was fully realized with the city-busting aerial attacks of World War II. Ever since, we have believed that being able to decimate a nation’s military, industrial, and demographic capital promises deterrence in peace and quick victories in war. Today, this vision is being slowly supplanted with weaponry and tactics that can target terror precisely, in order to disable nations without decimating them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Classification, and Secrecy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

90. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America