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111. Evaluating the impact of fossil fuel vehicles exit on the oil demand in China

Author:
Ziru Feng, Tian Cai, Kangli Xiang, Chenxi Xiang, and Lei Hou
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Vehicle ownership is one of the most important factors affecting fuel demand. Based on the forecast of China's vehicle ownership, this paper estimates China’s fuel demand in 2035 and explores the impact of new energy vehicles under the scenarios of slow, medium, and rapid substitution. The main contribution of this paper is making a more detailed estimation on the main parameters such as the saturation level and growth rate of the vehicle ownership by taking into account the heterogeneity of provinces when using the Gompertz model to forecast the future vehicle ownership. On that basis, the fuel demand of each province in 2035 is calculated. The results show that: ①The vehicle ownership rate of each province conforms to the S-shape trend with the growth of real GDP per capita. At present, most provinces are at a stage of accelerating growth. However, the time for the vehicle ownership rate of each province to reach the inflection point is quite different. ②Without considering the replacement of new energy vehicles, China's auto fuel demand is expected to be 746.69 million tonnes (Mt) in 2035. Guangdong, Henan, and Shandong are the top three provinces in fuel demand due to the economic and demographic factors, with the expected fuel demand of 76.76, 64.91 and 63.95Mt respectively. ③Considering the replacement of new energy vehicles, China’s fuel demand in 2035 will be 653, 615 and 578 Mt respectively under the scenarios of slow, medium and fast substitution. Even under the scenario of slow substitution, the reduction in fuel demand will be 94 Mt, accounting for 26.3% of China's net oil imports in 2016. Therefore, the withdrawal of fuel vehicles will greatly reduce the oil demand and the dependence on foreign oil of China. Faced with the dual pressure of environmental crisis and energy crisis, the forecast results of this study provide practical reference for policy makers to rationally design the future fuel vehicle exit plan and solve related environmental issues.
Topic:
Climate Change, Oil, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

112. The Mekong Matters for America/America Matters for the Mekong

Author:
East-West Center and Stimson Center
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This report explores the trade, investment, business, diplomacy, security, education,and people-to-people connections between the United States and the five countries of mainland Southeast Asia referred to as the Mekong region. Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam are bound together and geographically defined by the Mekong River, which has historically provided a rich, natural bounty of fish, agricultural productivity, physical connectivity, and key environmental services to more than 60 million people living in the river basin. The Mekong’s importance has only grown as the region’s social, economic, and diplomatic ties export the river’s bounty to the rest of the world. As the region develops, urbanization, infrastructure development, and climate change—among other changes—are all impacting the river, its resources, and the millions who depend on the mighty Mekong. This publication was produced in partnership with the Stimson Center Southeast Asia Program.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, and Urbanization
Political Geography:
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America

113. China’s Response to Climate Change: A Study in Contrasts and a Policy at a Crossroads

Author:
David B. Sandalow
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Abstract:
China is the world’s leading emitter of heat-trapping gases, by far. In 2019, Chinese emissions were greater than emissions from the United States, the European Union, and Japan combined. There is no solution to climate change without China. China’s response to climate change is a study in contrasts. China leads the world in solar power, wind power, and electric vehicle deployment, but also in coal consumption. The Chinese government has adopted some of the world’s most ambitious energy efficiency and forest conservation policies, but is financing a significant expansion of coal-fired power plant capacity at home and abroad. China’s leaders are strongly committed to the Paris Agreement, but appear to attach less priority to climate change than in years past. This Asia Society Policy Institute issue paper, China’s Response to Climate Change: A Study in Contrasts and a Policy at a Crossroads, written by former senior policymaker and current Columbia University fellow David Sandalow, explores these contrasts. It does so at an important time in Chinese climate change policy. During the next 18 months, the Chinese government will spend heavily on economic stimulus measures, release its 14th Five-Year Plan (for 2021–2025), and develop short- and long-term climate action plans (known as its “updated nationally-determined contributions” and “mid-century strategy” in the terminology of the global U.N. climate process). Decisions by the Chinese government will reverberate globally, including in the United States. A potential Biden administration’s ambition in addressing climate change would be reinforced by ambition in China. This issue paper also provides an up-to-date snapshot of China’s climate policies, drawing on data from 2019 and the beginning of 2020 (during the height of the COVID-19 economic lockdown), as well as recent remarks by Chinese leaders. It starts by examining Chinese emissions of heat-trapping gases. It then discusses China’s principal climate policies, explaining the main tools the Chinese government uses to address climate change and related topics. The issue paper concludes with a discussion of processes that will shape Chinese climate change policy in the years ahead. This paper is the second in a series of policy products that the Asia Society Policy Institute will publish as part of a project exploring the possibilities around U.S.-China climate cooperation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Governance, Renewable Energy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

