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131. America's Mega-Regional Trade Diplomacy: Comparing TTP and TTIP

Author:
Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The United States is currently negotiating two massive regional economic agreements, one with 11 Asian and Pacific Rim countries and the other with the 28-member European Union. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) herald a substantial shift in US foreign economic policy as Washington turns its focus from the stalemated Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations and scattered bilateral trade agreements to 'mega-regional' trade diplomacy. As the only party to both negotiations, Washington seeks to leverage issues in one to advance its interests in the other, while reinvigorating US global leadership.
Topic:
Diplomacy and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Washington, and Asia

132. U.S. Strategic Dialogues with Morocco and Algeria: Take Two

Author:
Vish Sakthivel
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Secretary Kerry's visit comes amid Morocco's efforts to expand its regional influence and an upcoming vote in Algeria. Next week, Secretary of State John Kerry will head to Rabat and Algiers to reconvene the Strategic Dialogues that were postponed in November when he had to travel to Geneva for urgent Iran negotiations. While the broader themes to be discussed remain the same, certain developments in the two countries' diplomatic positioning will likewise inform the talks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Morocco

133. Palestinian Public Opinion Offers Abbas Much Room for Maneuver

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A closer look at Palestinian views on prisoner releases, the Jewish state question, economic needs, and other issues suggests diplomatic openings are far from exhausted. As the United States works to salvage the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza is more prepared to accept various diplomatic compromises than official positions or elite attitudes would suggest. A number of new polls by different Palestinian pollsters, and in-depth discussions with Palestinian scholars and others in late March, indicate that Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas has greater latitude to make a deal than is often supposed. The polls cited here are from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), both based in Ramallah, and the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), based in Bethlehem.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and North America

134. U.S. Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, Part II: Assessment and Prospects

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The current impasse in Israeli-Palestinian talks is buffeted by a series of profound global and regional challenges, including Ukraine, Iran, and Syria, among others. In the immediate arena, while Israel and the Palestinian Authority may have dysfunctional political and diplomatic relations, they also have reasonably effective security cooperation and economic coordination. Therefore, a principal challenge for U.S. policy and for local leaders is to find ways to preserve, even enhance, the latter even as disagreement over the former worsens.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and North America

135. Iran Seeks to Untangle UN Sanctions

Author:
Steven Ditto
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic has added to its nuclear negotiating team a law professor who has extensive experience making Iran's case in international disputes. On April 9, Iran and the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, plus Germany) concluded the latest two-day round of talks on a nuclear deal, setting the next round for May 13. Earlier in the week, on April 7, Iranian media reported the appointment of Dr. Jamshid Momtaz as head of a "legal advisory group" to the Iranian negotiating team. A French-educated expert on sanctions, disarmament, and UN procedure, Momtaz has represented the Iranian government in some of its highest-profile international legal proceedings, including in claims against the U.S. government at the Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ). Momtaz's familiarity with the United Nations, his extensive practice in Europe, and his proven history of leveraging complex legal arguments to advance Iran's international interests indicate that in these latest rounds of P5+1 talks Tehran is likely looking for unconventional ways to "address" and "bring a satisfactory conclusion to" the UN Security Council resolutions against it, as called for in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed to in Geneva last November.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Human Rights, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Iran, and France

136. Keeping the Peace in the Pacific: The Next Steps in American Policy

Author:
John Lee and Charles Horner
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
U.S. administrations and officials are consistently caught flat-footed by the increasing assertiveness of the People's Republic of China (PRC) over disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas. This assertiveness is strident, yet controlled. Beijing's objectives in the region, with respect to maritime issues in particular, have been apparent for several decades. While the United States is well aware of the PRC's "talk and take" approach—speaking the language of negotiation while extending de facto control over disputed areas—U.S. policy has been tactical and responsive rather than strategic and preemptive, thus allowing China to control the pace and nature of escalation in executing talk and take.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

137. NATO's Framework Nations: Capabilities for an Unpredictable World

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
As the Ukraine crisis demonstrates, in an unpredictable world, military capabilities can be a critical factor. The longstanding goals of the United States and its NATO allies have been to create a Europe whole and free, and globally to support such goals through collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Ukraine raises the issue of how best to accomplish those ends. As part of the Ukraine response, there have been and will continue to be diplomatic, economic, and energy efforts. However, one key element will be to create more effective integrated capabilities that will support NATO's military tasks, and thus the values and goals that NATO represents.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

138. Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett‟s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter‟s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state‟s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, China, India, and Asia

139. Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars

Author:
Huiyun Feng and Kai He
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China‟s diplomacy has moved towards a more confident or even assertive direction in international politics. Economically, the Chinese Premier refused to re-value the Chinese currency as the United States requested and instead started to lecture about U.S. economic mismanagement during the 2008 financial meltdown (Pomfret, 2010). Diplomatically, China responded furiously to Obama‟s decision of arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama in early 2010, threatening to place sanctions on American companies. Politically, China reluctantly cooperated with Western countries, especially the United States, to punish either North Korean or Iranian provocations to the international order. Many other examples, from the Copenhagen Conference to the diplomatic standoffs between China and its neighbours, have also been listed as indications of China‟s assertive behaviour since 2008 (Swaine, 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011; Perlez 2012; Ross 2012; He and Feng 2012). In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still on-going flare-ups with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, and the recently intensified tension with Vietnam in the South China Sea seemingly have further intensified regional concerns over China‟s rise. It is worth noting that some scholars have started to question the validity of the discourse regarding China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. For example, through critically examining the “assertiveness” meme in the U.S. pundit and academic circles, Johnston questions: “How new and assertive is China‟s new assertiveness?” (Johnston, 2013). Although the extent and the nature of the assertiveness are still debatable, it is clear that China‟s foreign policy has shifted to a new direction, albeit temporarily. The goal of this paper is not to debate the temporal origins or intensity of China‟s assertiveness. Instead, it focuses on examining the perceptual roots of China‟s policy changes. As David Shambaugh (1991) points out, behaviour is principally a function of perception. In order to make sense of Chinese behaviour, we need to dig into the mindset of Chinese leaders. However, it is difficult to gauge what political leaders really perceive due to the political hierarchy and the complex nature of the decision-making process in any state system, especially China. In this research we examine Chinese leaders‟ perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese foreign policy through the eyes of China‟s International Relations (IR) scholars. We use Chinese IR scholars as a “proxy measure” to make sense of Chinese leaders‟ perceptions because Chinese IR scholars serve as the mediator between the Chinese leadership and the general public (Shambaugh, 1991; Saunders, 2000). Based on an original opinion survey of Chinese IR scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing in July 2013, we empirically test the perceptual roots of Chinese scholars‟ preference for an assertive diplomacy. In particular, we examine two competing arguments about China‟s assertiveness. Some scholars suggest a “power perception” argument in which China‟s assertiveness is rooted in Chinese leaders‟ changing perceptions regarding its power status versus the United States. In other words, as the 1 United States and other Western countries were troubled by their economic downturn, Chinese leaders became overly confident with China‟s rise and thereby started to say “no” to the United States as well as show its “teeth” to its neighbours (Nye, 2010; Green, 2010). Others advocate a “policy reaction” argument, which attributes China‟s assertiveness to a nationalist reaction to unfriendly international forces, especially from the West, which threatened to block China‟s rise. Continuous economic growth also instigated the rise of nationalism in Chinese society, which in turn pushed the Chinese government to react to Western criticisms and “plots” with more fury and toughness (Carr, 2010; Small, 2010; Swaine, 2011; Ross, 2012). In other words, China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy grew from an intentional reaction to the strategic pressure from the United States and the outside world. There are three parts in the paper. First, we briefly introduce our original survey conducted in the summer of 2013. Second, we develop two hypotheses based on the current debate about China‟s assertive diplomacy and test them by using the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. We suggest that both the “power perception” and “policy reaction” arguments make sense in explaining China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. However, our findings suggest that a more pessimistic perception regarding Chinese power is more likely to be associated with a preference for an assertive foreign policy. In other words, it is not a confident or an overly confident China but a lack of confidence instead, which is more likely to trigger an assertive foreign policy in China. In the conclusion section we discuss the implications of our findings for China‟s future international relations
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

140. The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s

Author:
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Columbia University Press
Abstract:
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker confronts the coldest period of the cold war--the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward China. A sophisticated, multidimensional account based on prodigious, cutting edge research, this volume convincingly portrays Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. Tucker provocatively argues that the Eisenhower Administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. Tucker deftly explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. Her most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Tucker finds Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political Economy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States and China
Publication Identifier:
9780231159258
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN