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31. When the KGB Sends Its B Team

Author:
Jonathan B. Rickert
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
During my foreign service tour in Moscow 1966-1968, embassy security regulations prohibited employees from traveling alone within the Soviet Union. We were warned that we risked being targeted by the KGB, whose operatives might attempt to compromise us in any number of ways. Among those often needing a travel companion to comply with this regulation were the embassy’s Publications Procurement Officers (PPOs), who traveled extensively within the country buying all sorts of books and other publications for various U.S. government organizations. And that is how I came to be invited to join PPO Bill Pryce on a book-buying trip to Ufa and Kazan in early December 1966.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, Memoir, and KGB
Political Geography:
Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America

32. Memories of the U.S. Legation in Budapest 1945-47

Author:
Scott R. Schoenfeld
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Editor’s note: The author lived in Budapest in the immediate post-war period while his father, H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld, was U.S. Minister to Hungary 1945-47. As an eight-year-old, he experienced the pervasive Russian military presence in the heavily damaged city. The house the family lived in has been the residence of U.S. ambassadors ever since. These excerpts from his unpublished memoir of the early days of the U.S. Legation have been edited for length. We arrived just days after hostilities ended in Hungary and less than three months after the Soviets’ long winter siege of Budapest, which damaged or destroyed almost every building in the city. Surprisingly, the house did not seem in bad condition when we moved in. In my bedroom, the occupying Russian troops had lit a fire in the washbasin to warm themselves. This had heavily scorched the wall and blackened the ceiling. Some of the large classical paintings that hung in the downstairs rooms had been bayoneted. The Russians had driven hooks in the dining room walls to tether their horses, but that was pretty much the worst of it. Outside was a different story. The house was situated near the route of the main Soviet military thrust into the city in the last days of the siege. Two German soldiers were buried in shallow graves on the hillside just a few yards behind the house. In the garden field below and in front of the house were the graves of twelve Russian soldiers killed in the fight. We were told that the bodies had been wrapped in the house curtains and stacked for two or three days in the lower entry hall of the house awaiting burial. Above the driveway was a large cave hollowed out of the steep hillside where civilians had taken refuge.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, History, Violence, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Hungary and United States of America

33. Jack F. Matlock and American Diplomacy with Russia

Author:
Olga Krasnyak
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Editor’s note: Dr. Krasnyak’s research was supported by the Matlock Archives Short-term Fellows in Residence Grant. The grant was provided by the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies (CSEEES) of Duke University. US-Russia relations are currently at a low point without promise for improvement in the short term. Russia and the US once again seem more likely to be talking about each other than with each other. Research into the career of Jack F. Matlock, a long-term diplomat and an Ambassador to the Soviet Union, offers insights into ways to conduct diplomacy to advance American interests with Russia. Ambassador Matlock’s contributions to diplomacy are important for understanding the history of US diplomacy with Russia; the Matlock archive collection at Duke University is a rich source for researching and teaching diplomacy.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Literature
Political Geography:
Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America

34. Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
FEBRUARY 05, 2020 Protracted Great-Power War A Preliminary Assessment By Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. Print Download PDF Executive Summary This study provides preliminary observations and insights on the character and conduct of protracted great-power war.1 It finds the U.S. Department of Defense is giving insufficient attention to preparing for such wars. While the probability of an extended great-power war may be low, the costs involved in waging one would likely be extraordinarily high, making it an issue of strategic significance for senior Defense Department leaders. Arguably the best way to avoid these costs is to demonstrate to great-power rivals that the United States is capable of prevailing in a protracted conflict. Once the United States became an active world power, in the early 20th century, a great deal of intellectual effort and considerable resources were devoted to planning for an extended great-power war. The primary purpose of these efforts was not to fight such a war but to avoid one, by discouraging prospective enemies from believing they could win. Even during the Cold War, when both superpowers possessed large nuclear arsenals, successive U.S. administrations sought to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States could wage an extended conventional war. Following the Cold War, planning for protracted great-power war contingencies was essentially abandoned. Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best. Should they choose the former course of action, U.S. defense leaders and planners must understand the characteristics of contemporary protracted great-power war, which are likely to be far different from those of both recent conflicts and World War II—the last protracted great-power conflict.
Topic:
Cold War, Power Politics, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States of America

35. The Role of the Army in Politics in Latin America and Turkey during the Cold War | Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Latin Amerika ve Türkiye’de Ordunun Siyasetteki Rolü