114. Climate Diplomacy under a New U.S. Administration

Author:
Thom Woodroofe and Brendan Guy
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Abstract:
The United States is the world’s second-largest greenhouse gas emitter. For that reason, the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November will have an undeniable impact on the future of the global climate change regime. This is especially the case now that the United Nations’ COP26 Climate Change Conference has been postponed to 2021 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, as Asia and the rest of the world consider whether and how to step up their levels of ambition as part of the five-year ratchet mechanism of the Paris Agreement, the United States has the potential to be either a catalytic force for that effort going into 2021 or an even stronger spoiler of the Agreement’s ongoing effectiveness at a crucial juncture. No country will be watching more closely than China. The 2014 U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping proved to be the watershed moment in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, as the two countries signaled for the first time that they would act in a coordinated manner to combat climate change. Whether the United States and China can recapture that spirit of shared ambition in the future will have ripple effects on the positions of other major emitters as well — especially India, Japan, and Australia, which may not enhance their own levels of ambition without a stronger indication of further action by the United States and China. While President Donald Trump has begun the process of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and rolled back domestic and international measures to combat climate change, it is clear that if a Democrat is elected president in 2020, they would make combating climate change a defining priority of their administration. Therefore, a clearer understanding of the specific approach that would underpin the climate diplomacy of a potential new Democratic president can provide greater reassurance to the international community as countries consider their own levels of ambition in the lead-up to COP26 and beyond. This paper, therefore, assesses the international climate policies of both Vice President Joe Biden and Senator Bernie Sanders across six areas, including their proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; engage with other major emitters, including China; use trade policy as a lever for climate action; increase climate finance and remove fossil fuel subsidies; take action across other sectors, and embed climate action as a core national security priority. The authors also lay out three cross-cutting considerations for a potential new Democratic administration to maximize their efforts in the global fight against climate change, including how they can best structure their administration; engage other major emitters most strategically; and use all tools in the toolkit to reduce emissions. This includes a number of specific recommendations for how the candidates’ existing policies can best be elaborated, including with regard to China; plans to host a world leader summit on climate early in a new administration; and the tabling of a new 2030 emissions reduction target. The likely constraints and choices that will confront a new U.S. administration as they determine their approach to climate action are also highlighted in the paper. This paper is the first in a series of policy products that the Asia Society Policy Institute will publish as part of a new project exploring the possibilities around U.S.-China climate cooperation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Government, Treaties and Agreements, Donald Trump, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

115. Tailpipe Wars: The Presidential Politics of U.S. Auto Emissions

Author:
Ryan Warsing
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite growing consensus that climate change is real, manmade, and pernicious, the U.S. Congress has failed to update old laws – to say nothing of passing new ones – that might mitigate the crisis. State governments have attempted to fill the void, with California setting de facto national policy using powers delegated under the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA). The Trump administration’s 2019 bid to revoke these powers rejects the process of “iterative federalism” and leads one to believe Trump’s agenda is both vindictive in nature and impervious to broad support for environmental regulation. Yet this support (even in electorally pivotal states like Pennsylvania) proves a weak motivating factor next to the needs of vulnerable constituencies, notably autoworkers. Trump’s agenda is rationally set by his need to attract support in states like Michigan where votes are precious and regulatory exposure is high. Long a means for the federal government to enjoy environmental progress at a safe political distance, the “California carve-out” seems to have exhausted its utility with the Trump administration, which deems all environmental regulation anathema to growth and the happiness of its base. Trump’s rationale is best understood using Conditional Pandering Theory (CPT), which predicts that presidents with middling approval numbers are apt to be led by the public as Election Day draws near and policy outcomes can be delayed. In the case of emissions, policy outcomes are immaterial so long as targeted marginal voters deliver the president a second term.
Topic:
Climate Change, Legislation, Pollution, Domestic Policy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

