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101. Will China's Rise Lead to War?

Author:
Charles Glaser
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Realist international relations theorists usually would predict that the basic pressures of the international system will force the United States and China into conflict. But properly understood, realism offers grounds for optimism in this case, so long as Washington can avoid exaggerating the risks posed by China's growing power.
Topic:
International Relations and War
Political Geography:
United States and China

102. How al Qaeda Works

Author:
Leah Farrall
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Accounts that contend that it is on the decline treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

103. Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda

Author:
Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 represents the culmination of a decade long fight to bring the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Sustaining the effort needed to arrive at this point is a testament to the resilience of the counterterrorism community and nation, but it subsequently raises a series of questions regarding the future of al‐Qa'ida and the violent social movement spawned by bin Laden and fellow entrepreneurial jihadis. It is tempting to view his death as the end of a long struggle, but the violent extremists radicalized and mobilized by al‐Qa'ida's global jihadi narrative regard this as the end of the opening act. The terrorist threat that the United States and its allies face today has evolved in the years since September 11. Over that time, experts have engaged in heated debates over al‐Qa'ida's strategic center of gravity, with some stressing the importance of central leadership while others emphasize the threat from radicalized individuals unconnected with any formal organization. This seemingly academic debate about the nature of al‐Qa'ida is crucial to understanding the possible manifestations of the threat following bin Laden's death, as well as guiding the way forward for policymakers, practitioners, and the general public. The attached article tries to assess the threat al‐Qa'ida poses by looking across the different operational levels: the core, periphery, and movement. The core represents those in a hierarchical organization, marked by a leadership cadre tied to their followers. Those connected to the al‐Qa'ida network, but outside the control of core leadership, are the peripheral actors. For al‐Qa'ida, this is often best represented by affiliated or associated groups such as al‐Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or al‐ Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The final level is made up of those who are unconnected from the larger network, but motivated to action through the principles espoused by the ideological leaders. These individuals are part of a broader social movement that adheres to the narrative and perpetrates violent action, but remains distinct from the core or connected affiliates.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

104. Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy

Author:
Minna Jarvenpaa
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The proposition that a political settlement is needed to end the war in Afghanistan has gained increasing attention in recent months. Channels for preliminary talks with Taliban leaders have been sought and a High Peace Council created. However, despite upbeat military assessments, the insurgency has expanded its reach across the country and continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan. Afghans increasingly resent the presence of foreign troops, and the Taliban draw strength from grievances by ordinary Afghans against their government. External money to supply military bases and pay for development projects often ends up fueling conflict rather than creating stability. For their part, President Karzai and many Afghan political elites lack genuine commitment to reform, calling into question the viability of a state-building international strategy and transition by 2014. Missing is a political strategy to end the conflict that goes beyond dealing with the Taliban; it must define the kind of state that Afghans are willing to live in and that regional neighbors can endorse. Knowing that such a settlement could take years to conclude does not diminish the urgency of initiating the process. Given doubts about Karzai's ability to manage the situation effectively, the international community needs to facilitate a peace process more pro-actively than it has. To be sustainable, the process will need to be inclusive; women's rights, human rights, and media freedoms cannot become casualties of negotiations. Afghanistan's international partners should commit to a peace process and lay the groundwork to appoint a mediator. This includes gauging the interests of parties, identifying actual participants in talks, and structuring an agenda. In the meantime, international military efforts must be realigned to avoid action that contradicts the ultimate aim of a peace settlement.
Topic:
NATO, Treaties and Agreements, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

