Search

Begin New Search Topic Cybersecurity Political Geography United States of America

51. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

52. Broadening the Transatlantic Partnership to Address the China Challenge

Author:
Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a turning point in Europe’s calculus regarding China. Beijing’s ham-fisted mask diplomacy, attempt to rewrite the pandemic’s origins and use of the World Health Organisation to advance the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underscored for Europe the nature of Beijing’s objectives. Europe has grown more attuned to the “strategic challenge” China poses in the economic, technology and global governance realms as a result. The growing convergence between US and European perspectives on China provides a solid foundation for future cooperation between the transatlantic partners. Yet, addressing the China challenge will require broadening beyond the transatlantic partnership and bringing Indo-Pacific partners to the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Communications, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, Transatlantic Relations, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

53. Cyber War and Cyber Peace: Past and Future Cyber Clashes in the Middle East

Author:
Selena Larson, James Shires, and Thom Langford
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Although the cyber domain is an emerging field of conflict, it is no longer a new frontier – many battles in cyberspace have been fought and it is imperative they be understood to begin imagining how the future of warfare online may look. As the United States, the Middle East, and policy community globally begin to consider how a Biden administration will approach conflict and cyber conflict in the region, this panel is an opportunity to study the history of cyber warfare in the Middle East as context for the policy challenges that will arise in the next four years. This panel is sponsored by SentinelOne, a cybersecurity solution encompassing AI-powered prevention, detection, response and hunting in a single autonomous platform.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

54. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Spring 2020

Author:
Donald M. Bishop, Valerie Jackson, Christopher Davis, Evan N. Polisar, Kerry K. Gershaneck, Troy E. Mitchell, James R. R. Van Eerden, Rosario M. Simonetti, Paolo Tripodi, David E. McCullin, Christopher Whyte, and Jeannie L. Johnson
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In 2010, MCU Press published the first issue of this journal, formerly known as Marine Corps University Journal, to serve as the bridge between the military Services and the professional military educators, strategists, and historians within the greater Department of Defense community. During the ensuing years, the press and the journal have evolved to offer innovative and active content that continues to serve as a forum for interdisciplinary discussion of national security and international relations issues and how they impact the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps. Now, 10 years later, we see the need to evolve and offer a wider base for those conversations to take place. To celebrate this 10-year anniversary and to reflect the journal’s change in focus over time, the journal has been renamed the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) to honor the constant innovation of our content, our authors, and the topics we present to our readers. JAMS will continue to offer readers thematic, biannual issues that encourage and continue the debates happening across Marine Corps University, the Services, and the Department of Defense. It is no coincidence then that this issue of JAMS focuses on innovation and the future of warfare. Each of the articles presented offers the readers a deep dive into a historical, current, or forward-looking perspective on innovation and the military Services. As with any discussion of the military and abstract concepts such as innovation, we must first set the parameters of our discussion. For many readers, the term innovation evokes thoughts of technology, shiny gadgets, and artificial intelligence. While innovation is not necessarily synonymous with technology, it is certainly a challenge to say what in fact it is—a thing, a concept, an action, the people involved, or all of the above. The experts may not agree on what innovation is, but they can agree that it requires change or transformation to be successful. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War compares the nature of warfare to that of water for “just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” More contemporary agents of innovation include military theorists such as Earl H. Ellis, John R. Boyd, Michael D. Wyly, and John F. Schmitt. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Ellis’s work on Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (Operation Plan 712) in 1921 clearly demonstrated his ability to forecast the future needs for amphibious warfare in the Pacific two decades prior to World War II. Though most readers will recognize former Air Force colonel John R. Boyd for his observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) decision-making loop, his more innovative work may well be seen in the energy maneuverability (E-M) theory, a mathematical study of fighter aviation. Then-major Wyly was tasked with reforming the Marine Corps concept of maneuver warfare in the wake of the Vietnam War. The work of Wyly, Boyd, and William S. Lind would serve as the foundation for Warfighting, Marine Corp Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, that was later formally written by then-captain John Schmitt, along with several other doctrinal publications, including Ground Combat Operations, Campaigning, Command and Control, Planning, Expeditionary Operations, and a revision of Warfighting. The articles in this issue of JAMS continue the discussion fostered by these innovative pathfinders. Our introductory section from the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity discusses the conception and creation of the center and some of its most innovative programs, including the award-winning Destination Unknown graphic novel and the center’s first essay contest, the U.S. Marine Corps Postmortem, and offers insight from Marine Corps leaders who consider both success and failure as critical measures for the strength of an organization. For example, Lieutenant General Loretta E. Reynolds contemplates how the Corps “must find a way to manage today’s risks while constantly readying ourselves for the emerging challenges of the future fight.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Counterinsurgency, Culture, Armed Forces, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Geopolitics, History, Surveillance, Think Tanks, Propaganda, Innovation, Armed Conflict, and Game Theory
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Haiti, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

55. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

56. Hitting Home: Cyber-Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and Its Impact on the United States

Author:
Yuriy Danyk, Chad Michael Briggs, and Tamara Maliarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict in Ukraine has received renewed attention in Washington D.C., and it is worth considering the relevance of this conflict to US national security interests. The open conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014 has been part of a larger hybrid war, including political and information warfare, cyber warfare, assassinations, promotion of corruption, and traditional (kinetic) warfare carried out by destructive geopolitical actors (DGAs) [1]. The conventional conflict cannot be taken out of context, and it is the less visible and “dark” aspects of hybrid warfare that should particularly worry the United States. Hybrid warfare consists of a wide spectrum of attacks, from conventional to covert, carried out to destabilize one’s opponent. Rather than being isolated incidents, cyber attacks often represent part of a wide spectrum of coordinated, offensive strategies against countries like Ukraine and the United States.
Topic:
National Security, War, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

57. Quantum Computing’s Cyber-Threat to National Security

Author:
Steve Grobman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Quantum computing has the potential to bring tremendous advancements to science, including biology, chemistry, physics, and many other disciplines. The practical application will empower a stronger defense against future pandemics similar to COVID-19, not only in the acceleration of the development of vaccines and treatments, but also in optimizing currently unsolvable logistics problems such as how to deliver and route vaccines. In computer science, the “traveling salesman problem” shows it is impractical to find the optimal shortest path to visit cities once the list grows to even a few dozen. This same challenge in delivering vaccines to rural areas during a pandemic is exactly the type of problem that quantum computing will be well suited to solve.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

58. Where Are We Now? Examining the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Combat Cybercrime

Author:
Michael Garcia and Anisha Hindocha
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States has seen an acceleration of an already massive cybercrime wave. Daily reports of cybercrime to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center have nearly quadrupled since the pandemic began, to roughly 4,000 reports per day. Unfortunately, even before this crisis began, the enforcement rates for these crimes are low – for every 1,000 reported cyber incidents, only three arrests of the perpetrators occur. In the fall of 2018, the White House released the “National Cyber Strategy of the United States,” which detailed how the Administration would create or update policies for combating cybercrime. While no implementation plan for this Strategy was ever published, Third Way conducted an analysis of publicly available information of the Administration’s actions and budgetary allocations since the strategy’s release to examine their cybercrime enforcement efforts.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

59. US Global Cybercrime Cooperation: A Brief Explainer

Author:
Allison Peters and Anisha Hindocha
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Cybercrime is a persistent and transnational threat with the rates in the United States estimated to have up to quadrupled during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, law enforcement in the United States and globally has struggled to keep up with this crime, resulting in a considerable enforcement gap that allows cybercriminals to operate with near impunity. In the United States, only 3 in 1,000 malicious cyber incidents will ever see an arrest and the global enforcement gap is likely to be similar.1 The investigation of one cybercrime case often involves criminal justice systems in many different countries, requiring intense international cooperation to bring the perpetrators to justice. The United States is a member of a number of formal and informal mechanisms that help facilitate this cooperation. This includes being a party to a number of binding treaties—particularly the only global cybercrime treaty known as the Budapest Convention—as well as a member of key networks and in multilateral forums. The United States is also a member of a number of entities aimed at developing norms to guide the behavior of nation-states in cyberspace where cooperation in cybercrime investigations is encouraged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Crime, Cybersecurity, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

60. Weakened Encryption: The Threat to America’s National Security

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
For years, law enforcement officials have warned that, because of encryption, criminals can hide their communications and acts, causing law enforcement to struggle to decrypt data during their investigation—a challenge commonly referred to as “going dark.” They called on technology companies to build a process, like a “master key,” to enable law enforcement to unlock encrypted communications. While this may seem like a tempting idea, it would have grave implications for our national security. As more and more of our communications move online, users seek out encrypted services to protect their privacy. Unlike telephonic communications, and despite repeated requests by law enforcement to do so, Congress has not required internet communications platforms to give law enforcement access to intercept user communications or access stored communications. In this paper, we assess the national security risks to a requirement to provide that master key (referred to throughout as “exceptional” or “backdoor” access) to encrypted communications and propose alternative approaches to address online harms.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Encryption
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America