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931. The Never-Ending Iraqi Crisis

Author:
Bjørn Moller
Publication Date:
03-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
There is little doubt that Iraq was in blatant violation of the 1991 ceasefire agreement in general and of the famous “mother of all resolutions”, UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) in particular, in which the extent and modalities of the disarmament of the defeated aggressor were detailed: The Security Council..... 8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres... 34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

932. Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?: The Historical Record

Author:
Ivan Eland
Publication Date:
12-1998
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
According to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, terrorism is the most important threat the United States and the world face as the 21st century begins. High-level U.S. officials have acknowledged that terrorists are now more likely to be able to obtain and use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons than ever before.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States

933. Third Party Arms Transfers: Requirements for the 21st Century

Author:
John D. Macomber and Charles McC. Mathias
Publication Date:
10-1998
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Can the United States collaborate with foreign nations in armaments development and production without jeopardizing US national security? This question - in light of America's global security obligations - demands a satisfactory answer. The economic and political advantages of greater international cooperation are significant. Benefits from cooperation include improved interoperability of weapons and equipment used by US allies and partners in operations with the United States, reduction in production costs, and preservation of a defense industrial base among US allies. Yet, considerations of national security are equally cogent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:
United States and America

934. U.S. Commercial Diplomacy

Author:
Raymond J. Albright, S. Robbin Johnson, David J. Rothkopf, Christopher B. Johnstone, and Gary C. Hufbauer
Publication Date:
05-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In the larger scheme of U.S. trade, government financing agencies do not loom as large as fiscal and monetary policies, dollar exchange rates, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Yet, the acronym financial agencies—the Export–Import Bank (Ex–Im), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Trade Development Agency (TDA) —are prominent in the current debates of what is needed to keep American exports competitive, especially in the most dynamic areas of U.S. trade growth—Asia and Latin America.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, and North America

935. Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq

Publication Date:
01-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The Persian Gulf is one of the few regions whose importance to the United States is obvious. The flow of Gulf oil will continue to be crucial to the economic well–being of the industrialized world for the foreseeable future; developments in the Gulf will have a critical impact on issues ranging from Arab–Israeli relations and religious extremism to terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability is a vital U.S. interest.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

936. Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan

Author:
Barnett Rubin
Publication Date:
10-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On August 8, 1998, the Taliban (Islamic student) movement of Afghanistan took control of Mazar-i Sharif, the last city remaining outside their control. 2 In their campaign in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban succeeded in gaining control of nearly all the parts of the country's territory that had remained outside their power since they marched into Kabul on September 26, 1996. Just as the Taliban prepared to campaign for international diplomatic recognition, however, the United States on August 20, 1998, launched a cruise missile attack against camps in Afghanistan that it charged contained the terrorist infrastructure of a movement led by Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile. The United States claimed to have strong evidence implicating bin Laden and his network of exiled Islamists in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7. The United States also raided a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, said to be manufacturing precursors of chemical weapons substances. The Taliban's continued defense of bin Laden and their denunciation of the U.S. raid ruled out any dialogue between the Taliban and the United States that perhaps would lead to U.S. diplomatic recognition and construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan. The Taliban's behavior complicated their relations with regional states as well. Saudi Arabia, one of only three states that recognized the Taliban's government, expelled their diplomatic representative on September 22 in reprisal for the Taliban's continued harboring of Osama bin Laden. Most dramatically, the Taliban's killing of nine Iranian diplomats during their takeover of Mazar-i Sharif has led to an extended confrontation with Tehran. War, or at least military action, cannot be ruled out. During the more than 20 years since the “Sawr Revolution” of April 27, 1978, brought a communist party to power, Afghanistan had moved from one stage to another of civil war and political disintegration, without seeming to get any closer toward peace, political order, or sustainable development. The combination of an inimical regional environment, characterized by unstable strategic and economic competition, with the destruction of much of the country's elites, institutions, and infrastructure, has assured the continuation of war among forces based in different regions of the divided country. The victory of the Taliban may put an end to open warfare, but it is likely to result in continued guerrilla or commando activities. The emergence of an assertive Islamic traditionalism in the form of the Taliban has also placed new obstacles in the way of international humanitarian and peacemaking programs. 3 The division of control over the country had remained relatively stable since the summer of 1997. The Taliban movement, originally based in the southern city of Qandahar, the heartland of Pashtun traditionalism and the homeland of Afghanistan's old royal clan, had conquered the Persian-speaking city of Herat, near the Iranian border, in September 1995. A year later, in September 1996, the Taliban swept into the eastern Pashtun city of Jalalabad and Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul, driving out the Tajik-dominated government of the “Islamic State of Afghanistan” that was led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. At the end of May 1997, the Taliban took advantage of divisions within the mainly Uzbek National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) to take temporary control of Mazar-i Sharif. This northern city on the border of Uzbekistan was the only major urban center still not controlled by them. The Shia in the city, however, mostly from the Hazara ethnic group, resisted the Taliban attempt to disarm them and drove the conquerors out in bloody battles that killed thousands and may also have led to the subsequent massacre of prisoners. A Taliban attempt to recapture Mazar-i Sharif in September 1997 also failed, largely because of a major resupply effort mounted by Iran. While the Taliban failed in their first two attempts to control the entire North from this urban center, they managed to establish a long-term presence in the area. They gained the support of many of the ethnic Pashtuns who had been settled in the North by the Afghan monarchy and established a political and military base in Kunduz, which was supplied by air from Kabul and, according to some reports, Pakistan. Despite intermittent activity on several front lines (north of Kabul, around Kunduz, northeast of Herat, on the borders of Hazarajat), the lines of control remained relatively stable until the Taliban's new offensive in July 1998. 4 The Taliban have constituted a governmental structure that they call the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistano Islami Amarat). Before the summer 1998 offensive, they controlled the entire Pashtun belt, from Jalalabad in the East, through Qandahar in the South, and on through the Southwest. They also controlled the ethnically mixed, primarily Persian-speaking cities of Herat and Kabul, which border on the Pashtun areas. Finally, they controlled a pocket of territory in the North centered around Kunduz. They thus controlled the highways connecting Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, nearly all the Pakistani border, the entire Iranian border, and about half of the border with Turkmenistan. They also appeared to control part of the border with Tajikistan, including the port of Sher Khan Bandar. These areas included all the country's major customs posts except for Hairatan, north of Mazar-i Sharif, which the Taliban briefly held in May 1997. They also controlled the areas estimated to produce 90 percent of Afghanistan's opium poppies, the country's most profitable crop. Taxes on this crop are an important source of revenue for the Taliban, though they strictly prohibit its consumption. The United Nations estimates that Afghanistan and the surrounding region produce slightly more than half the world's supply of this drug. 5 The opposition to the Taliban, known generically as the “United Front,” consisted of several groups controlling different portions of the remaining parts of the country, which are largely inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. After the main Taliban offensive, elements of these groups controlled only a few mountainous areas home to ethnic minorities: Badakhshan and the Panjsher Valley, inhabited by Tajiks, and the Hazarajat, home to the Shia Muslim Hazara ethnic group. Before the Taliban's July-August offensive, the opposition groups had controlled most of the northern tier of provinces from Faryab to Badakhshan (except for Kunduz) as well as the Hazarajat. They controlled the main highway leading to Uzbekistan and the railhead at Hairatan that connects to the former Soviet rail system with links to Asia and Europe. Hairatan is the only major customs post in their region. These territories included about half of Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan, the short but logistically and economically important border with Uzbekistan, nearly the entire border with Tajikistan, and a remote, mountainous, and largely inaccessible part of the border with Pakistan (including Pakistan-controlled Kashmir). Even before the offensive, the Taliban appeared to control at least two-thirds of Afghanistan's territory; their own estimates ranged as high as 85 percent. Much of that territory, however, was uninhabited desert, especially in the Southwest. The areas under Taliban control at that time included probably slightly more than half the country's population, which is currently estimated at nearly 24 million. 6 The two largest population centers then under Taliban rule, Herat and Kabul, were largely hostile to them, and the requirements of controlling these areas probably make them more of a drain on Taliban personnel than a source of recruits. These market centers provided significant income, however. The Taliban's main advantage was that they controlled the territory and population in the regions they ruled through a unitary structure, while the opposition remained split and riven by feuds. The opposition was divided into several groups, and each group was further divided into feuding factions. Furthermore, both sides depended to a great extent (though precise data are lacking) on foreign military, technical, and financial assistance. The Taliban are supported and were to some extent organized by Pakistan, with financial support from both official and unofficial sources in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states, while the northern groups have received aid from Iran, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Taliban thus controlled the borders and highways leading not only to their own main supporter, Pakistan, but also to the opposition's main supporter, Iran. Supplying the Taliban was thus easier and less expensive than supplying the northern groups. By late August, the Taliban had control of virtually all the country's airfields except for two in Hazarajat. This effectively stopped aid to any other region. The regional competition results from the reconfiguration of the region after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are competing for control over the routes by which Central Asia's oil and gas resources will reach outside markets, which in turn will largely determine what power becomes predominant in the area. 7 The decision by India, followed by Pakistan, to test nuclear weapons has raised the stakes in the region and complicated peacemaking efforts. The independence of ethno-national states in Central Asia has given new prominence to ethnic identities, affecting co-ethnics across borders. And the increasing politicization of Islamic identity has increased the salience of Sunni/Shia sectarian differences. Perhaps the best-known fact about the Taliban is the restrictions they have imposed on women. These restrictions require that women be fully veiled, forbid them most education and employment, and impose strict limitations on their access to public services, including health care. The Taliban have also required men to grow full, untrimmed beards, cut their hair short, and attend mosque. They forbid any social mingling or communication among men and women outside the family. These rules (and others) have led to a series of confrontations with the representatives of the international community, largely the U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) present in Afghanistan. 8 Despite these rules, until the summer of 1998 these international organizations continued to work in Taliban areas; they did not work in most areas controlled by the northern groups. All agencies withdrew from Mazar-i Sharif after their offices, property, and storehouses (including food intended for destitute or famine-stricken areas) were thoroughly looted for the second time in September 1997 (they had been looted previously in May). The United Nations continued to work in Hazarajat, however. Western NGOs left Kabul in July 1998 when the Taliban refused to withdraw a requirement that all the NGOs move to the Polytechnic, a ruined Soviet-built campus in northern Kabul. More Westerners left in response to U.S. warnings about dangers to non-Muslim foreigners during the preparation for the August 20 raids. The Taliban resent the fact that although they have provided security for U.N. and NGO staff and property, the opposition, which has failed to do so, continues to be recognized as the government of Afghanistan by most countries and to occupy Afghanistan's U.N. seat. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Opposition to the Taliban's gender policies accounts for much of the resistance to either recognizing them or vacating Afghanistan's U.N. seat. Indeed, a significant movement has developed in Europe and North America in opposition to the Taliban's gender policies, and this movement, as much as the interest in gas and oil pipelines, has placed Afghanistan back on the international radar screen. The Taliban's harboring of bin Laden and his network provides yet another even more prominent reason.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Taliban, and Saudi Arabia

937. Statement on the Situation in Afghanistan

Author:
Barnett Rubin
Publication Date:
10-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation, and thank you for your continuing work to focus attention on Afghanistan. I have brought a written submission for the record providing background information on recent events in Afghanistan. In my statement I will concentrate on policy challenges posed by Afghanistan to the United States and the international community.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Middle East

938. U.S. Foreign Policy: Long Cycles — What Might They Mean for World Long Cycles?

Author:
Jack E. Holmes, Kevin Joldersma, and Aaron Keck
Publication Date:
03-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Studies Association
Abstract:
The author has studied U.S. foreign policy long cycles for two decades and has an extensive database covering 1776-1990. A good deal of attention has been paid to U.S. foreign policy in the post-1945 setting where the U.S. is a world superpower. Now that the U.S. has been freed from the immediate demands of the Cold War, it is important to study American policy over the long run, especially the period before 1945. This paper uses conclusions from the author's previous work to raise issues which have implications for the study of world long cycles. Particular attention is given to consensus (societal/governmental) variables since the U.S. is one of the few countries with a long history under the same written constitution. The American experience indicates that the U.S. is inclined toward independent action as sometimes dictated by domestic considerations. While it is clear that the U.S. will act as a superpower in part due to the nature of the international system, it is important to consider some uniquely American features which also have an important impact on policy. The author's work includes two books on long-term American foreign policy trends. The first one, The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy, was published in 1985. It presented a general theory regarding how and why introvert and extrovert foreign policy moods alternate every two decades. This theory, as well as the dates of the cycles, is based on the work of Frank L. Klingberg (1952). Klingberg elaborates on his cycles in later works (1983 and 1996). Since the 1985 work contained a good deal of theory, it was thought that a more empirical study of these trends would be in order. Toward this end, the author created over 150 variables which have been given annual values for at least 150 years. These variables were based on the work of other authors and compilations of data. The resulting work, Ambivalent America, which has been the basis for several convention papers and is nearing completion as a book, raises a second set of conclusions which supplement those of the first book. At the same time, several authors have investigated world long cycles and raised a number of important issues. Most of these authors emphasize the period since the start of major European influence on the world while others go back prior to that period. With the exceptions of works by Klingberg and this author, however, similar attention has not been given to American trends. Pollins and Schweller (1997) do explore some issues relating to interactions of American and world cycles. The author believes that a conceptual comparison of American long cycles with world long cycles will raise some important issues, and that is the purpose of this paper.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Cold War
Political Geography:
United States

939. Time to Reinvent APEC

Author:
Edward Lincoln and Kenneth Flamm
Publication Date:
11-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, provides an opportunity for 18 countries with strong trade and investment ties to discuss a wide range of economic issues. APEC has scored two tangible achievements to date: a sweeping but vaguely worded 1994 pledge by its member states to open up to free trade and investment by 2010 and 2020, and a central role in the negotiation of the 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA). However, APEC is in danger of fading. When this year's summit begins on November 19, the United States must push for major reform of the APEC bargaining process if the organization is to have any chance of realizing its ambitious trade reform targets.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Emerging Markets, International Organization, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

940. Globaphobia: The Wrong Debate Over Trade Policy

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan
Publication Date:
10-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
The outcome of the fast-track debate that opened this month will determine whether the United States continues to lead the world toward a more open global economy or whether, for the first time since the end of World War II, it sends the opposite message.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Political Economy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States