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321. Robert Mandel. Dark Logic: Transnational Criminal Tactics and Global Security.

Author:
Hadleigh McAlister
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came as a great shock to the world. The cessation of hostilities, which had never been formally declared, between the United States and the USSR was a bittersweet moment in history. The demise of communism did not usher in an era of peace but rather one of terror. Amid the chaos of the 1990s, a host of transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime thrived. Driven by fanatical religious devotion and an unquenchable lust for profit, these unconventional foes have emerged as global threats in the post-Cold War era.Not surprisingly, since 9/11 there has been renewed interest in studies that examine organized crime, due to the interaction between terrorist and criminal organizations. In his book, Dark Logic: Transnational Criminal Tactics and Global Security , Robert Mandel delves deep into the criminal underworld through an examination of five of the world's largest organized crime syndicates: the Chinese Triads, Columbian Cartels, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and the Russian Mob. This study, through a detailed risk assessment of the strategies and tactics employed by the aforementioned criminal organizations, explores how transnational organized crime threatens both human and national security. This analysis is followed by an evaluation of possible countermeasures that governments can deploy to reduce criminal activity at the local, national, regional, and international levels.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, and Italy

322. Europe's Palestine Problem

Author:
Rory Miller
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In the middle of a stalled peace process, one of the few things Israeli and Palestinian officials agree on is that U.S. President Barack Obama deserves much of the blame for the impasse. Israeli policymakers are furious with the demand that Obama made early in his term that Israel freeze settlement construction in the West Bank and with his declaration in May that Israel's 1967 borders should serve as the starting point for peace discussions. Palestinian leaders, for their part, believe that Obama has failed to fulfill the promise he made in his June 2009 Cairo speech to back their legitimate aspirations for statehood, and they are irritated that he has not forced the Israelis to continue the settlement freeze. The recent decisions by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to strike a unity deal with Hamas and press for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood is a sign of how frustrated with Washington he has become. In the face of this impasse, a variety of international figures are now asking Europe to step in. Arab leaders such as former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa have called on Europe to take charge of the peace process. In a May meeting with EU officials, for example, King Abdullah of Jordan urged Europe "to intensify efforts with a view to removing the obstacles that impede the resumption of the peace process." The EU's current political and diplomatic leaders need no encouragement. They already seem to feel that they have both a right and a duty to help solve the conflict. Last year, then French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Miguel Ángel Moratinos, his Spanish counterpart, said in a joint statement that the EU "must play a role because it is a friend of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority [PA] and above all because its own long-term security is at stake."
Topic:
Security and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Palestine

323. September 11 in Retrospect

Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
It's tempting to see the 9/11 attacks as having fundamentally changed U.S. foreign policy. It's also wrong. The Bush administration may have gone over the top in responding, but its course was less novel than generally believed. A quest for primacy and military supremacy, a readiness to act proactively and unilaterally, and a focus on democracy and free markets -- all are long-standing features of U.S. policy.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Middle East

324. Leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans

Author:
David M. Rodriguez
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In the summer of 2011, I visited the Afghan army's Regional Military Training Center in Helmand Province. The recruits had been there for two weeks, and they looked as strong as any group of U.S. soldiers in basic training. The Afghan drill instructors were as competent, and had the same cocky swagger, as American ones. "Sir, look at all of our volunteers," one drill sergeant proudly said to me. "They're great. We have already won. . . . We just don't know it yet." To comprehend the United States' progress in Afghanistan, it is important to understand how and where we have focused our resources and what work lies ahead. To be sure, the United States and its coalition partners still have plenty of challenges left to tackle in Afghanistan. However, there are indisputable gains everywhere we have focused our efforts. In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, then the commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, with the help of David Petraeus, then the commander of the U.S. Central Command, worked hard to design a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign for Afghanistan that would "get the inputs right," as Petraues often said. The upshot was more resources, troops, and civilian support and better command coherence. There are now more Afghan and coalition soldiers in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces alone than there were in all of Regional Command East, the formation responsible for security in Afghanistan's 14 eastern provinces, when I commanded the latter from 2007 to 2008. As 33,000 U.S. troops begin the drawdown, returning to the United States by next summer, 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police will be in place to continue their work. There are clear signs of progress in Afghanistan, and coalition forces have regained the initiative. The strategy has worked because it sought to match the coalition's goals with available resources. It involved four major concepts. First, use a bottom-up approach founded on good governance, capable security forces, and engagement with local communities. If towns had good leaders and security providers, populations would find local solutions to their local problems, with just a little help from Kabul. Insurgents could no longer exploit popular grievances about security, justice, and a lack of basic services.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and America

