291. A Plan for U.S. Withdrawal from the Middle East
- Author:
- Mike Sweeney
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Thinking through the process of transiting U.S. forces completely out of the Middle East gives additional depth to conversations on force reductions and further normalizes the idea that the United States can eventually leave the region. The underlying social and economic forces that produced the Arab Spring demonstrations of 2011 have not been adequately addressed. They will likely spark additional instability in the years ahead. This fact should affect not only U.S. considerations about decamping the region, but also the pace and speed of a withdrawal. Iranian missile capabilities—as demonstrated in the retaliatory attacks following the death of Qassem Soleimani–allow Tehran to increasingly contest U.S. presence in the region. This will be a long-term factor in U.S. basing decisions, regardless of force levels. The center of gravity for U.S. presence in the Middle East is the “core four” of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They account for more than half the total number of U.S. troops in the region and also host the most substantial physical basing infrastructure. The direction of a U.S. withdrawal should be away from the center and toward the periphery, with forces flowing from the Persian Gulf west and south toward redoubts in Jordan and Oman. A measured timetable of four years would allow the United States to significantly reduce its presence by as much as 50,000 military personnel when rotational deployments (like carrier deployments) are factored in. At the end of the four-year period, the United States would be postured to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America