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11. The Last Straw: Responding to Russia’s Anti-Western Aggression

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Evelyn Farkas, Ben Freeman, and Gary Ashcroft
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election is just one part of a wide-ranging effort by Moscow to undermine confidence in democracy and the rule of law throughout countries in the West. Russia has engaged in this effort because, in both economic and demographic terms, it is a declining power – the only way it can “enhance” its power is by weakening its perceived adversaries. Because Russia’s aim is to erode the health of Western nations, we argue it is time for America and its allies to employ a comprehensive, non-kinetic response to contain Russia.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

12. Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have in recent years invested billions of dollars in the U.S. technology industry, raising concerns that a powerful rival has gained or could soon gain access to sensitive and, in some cases, critical technologies that underpin American military superiority and economic might. At the workshop entitled “Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests,” held in San Francisco, on July 18, 2017, CFR convened nearly thirty current and former government officials, academics, bankers, investors, and corporate executives to explore whether the large and growing early-stage Chinese investment in critical U.S. technology poses a threat to U.S. national security, and, if so, to outline policies that mitigate the risks of unbridled Chinese investment and to bolster U.S. competitiveness.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

13. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

14. Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments to Evaluate Cybersecurity Policies

Author:
Benjamin Dean
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Over the past decade, numerous countries around the world have developed and implemented national cybersecurity strategies. Yet very few of these strategies have been subject to evaluations. As a result, it is difficult to judge the performance of strategies, the programs that comprise them, and the cost-effectiveness of funds spent. Natural and quasi-natural experiments are a promising set of research methods for the evaluation of cybersecurity programs. This paper provides an overview of the methods used for natural or quasi-natural experiments, recounts past studies in other domains where the methods have been used effectively, and then identifies cybersecurity activities or programs for which these methods might be applied for future evaluations (e.g., computer emergency response teams in the EU, cybersecurity health checks in Australia, and data breach notification laws in the United States).
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Data
Political Geography:
United States and North America

15. Honing Cyber Attribution

Author:
Justin Key Canfil
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Concerns about state-directed cyber intrusions have grown increasingly prevalent in recent years. The idea that state principals can obfuscate their involvement in such attacks by delegating operational tasks to non-state agents poses a particularly significant challenge to international enforcement and remedies. Gaps in international law, coupled with obstacles to detection in such cases, may make it more difficult to bring sponsoring states to justice. This paper offers a roadmap for assessing the propensity of states to delegate to non-state actors and correct for false positives in standard (typically more technical) cyber attack attribution methods. I conclude that the conditions under which attacks are likely to have been backed by sponsoring states occupy a much narrower window than conventional wisdom suggests, and that the universe of transgressors can be identified when standard indicators overlap with specific conditions.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North Am

16. Is Cyber Defense Possible?

Author:
Sorin Ducaru
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Cyber issues are rapidly growing in importance to defense alliances. The Journal of International Affairs talked to Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, about NATO’s efforts to improve its cyber defenses against emerging threats.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