325. The Paradox of Proximity: India's approach to fragility in the neighbourhood

Author:
Nitin Pai
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The risks posed by fragile states have moved to the centre-stage of Western security consciousness only in recent years, fundamentally as the result of globalisation and precipitously due to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The threats posed by fragile states to the Western countries are palpable and proximate-for instance, in the form of terrorist plots, influx of refugees and organised crime-but the origins of the threats are relatively remote. Western policymakers and publics, therefore, enjoy a certain geographical and temporal insulation, not only allowing for detached analysis but also allowing a broader range of policy options.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Development, International Affairs, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
United States, South Asia, and India

326. South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State

Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Unity state confronts a set of challenges unparalleled in South Sudan. Some exemplify concerns that register across the emerging republic; others are unique to the state. Situated abreast multiple frontiers, its political, social, economic and security dilemmas make for a perfect storm. Some have festered for years, while more recent developments—prompted by the partition of the "old" Sudan—have exacerbated instability and intensified resource pressure. Recent rebel militia activity has drawn considerable attention to the state, highlighting internal fractures and latent grievances. But the fault lines in Unity run deeper than the rebellions. A governance crisis—with a national subtext—has polarised state politics and sown seeds of discontent. Territorial disputes, cross-border tensions, economic isolation, development deficits and a still tenuous North-South relationship also fuel instability, each one compounding the next amid a rapidly evolving post-independence environment. Juba, and its international partners, must marshal attention and resources toward the fundamental sources of instability in places like Unity if the emerging Republic is to realise its full potential.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, and Oil
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Sudan

327. The Iraq Federal Police

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In 2004, the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi security forces faced a growing challenge from insurgents and militia groups as the country drifted toward civil war. In street battles with heavily armed insurgent and militia groups, Iraq's fledgling police units mutinied under fire and resigned en masse, pointing out shortfalls in the U.S. police training program. In response, the U.S. government transferred leadership of the U.S. police assistance program from the State Department to the Defense Department, which created heavy police tactical units capable of dealing with armed groups. At the same time, the Iraqi interior ministry independently organized police commando units composed of former Iraqi soldiers that successfully fought alongside U.S. military forces. In 2005, the installation of a new Iraqi government and the escalation of sectarian violence brought a change in the composition of the Iraqi police commando units. The new interior minister, a senior Shiite party official, enabled members of Shiite militia groups to take over the police commando units and engage in the kidnap, torture, and murder of Sunnis. To control police death squads, the U.S. military combined all of Iraq's heavy police and police commando units into a new entity, the Iraq National Police (INP). In October 2006, the U.S. military began a program to retrain police commando units that were engaged in sectarian violence. Over the following year, Iraq's new interior minister, Jawad al-Bolani, undertook a program to reform the INP, appointing a new commanding general, purging the officer corps, and inviting a training team from the Italian Carabinieri to provide advanced instruction for INP units. In 2007, INP units successfully partnered with U.S. combat brigade teams that were deployed to Baghdad as part of President Bush's surge of U.S. military force into Iraq. Over the next two years, the valor of Iraqi constabulary units and their acceptance in both Sunni and Shiite areas brought a new name, the Iraq Federal Police (IFP), and the deployment of an IFP unit to every province in the country. Lessons learned in the development of an indigenous police constabulary in Iraq should be applied to current and future stability operation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Law Enforcement, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

328. Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

Author:
John K. Naland
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department- led units inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level. During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful-but harder to quantify-work in mentoring local officials. Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals. Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance. Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia

329. A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan

Author:
Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins, led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. The process that led to the Bonn Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship and was the result of the effective application of military and diplomatic power.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, NATO, United Nations, War, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Germany

330. From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR

Author:
Alison Laporte-Oshiro
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Consolidating the legitimate use of force in the hands of the state is a vital first step in post-conflict peacebuilding. Transitional governments must move quickly to neutralize rival armed groups and provide a basic level of security for citizens. Two processes are vital to securing a monopoly of force: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) involve disbanding armed groups that challenge the government's monopoly of force. Security sector reform (SSR) means reforming and rebuilding the national security forces so that they are professional and accountable. U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo yielded three crosscutting lessons: go in heavy, tackle DDR and SSR in tandem, and consolidate U.S. capacity to implement both tasks in a coordinated, scalable way.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Liberia