105. Creating New Facts on the Ground

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although meaningful cooperation in the region surrounding Afghanistan is of vital importance, it has been elusive because Afghanistan\'s key neighbors have significantly divergent aims. Engineering a successful regional solution would require the United States to fundamentally transform either these actors\' objectives or their dominant strategies. Achieving the latter may prove more feasible, most crucially vis-à-vis Pakistan. The region\'s history of discord is mainly rooted in the troubled relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistan\'s involvement in Afghanistan is colored by its rivalry with India, its relations with Afghanistan are a geopolitical challenge independent of India because of its fears of disorder along its western borders, the unwelcome idea of “Pashtunistan,” and a related long-standing border dispute. Pakistan\'s reaction to these problems has only exacerbated them. As Islamabad, by supporting the Taliban insurgency, has sought to exercise preponderant, if not overweening, influence over Kabul\'s strategic choices, it has earned Kabul\'s distrust, deepened the Kabul–New Delhi partnership, and increased the risk to its relations with Washington—not to mention threatening the lives of U.S. and other coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Despite widespread support in Afghanistan for ending the war through a negotiated settlement if possible, the Afghan Taliban leadership is unlikely to consider reconciliation unless it is faced with the prospect of continued losses of the kind sustained as a result of coalition military operations in 2010. A regional solution is similarly unlikely as long as Afghanistan and its neighbors, including India, perceive Islamabad as bent on holding Kabul in a choking embrace. Solving these problems lies beyond the capability of American diplomacy, and right now even of the promised diplomatic surge. The best hope for progress lies in continuing military action to alter the realities on the ground— thereby inducing the Taliban to consider reconciliation, while simultaneously neutralizing the Pakistani strategy that is currently preventing a regional solution. To increase the probability of military success, however, President Obama will need to forgo the politically calculated drawdown of combat troops this summer and instead accept the advice of his field commanders to maintain the largest possible contingent necessary for the coming campaign in eastern Afghanistan. Hard and unpalatable as it might be for the president, this course alone offers a solution that will protect the recent gains in Afghanistan and advance American interests over the long term.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, America, and Washington

106. Unsociable sociability: The paradox of Canadian-American friendship

Author:
Caroline Patsias and Dany Deschenes
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Politics
Institution:
Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract:
Since the end of World War II, relations between Canadian and US leaders have become difficult, as the absence of the unifying force of war led to different political visions. However, on the whole, and in spite of a power differential that has grown since 1945, relations between Canada and the United States have nevertheless been good. How is this explained? In this reflection, rather than taking a structural-realist approach, we build on a perspective proposed by Stéphane Roussel in his theory on democratic peace between Canada and the United States. Roussel showed how the constructivist model could justify the absence of coercion and the relatively egalitarian cooperation between both states. While Roussel's studies refer only to the 1867–1958 period, we broaden the perspective to include the contemporary period and propose that the 'unsocial sociability' at the heart of Canadian-American relations is due to the recognition of the democratic nature of the other's regime and the implementation of institutional mechanisms and techniques.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
United States, America, and Canada

107. Next Steps for Pakistan Strategy

Author:
Daniel Markey
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
U.S.-Pakistani relations are in crisis. For Washington, Osam a bin Laden's safe haven in Abbottabad raises questions about Pakistan's complicity and/or incompetence. For Islamabad, bin Laden's killing shows its vulnerability to U.S. operations on its own soil .
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, and Washington

108. Washington's Phantom War

Author:
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In the wake of Islamabad's decision to ban the United States from using the Shamsi airbase to launch drone attacks, Washington will need to rethink its drone program. Unless the strikes become more transparent and control over them is transferred from the CIA to the military, they won't help Washington win the larger war.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
United States and Washington

109. Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies and Future Directions

Author:
Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
At the time of this writing, the United States and the other members of the International Security Assistance Forces are completing nearly a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. What started as more conventional or traditional fights has degenerated over time into insurgency warfare, something U.S. Forces have had to re-learn and re-build to fight. Re-learn and re-build are key elements as U.S. Forces have fought insurgencies in the past, but consistently maintained forces to fight more conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is very different from armored vehicles rolling through the Fulda Gap, or the race to Baghdad. It is a fight not against a Government as much as it is a fight for control of the mind-set of the population by non-state actors in a race to gain popular support. It is a grassroots battle that not only requires military force, but security established at the local level through everyday police presence that represents the Rule of Law, the national Government, and safety and stability locally. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) came together to look at Policing and COIN and the ways, methods, and techniques that could be shared to help overcome the insurgencies Coalition forces face. The efforts of the CTNSP at the National Defense University (NDU) and the CTTSO culminated in a one-day workshop held on September 29, 2010, on Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

110. Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance, the international community has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security. As the insurgency spreads to areas regarded as relatively safe till now, and policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals seek a way out of an unpopular war, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign forces by December 2014. The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Foreign Aid, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States