Author:
Tuğba Ergezen and Ceren Uysal Oğuz
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
The armies as one of the proponents of the constant progress and transformation of humanity, continue to exist in parallel to the concept of security of which the meaning, the scope and the parameters evolve continuously. From conquests to independence wars and the protection of the states' territorial integrity, the armies have been functioning as guardians against external threats and internal ones stemming from political crises, social unrest, and economic instabilities. Moreover, during the Cold War, the United States used the armies of less developed and developing countries to overthrow elected leaders to establish anti-communist governments that would work in accordance with the US. This article aims to discuss the common and similar points between Turkey and Latin American countries that have experienced coups and military interventions during the Cold War period. In this respect, the similar political, economic and military reasons that led to the armies’ involvement in politics through coups and interventions are argued even though these countries have historical, cultural, administrative and social differences. | İnsanlığın gelişim ve değişim sürecinin bileşenlerinden biri olan ordular, anlam, kapsam ve parametreleri sürekli dönüşen güvenlik kavramına paralel olarak varlıklarını sürdürmektedir. Fetihlerden bağımsızlık mücadelelerine ve ülke topraklarını korumaya kadar farklı görevler üstlenen orduların, dışarıdan gelen tehditlerin yanı sıra, çeşitli siyasi krizler, toplumsal hareketler ve ekonomik istikrarsızlıklar gibi “iç tehditlere” karşı bir mekanizma olarak da kullanılması söz konusu olmuştur. Öte yandan özellikle Soğuk Savaş döneminde az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde orduların, seçilmiş yönetimleri devirerek ABD’nin istediği anti-komünist yönetimlerin işbaşına gelmesini sağlamakta kullanılması da oldukça sık görülen bir olgu haline gelmiştir. Kendilerine özgü tarihsel, kültürel, idari ve toplumsal birtakım farklılıklara sahip olmakla birlikte, Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD’nin de etkisiyle benzer ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri süreçlerden geçen Latin Amerika ülkeleri ve Türkiye arasında orduların siyasetteki rolü, darbelerin arkasında yatan temel faktörler gibi ortak bazı unsurlar bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Soğuk Savaş döneminde çok sayıda askeri müdahalenin yaşandığı Latin Amerika ülkeleri ve Türkiye’nin coğrafi uzaklıklarına karşın ortak deneyimlerine yön veren benzer faktörlerin tartışılmasıdır.
Topic:
Cold War, History, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Army
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

36. Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China?

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China? OCTOBER 13, 2020 By: Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Craig Kafura, Assistant Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy American Views of China Plummet; Public Split on Containment or Cooperation For the first time in nearly two decades, a majority of Americans describe the development of China as a world power as a critical threat to the United States, according to the 2020 Chicago Council Survey. At the same time, American feelings towards China have fallen to their lowest point in Council polling history, dating back to 1978. Reflecting these changing attitudes, Americans are now split on whether the US should cooperate and engage with China or actively seek to limit its influence. This is a significant change. Over the past four years, US-China relations have lurched from one crisis to another. Despite the sharp downturn in relations, and the growing consensus in Washington on pursing a more confrontational approach to China, Chicago Council Survey data through January 2020 showed that this consensus and the growing US-China rivalry had yet to make a deep impact on American views of China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Politics, Public Opinion, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. Uncertain Days for Scholars as Sino-U.S. Tensions Rise

Author:
Jeremy A. Murray
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and China have become pawns in an increasingly fraught relationship. But maintaining and deepening these ties will prevent a return to the dangerous mutual ignorance of the Cold War.
Topic:
Cold War, Education, Nationalism, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Academia
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

