Heather Conley began the session with a report regarding the current plans for US policy in the region. Generally NEI is considered a success story, thus the US is now retooling its policies by asking where the US should go in a post-enlargement world, and asking how to use this policy elsewhere.
As pressures mount to strike before summer weather forecloses military options for the year, the debate whether the United States should undertake a preventive war against Iraq moves inexorably toward the center of the American political stage, despite the understandable reluctance of many Americans to think about the difficult trade-offs and troubling questions such a war would raise. Proponents of the war focus on the dangers of leaving Saddam Hussein in power. Opponents focus on the morality, military risks, and international political costs of undertaking a preventive war, on the possibilities of containing Saddam Hussein's influence and deterring his use of weapons of mass destruction without resort to war, and on the difficulties of building stable political institutions in the region after a victory.
Achieving adequate preparedness for a terrorist attack against the United States involving a nuclear or radiological weapon is simultaneously a technical problem, a public-policy challenge, and a public-education mission. Response to terrorist attacks differs in important ways from response to more familiar nuclear emergencies arising from reactor accidents, and also from response to conventional and chemical and biological terrorist attacks. The complications of risk communication in the realm of nuclear terrorism include overcoming misinformation about the nature of the threats posed by terrorist attacks involving nuclear and radiological weapons as well as mistrust of experts, the government, and the media.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
The US is Redefining Security: Three major areas in which the US is redefining defense: Home land defense, Force Transformation, Nuclear Posture Review.
Russia retains a significant strategic nuclear force capability, despite the decline in overall force size since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and despite apparent defense budgetary shortfalls and system aging. Russia also inherited sizeable biological and chemical warfare establishments from the FSU, and some components of these programs remain largely intact. Russian entities have exported various nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to states of proliferation concern, and Russia also remains a source for offensive biological and chemical warfare technologies and expertise.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea's NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large- scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching tar-gets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction