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71. Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara

Author:
Anouar Boukhars
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory annexed by Morocco despite Algerian objections, is a critical region that could quickly become part of the criminal and terrorist networks threatening North Africa and the Sahel. The undergoverned areas abutting the territory are becoming major hubs for drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, and weapons circulation. And Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is extending its reach in the region. The potential for destabilization is real.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Ethnic Conflict, Islam, Terrorism, and Self Determination
Political Geography:
Africa and United States

72. Mauritania's Islamists

Author:
Alex Thurston
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Islamists have become an important political force in Mauritania since formal Islamist associations first emerged in the 1970s. Islamist activism has contributed to the ongoing Islamization of Mauritanian society, as is evident from the proliferation of mosques and Islamic associations in the capital, Nouakchott, and elsewhere. In the 1990s, political liberalization allowed Islamists to participate in elections as independents, and since its legalization in 2007, Tewassoul, the strongest Islamist party in Mauritania today, has become a significant minority voice in the country's politics and has built ties with Islamists elsewhere in the Arab world. These moderate Islamists who participate in elections hold different beliefs and goals from Mauritania's jihadist fringe. Overall, Mauritanian Islamism does not currently pose a threat to the United States. The mainstream of the movement appears committed to democracy and, even so, is unlikely to take power. Islamist parties like Tewassoul have never captured a large share of the vote in elections, and moderate Islamist leaders have explicitly rejected using violence to take over the state. Indeed, the United States may even find an upside to the Islamists' rise: Mainstream Islamist leaders publicly condemn the Muslim terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which the Mauritanian government has been combating since 2005.
Topic:
Democratization, Islam, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States and North Africa

73. Middle East Security Report : Syria's Armed Opposition

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The rebels will have to rely on external lines of supply to replenish their arms and ammunition if they are to continue eroding the regime's control. The emergence of al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells working against the regime poses risks to the United States and a challenge to those calling for material support of the armed opposition. As the militias continue to face overwhelming regime firepower the likelihood of their radicalization may increase. Moreover, the indigenous rebels may turn to al-Qaeda for high-end weaponry and spectacular tactics as the regime's escalation leaves the rebels with no proportionate response, as occurred in Iraq in 2005-2006. Developing relations with armed opposition leaders and recognizing specific rebel organizations may help to deter this dangerous trend. It is imperative that the United States distinguish between the expatriate political opposition and the armed opposition against the Assad regime on the ground in Syria. American objectives in Syria are to hasten the fall of the Assad regime; to contain the regional spillover generated by the ongoing conflict; and to gain influence over the state and armed forces that emerge in Assad's wake. Therefore, the United States must consider developing relations with critical elements of Syria's armed opposition movement in order to achieve shared objectives, and to manage the consequences should the Assad regime fall or the conflict protract.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Germany, and Syria

74. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat

Author:
Jeffrey Dressler
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan's most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future. Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis' military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban's historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. The Haqqanis maintain considerable sanctuary and support nodes inside Pakistan's tribal areas. From their safehavens in North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies in Pakistan, the Haqqanis project men and materiel to resource their terrorist campaign in Afghanistan's southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia onwards to the provinces surrounding Kabul. The Haqqani Network is the primary proxy force backed by elements of Pakistan's security establishment. Pakistan's support for the Haqqani Network has increased, through both facilitating additional sanctuary and providing strategic and operational guidance. The Haqqanis serve Pakistan's interests by dominating key terrain along the border and beyond in Afghanistan's south and east, serving as a Pakistani-influenced “firewall” against national, northern, U.S. and Indian influence. The Haqqanis would also serve Pakistan's interests by being the primary influence in Afghanistan's Ghilzai Pashtun lands, as well as the tribal areas in North Waziristan, organizing these tribal areas in ways consistent with Pakistan's interests. The Haqqanis execute spectacular attacks in Kabul in order to generate a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. The Haqqanis have strengthened their presence in Logar and Wardak, surrounding the southern and western approaches to Kabul. They have also expanded into Kabul's eastern approachs in the provinces of Nangarhar, Lahgman, and Kapisa. The network will use these positions to increase their destabilizing attacks in Kabul. The Haqqani Network has increased their presence in Afghanistan's north, through their partnership with the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Haqqani Network and IMU execute targeted assassinations of northern powerbrokers who are affiliated with the Jamiat-e Islami Party. These assassinations are meant to undermine the Jamiat party and the influence of minority powerbrokers, who are historical rivals to the Pashtuns and the Pakistani state. The Haqqanis are ideologically committed insurgents, and they are increasing their territorial reach. The group also has ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Haqqanis have never given any indication that breaking ties with al-Qaeda was either possible or in their interests. Consequently, the Haqqani Network is not reconcilable. They also do not fully follow the guidance of the Quetta Shura Taliban, because they maintain a separate power base and leadership structure. Coalition and Afghan forces must conduct a sustained, well-resourced offensive against the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan. This campaign would likely require at least two adequately-resourced fighting seasons. Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. retains force levels at 68,000 troops after September 2012, rather than conducting a further drawdown. Without such a campaign, the Haqqani Network will be a dominant force inside of Afghanistan indefinitely, and the United States woulf fail to achieve its stated objective of preventing the return of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to Afghanistan. Addressing the threat from the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan is necessary, even if further action should ultimately be taken to disrupt the organization in Miramshah. The ANSF are not equipped to deal with the threat from the Haqqani Network in their current state. The Afghan Security Forces lack the intelligence, enablers, and sophisticated command and control required to reclaim the enemy support zones south of Kabul. The Afghan units are also under-filled and wrongly positioned for this fight. American troops in a properly-resourced campaign can help reduce the threat from the Haqqani Network to a level that the Afghan Security Forces can handle. The United States must not abruptly shift the mission of its forces in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to security force assistance. U.S. forces cannot curtail or cease offensive operations in the areas South of Kabul in Regional Command East in 2012. The United States and its Afghan partners must dismantle the Haqqani Network's strongholds in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia and contain the organization's expansion toward Kabul prior to a shift in mission. Failure to do so will present a strategic threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