17. How the Next U.S. President Can Contain China in Cyberspace

Author:
Adam Segal and Rob Knake
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
When transition planning gets underway in earnest this fall, one of the hardest memos to write will be the outbrief from the current National Security Council (NSC) team on what to do about China’s ongoing campaign of cyber espionage targeting the intellectual property of U.S. companies. While long a focus of both the president’s cyber and China teams, there is little chance that in the coming months the issue is going to be brought to any type of resolution. Instead, the next president will inherit a partially implemented plan that has produced positive results in the short term, but its long-term sustainability remains uncertain. He or she would be wise to follow the playbook left by the Obama administration, with a redoubled focus on the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. Critics of the administration on this topic generally fall into two camps. One, summed up nicely by the title of a book by Peter Kiernan, is the Becoming China’s Bitch camp.[1] In this view, the United States is so dependent on China that the Chinese can do what they want and there is little Americans can do to stop them. They hold U.S. debt, Americans can’t manufacture anything without them, Chinese students are leaps and bounds smarter than American students, and there are millions more of them studying science and math. The Chinese are strategic, looking around the corner of history and shaping it in their interests. They are playing three-dimensional chess and President Obama has been playing checkers. They put the blame on what they would characterize as Obama’s willingness to “lead from behind.” They then quote Sun Tzu, reference Unrestricted Warfare, and drop the mic.[2] The second view is the Coming Collapse of China camp.[3] In this view, despite an aggressive anti-corruption campaign and a more assertive foreign policy, China is weak, wounded, and dangerous. The Communist Party made a deal with the devil, offering economic growth in exchange for loyalty to the regime. Now, the leadership can’t keep up with their end of the bargain. Growth is slowing, and at a faster pace than the official figures acknowledge. Over investment continues and economic reforms have stalled. Air and water pollution are a drag on the economy and a threat to citizen health. Paranoid about any dissent, the party has tightened restrictions on the Internet and the media and arrested feminists, civil rights activists, and lawyers. One spark could start protests that lead to widespread instability and perhaps the end of Communist Party rule. What’s interesting is that these divergent views of China’s place in the world similarly predict there is little chance that China will cease stealing intellectual property. In the first view, China holds all the cards, and there is simply nothing the United States can do to impose costs and stop the hacking of companies. If China is desperate and dangerous, then it can’t stop stealing technology and business secrets because they are needed to fuel the economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

18. Department of Energy Cyber Security Incidents

Author:
Marshall Kuypers and Elizabeth Pate-Cornell
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Despite significant interest in cybersecurity, data on cyber security incidents remains scarce. On April 16, 2015, the US Department of Energy released data on 1,131 cybersecurity incidents through a Freedom of Information Act Request. While only containing the date, location, and type of incident, several interesting insights can be kneaded from the data. In this paper, we analyze the DOE security incident data and perform a statistical analysis on the rate of incidents. We find that the rate of cybersecurity incidents is decreasing over time and that incidents can be modeled stochastically. We believe that this is further evidence that cyber risk can be accurately evaluated with data-driven models.
Topic:
Security and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States

19. Confidence Building in Cyberspace: A Comparison of Territorial and Weapons-Based Regimes

Author:
Dr. Mary Manjikian
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
An analysis of weapons-based confidence-building measures shows how academics can work together to self-police their research for national security implications, socialize new members of the academic community into the importance of considering security issues, and develop and disseminate norms regarding what is and is not a moral and ethical use of these technologies. It may be possible for academics and policymakers to come together to work for a ban or build-down on cyber weapons patterned on international efforts to ban chemical and biological weapons and implement export regimes to control the export of code which may form the components of cyber weapons. If we conceptualize cyberspace as territory, we can also learn from the example of territorially-based confidence-building measures such as those implemented along the Indo-Pakistan border. This approach stresses the importance of developing notification procedures to prevent misperceptions and the escalation spiral, as well as communicating regularly to establish trust between all parties. The case studies presented here illustrate the promises and pitfalls of each approach and offer valuable warnings to policymakers seeking to implement such measures in cyberspace. They show what happens when not everyone in a regime is equally committed to a specific outcome by illustrating the difficulties of monitoring compliance in confidence-building regimes, and show the ways in which doctrines and confidence-building measures may not be perfectly aligned.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

20. A Framework for Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity and Assessing its Impact

Author:
Charles Harry
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While significant media attention has been given to the volume and range of cyber attacks, the inability to measure and categorize disruptive events has complicated efforts of policy makers to push comprehensive responses that address the range of cyber activity. While organizations and public officials have spent significant time and resources attempting to grapple with the complex nature of these threats, a systematic and comprehensive approach to categorize and measure disruptive attacks remains elusive. This paper addresses this issue by differentiating between exploitive and disruptive cyber events, proposes a formal method to categorize five types of disruptive events, and measures their impact along three dimensions of analysis. Scope, magnitude, and duration of disruptive cyber events are analyzed to locate each event on a Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) so organizations and policymakers can estimate the aggregated effect of a malicious act aimed at impacting their operations. Using the five different event classes and the CDI estimation method makes it easier for organizations and policy makers to disaggregate a complex topic, contextualize and process individual threats to their network, target where increased investment can reduce the risk of specific disruptive cyber events, and distinguish between events that represent a private-sector problem from those that merit a more serious public-sector concern.
Topic:
Mass Media and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States, North America, Washington, and D.C.