116. U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives From Nebraska

Author:
Salman Ahmed, Allison Gelman, Tarik Abdel-Monem, Wendy Cutler, Rozlyn Engel, David Gordon, Jennifer Harris, Douglas Lute, Jill O'Donnell, Daniel M. Price, David Rosenbaum, Christopher Smart, Jake Sullivan, Ashley J. Tellis, Eric Thompson, Janell C. Walther, and Tom Wyler
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. foreign policy has not come up often in the 2020 presidential campaign. But when it has, candidates on both sides of the aisle frequently have stressed that U.S. foreign policy should not only keep the American people safe but also deliver more tangible economic benefits for the country’s middle class. The debate among the presidential contenders is not if that should happen but how to make it happen. All too often, this debate takes place within relatively small circles within Washington, DC, without the benefit of input from state and local officials, small business owners, community leaders, local labor representatives, and others on the front lines of addressing the challenges facing middle-class households. That is why the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened a bipartisan task force in late 2017 to lift up such voices and inject them into the ongoing debate. The task force partnered with university researchers to study the perceived and measurable economic effects of U.S. foreign policy on three politically and economically different states in the nation’s heartland—Colorado, Nebraska, and Ohio. The first two reports on Ohio and Colorado were published in December 2018 and November 2019, respectively. This third report on Nebraska has been prepared in partnership with a team of researchers at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln (UNL). To gauge perceptions of how Nebraska’s middle class is faring and the ways in which U.S. foreign policy might fit in, the Carnegie and UNL research teams reviewed household surveys and conducted individual interviews and focus groups, between July and August 2019, with over 130 Nebraskans in Columbus, Scottsbluff/Gering, Kearney, Lincoln, North Platte, and Omaha.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Politics, Immigration, Economy, Domestic Politics, Class, and Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

117. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:
Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

118. The Just Transition in Energy

Author:
Ian Goldin
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
With each new year of data, and each new intergovernmental report, it becomes harder to deny the scale and urgency of the energy transition required to prevent catastrophic anthropogenic climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change urges countries to take action to prevent a rise in temperature by more than 1.5°C, and warns of catastrophic consequences of a rise above 2°C. Yet current policies and pledges fall far short of hitting these targets. Worse, since harmful climate change is caused by the stock of carbon in the atmosphere, the longer we delay measures to limit the flow of new carbon into the atmosphere, the more drastic those measures will have to be. This uneven distribution of threat and responsibility raises difficult questions. Developed countries are generally more advanced in their transition to renewables, which means that some of the cheapest opportunities to reduce emissions are in developing countries. Yet the fact remains that developed countries are responsible for a larger share of historic emissions—and developing countries may have a right to pursue development unhindered, as developed countries did in earlier decades. There are therefore several elements of the “just transition” in energy. The world needs to transition to cleaner energy, and the developing world needs to keep developing, all while supporting the countries and communities that bear the highest costs of mitigation measures—and supporting those areas already beginning to feel the negative effects of climate change. This report will outline the key challenges and opportunities and conclude with a series of practical steps available to policymakers.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, International Security, Crisis Management, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, Middle East, India, East Asia, South Africa, Latin America, West Africa, United States of America, and Sub-Saharan Africa

119. President Joe Biden and the restoration of US global leadership: Turning the tide?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Bart Gaens, and Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Te election of Joe Biden as president and Kamala Har- ris as vice president of the United States has generally been welcomed across the world. Allies and partners are relieved that they will again be treated with respect as common issues are addressed, while having been re- minded that they too must ‘step up’ and not only rely on the United States. Even adversaries and competitors acknowledge that it is preferable for the north star of US foreign policy to be something other than impul- sive unpredictability. Based on Joe Biden’s worldview, the world will see a return to more traditional foreign policy precepts. Tis is refected in Biden’s choice of individuals for senior security policy positions in his administration. While the United States is a global power, each ad- ministration addresses the more enduring national interests in diferent ways. In the coming years, key issues to address include, frst, global challenges such as climate change and pandemics; second, strength- ening the transatlantic relationship and global coop- eration between democratic states more broadly; and third, reinforcing the US relationship with various Asian allies and partners, and managing competition with China. From a Nordic perspective, the Biden ad- ministration is expected to continue the cooperative agenda regarding regional security (bolstering defence cooperation and deterring against Russian encroach- ment) carried over from the Obama and Trump admin- istrations, while more robustly addressing global issues such as climate change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

120. A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey, Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Ellie Geranmayeh, Mark Leonard, Theodore Murphy, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, and Tara Varma
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The election of Joe Biden marks a new era in the transatlantic relationship – in upholding the liberal international order, America wants a Europe that is a sovereign partner, not a helpless dependent. Washington will look to the EU to support the US lead in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China, while also wanting Europe to take more responsibility for security and stability in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In exchange, the EU and member states should propose a new transatlantic bargain that encompasses cross-cutting global issues such as health policy, trade, security, climate change, and the defence of democracy. The Trump years galvanised Europeans’ efforts to strengthen their own sovereignty; they now need to agree concrete offers they can make to the new administration. This will require nothing less than a fundamental change in mindset for Europeans, who will have to suppress any hankerings for the old order and decide how they will help build it anew.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Human Rights, International Cooperation, European Union, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America