75. The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

Author:
Sam Wyer
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
This report examines the political, religious, and military resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, identifying the group's key actors, their present disposition and strategy, and their regional expansion. AAH is an Iranian-backed Shi'a militant group that split from Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) in 2006. Since that time, AAH has conducted thousands of lethal explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces, targeted kidnappings of Westerners, rocket and mortar attacks on the U.S. Embassy, the murder of American soldiers, and the assassination of Iraqi officials.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

76. Fixing Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation

Author:
Moeed Yusuf
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Out of the proposed alternatives for dealing with Pakistan discussed in Washington, one that seems to have gained some traction calls for aggressively playing up Pakistan's civil-military divide by propping up civilians while dealing harshly with the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). While normatively attractive, the approach to deal with Pakistan as two Pakistans is unworkable. It grossly exaggerates the U.S.'s capacity to affect institutional change in Pakistan and fundamentally misunderstands what underpins the civil-military dynamic. In reality, any attempt by the U.S. to actively exploit this internal disconnect is likely to end up strengthening right wing rhetoric in Pakistan, provide more space for security-centric policies, and further alienate the Pakistani people from the U.S. A more prudent approach would be one that limits itself to targeted interventions in areas truly at the heart of the civil-military dichotomy and that would resonate positively with the Pakistani people: by continuing to help improve civilian governance performance and by providing regional security assurances to Pakistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Corruption, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Washington

77. Paying for Afghanistan's Security Forces During Transition: Issues for Chicago and Beyond

Author:
William Byrd
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This report reflects the author's research interests and several publications on security sector reform from a financial and development perspective. It is intended to lay out key issues and trade-offs in this area, and brings in concepts and tools of public financial management which are applicable to the security sector. The views expressed in this brief do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Chicago

78. Homeland Security and Intelligence: Next Steps in Evolving the Mission

Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
American expectations of how their government secures the United States have evolved substantially, especially during the post-9/11 decade. From the post-World War II, 20th-century evolution of the national security architecture in the United States, focused on countering overseas nation-states with conventional forces, we now face requirements to protect at home. And not only to protect, but to prevent: the new, domestic security architecture is targeted more at securing borders, infrastructure, and cyberspace with defensive measures as it is at pursuing any single adversary with offensive measures.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

79. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:
Harsh Pant
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

80. Beware of Imitators: al-Qa' ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary

Author:
Nelly Lahoud
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“I should write a history of the jihadis in my time as I witnessed it and not as it is perceived by the West or those who disagree with us,” explains Fadil Harun regarding his motivation to publish his two-volume manuscript al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War against Islam: the Story of Fadil Harun). Posted on the jihadi website Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin on 26 February 2009, the manuscript constitutes Harun's autobiography, in which he presents an intimate account of his life in the context of his career with al-Qa`ida. Harun (also known as Fazul `Abdallah Muhammad) was an al- Qa`ida operative who was killed in June 2011 by Somali government forces. Among the operations in which he played a key role are the 1998 East Africa bombings that targeted U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, following which he claims to have been appointed al-Qa`ida's “Confidential Secretary” (amin sirr al-qa`ida).
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Somalia, Nairobi, and East Africa