38. The Logic of Geopolitics in American-Russian Relations

Author:
Allen C. Lynch
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
One of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s first requests as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor in 1977 was to ask the Pentagon for its plans – including targets – for nuclear war against “Russia”. Brzezinski was outraged when he was presented with the plan for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He could not believe that the U.S. military had no plans to spe- cifically weaken the Russian core of the Soviet empire. For the Pentagon planners, Russia and the Soviet Union were one and the same.1 I begin with this anecdote because it reflects well an enduring geopolitical logic to American-Russian relations: American policy toward Russia, whether it be in the Tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet period, has not been based on opposing a strong Russian state per se. (That state married to communist ideology was something else altogether.) In the after- math of the Russian Civil War, for instance, the United States delayed recognition of Baltic independence until 1922, two years after Soviet Russia had recognized the independence of Estonia in the Treaty of Tartu, on the grounds that Polish and Finnish independence apart nothing should be done to call into question the territorial continuity of the Russian Em- pire.2 Indeed, American officials seldom viewed the Soviet Union as an empire, as the Pen- tagon war plans just cited illustrate. Historically, the logic of geopolitics i.e., the influence of organization in space on international political relationships has often tended to frame American-Russian relations in terms of complementarities of interest. Of course, geopolitics is not the only logic in AmericanRussian relations; ideology, domestic politics, as well as vested institutional interests all play their role in varying degrees under varying circum- stances. But historically, insofar as geopolitical factors have prevailed, American-Russian relations have generally been harmonious, if also remote and indirect in nature. (By indirect I mean that each sees the other mainly in terms of other powers or processes, e.g., the state of the balance of power in Europe and/or Northeast Asia.) Let us recall that Russia, whether it be under Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet auspices, is an essentially continental Eurasian power. Its primary state interest for centuries has been to build and consolidate a trans-continental, multi-national and imperial state while also man- aging international power politics with a series of powerful adversaries throughout Asia and Europe. Above all, Russia sought to ensure that no powerful coalition of external (and in Eu- rope technologically superior) powers could unite to challenge the Russian Empire’s territorial or political integrity. Russian diplomats and rulers thus learned to play the European balance of power with considerable finesse (e.g., the Treaty of Nystadt, 1721, under Peter the Great; the Congress of Vienna, 1815, under Alexander I; the Treaty of Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany, 1922; the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939; the Grand Alliance with the United States and Great Britain, 1941–45; and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, to name just a few instances). As with Great Britain, maintaining a favorable European balance of power has been central to Russian statecraft.3 The United States, by contrast, is functionally an insular power (albeit on a continental scale) with respect to the rest of the world, surrounded as it is by two great oceans and militarily weak and isolated neighbors (i.e., Canada and Mexico). America’s primary foreign policy concern throughout most of its history has thus been, like Russia’s, to prevent the emergence of a hostile European hegemon that could threaten the country’s expansion in North America and its own hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Once the United States had stabilized its independence from Britain after the War of 1812, U.S. and British geopo- litical interests tended to coincide.4 In this context, American and Russian interests have more often been complementary than antagonistic. It has been primarily the intrusion of ideological elements, reflecting for example Americans’ global democratic aspirations or the Soviet Union’s ultimate objec- tive of the triumph of communism worldwide, that have rendered the bilateral relationship intransigent and even dangerous.5
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Post Cold War, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

39. Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Robert O. Work and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
During the Cold War, the U.S. military relied on technological superiority to “offset” the Soviet Union’s advantages in time, space, and force size. Our military-technical edge allowed the U.S. Joint Force to adopt force postures and operational concepts that largely compensated for the Soviet military’s numerical conventional advantage without needing to match it man-for-man or tank-for-tank. After the Cold War ended, this same military-technical advantage provided the U.S. military a decisive conventional overmatch against regional adversaries for over two decades. Now, however, the “rogue” regional powers that have preoccupied U.S. attention for so long have been replaced by two great powers with substantially greater capabilities. A resurgent and revanchist Russia and a rising, increasingly more powerful China are taking aggressive actions that threaten regional security and stability and challenge the existing international order. Without question, of these two great-power competitors, China poses the greater challenge over the long term. Since about 1885, the United States never has faced a competitor or even group of competitors with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) larger than its own. China surpassed the United States in purchasing power parity in 2014 and is on track to have the world’s largest GDP in absolute terms by 2030. In comparison, our Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was hobbled by unsustainable economic contradictions that ultimately crumbled under pressure. At the height of its power, its GDP was roughly 40 percent the size of the United States’. If that is not concerning enough for U.S. strategic planners, Chinese technological capabilities are growing as rapidly as its economic power. The Soviets were never able to match, much less overcome, America’s technological superiority. The same may not be true for China—certainly not for lack of trying. Indeed, China is keenly focused on blunting the U.S. military’s technological superiority, even as it strives to achieve technological parity, and eventually technological dominance. Chinese strategists do not explicitly describe their aims in this manner. Nevertheless, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two decades and what they plan to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider the possibility that the U.S. Joint Force is close to becoming the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technical offset strategy. The purpose of this paper is to describe this strategy and outline its key lines of effort.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Cold War, National Security, Military Affairs, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. Same Ends but Different Means: Change, Continuity and Moscow’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Mark N. Katz
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Islamism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America