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51. Ending Wars: When Does Diplomacy Have a Role?

Author:
Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
When, whether and under what conditions to enter into negotiations to end the war in Ukraine is one of the thorniest international issues of the moment. My objective in this article is to look briefly at the role diplomacy has played, or not played, in ending several of the most destructive wars in European history and then to explore what role it might play in ending the war in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

53. Can Back Channels Prevent Direct Military Conflict Between Russia and NATO?

Author:
Yury Nadtochey
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Against the background of ongoing war in Ukraine few options remain to escape the worst scenario of tensions between Russia and the West in Eastern Europe and beyond. We might point out three possible ways on how this disastrous future can be avoided: ​ 1) unilateral steps taken by the conflicting parties in order to de-escalate; 2) enhancing existing communication lines; 3) back channel diplomacy
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Communications, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

54. Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World

Author:
Maxwell Stewart
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article revisits the 2021 Global Posture Review’s determination for a status quo European force posture in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the poor Russian performance and attrition in the war, and the likely frozen conflict that will emerge, the article lays out the process by which the United States can draw down its permanent presence in Europe to refocus on the Pacific and restructure its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all while maintaining alliance unity. The article has two main recommendations. The first is a time line for a reduced U.S. force posture in Europe from the present to 2035 while placing more emphasis on a European role in NATO leadership. The second is focused on how to maintain strategic flexibility while reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment. It then identifies and provides mitigations for the anticipated risks associated with the recommendations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rebalancing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

55. Hard choices: if not now, when?

Author:
Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Yet, even before the NATO Summit, the long-expected Ukrainian spring counteroffensive was falling short of the significant gains anticipated after the massive Western aid provided during the war’s first 15 months – $37.6 billion in U.S. security assistance alone, according to the Pentagon (May 31, 2023). With Kyiv nonetheless insisting in late summer, that “we don’t care how long it takes,” questions are now raised, morally awkward but strategically valid and likely to spread over the coming months: How much longer before it proves too long, and how much more will be needed before it is too much?
Topic:
NATO, Armed Conflict, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

56. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine

Author:
Eric Ciaramella
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The moment has arrived for Western leaders to offer a practical vision for Ukraine’s long-term security. This paper lays out a detailed proposal for a sustainable multilateral security arrangement in which Ukraine has a strong military that is backed by legally codified pledges of support—training, equipping, and defense industrial cooperation—from the United States and Europe. The model outlined in this paper draws on official Ukrainian government proposals and lessons from the United States’ security relationships with close partners that are not treaty allies, notably Israel. It prioritizes a strategy of deterrence by denial: by fielding a robust, modernized, and well-trained military, Ukraine can raise the cost of future aggression to such a point that Russia would lose confidence in its ability to achieve its objectives there through force.1 Independent of battlefield developments, Ukraine and its partners must negotiate a long-term security arrangement now. Reaching a consensus sooner rather than later on a framework makes more sense than putting off controversial decisions until large-scale hostilities end. A security arrangement has the potential to undermine President Vladimir Putin’s conviction that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. It can also assure Ukraine that it will be able to defend its sovereignty even if it does not liberate its entire territory this year. Many of the elements contained in this proposal can be implemented during wartime—indeed, some of them are already in place—and strengthened after the war. The proposed security model is not necessarily an alternative to NATO membership, which enjoys strong support from Ukraine’s leaders and public. The allies have promised the country an eventual place in NATO, but they have made clear that this will not be on the agenda while the war is ongoing. Even once the war ends, they are unlikely to move swiftly to admit Ukraine. Therefore, the proposal here seeks to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself as it remains outside of NATO for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it emphasizes the critical role Ukraine’s EU accession will play in its long-term security. The United States must lead the conversation on a future security arrangement. Not only does its unparalleled capacity for security assistance and multinational coordination make it vital to the success of the arrangement, but a clear long-term U.S. pledge to Ukraine would also prompt Europe to increase its commitments, thereby ensuring proper burden-sharing. The proposed arrangement would be flexible enough to encompass commitments from the EU as a collective, from individual member states, and from other countries. To make the U.S. commitment to Ukraine credible and durable, the Biden administration must work with Congress to secure broad bipartisan support. This study identifies five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement: Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe A predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression Support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion Clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction Much of the public debate to date has focused on Ukraine’s request for security “guarantees” in response to the failure of the previous “assurances” encapsulated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To avoid confusion, and in light of the historical baggage these terms carry, this paper uses “arrangement” or “commitment” to refer to the future legal and political framework in question.2
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

57. Ukraine, NATO and the Black Sea

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since its occupation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has steadily expanded military capabilities and technical infrastructure on the peninsula, transforming the region into a springboard for offensive military operations in the Black Sea and beyond. Despite growing insecurity and Russian militarization of the region over the years, the transatlantic community has not put as high of a strategic premium on the Black Sea compared to the Baltic region. Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine, however, has reshaped the strategic landscape, giving momentum for NATO to remedy its Black Sea defence posture. Greater military support to Ukraine and strengthened forward presence in the area would be key components of a new approach to deterring and confronting Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, Militarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Black Sea

58. The future of the transatlantic partnership: US perceptions and debates

Author:
Sophia Winograd, Valentina Gruarin, Cengiz Günay, and Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, altered Europe’s security architecture and long-term strategic planning. Many in Europe have shared with the Biden administration that the aggression is not only an existential threat to Ukraine but also to the liberal world order and its values. The war has revived transatlantic coordination and increased the popularity of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic. However, there are critical voices which have questioned the transatlantic commitment and its longevity. This paper examines whether and how the transatlantic partnership has been revitalized and whether it is long lasting. It does so by focusing on U.S. debates, differing opinions, and varying positions on the war and cooperation with NATO and the EU.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Partnerships, Transatlantic Relations, Debates, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

59. Franco-German leadership in European security: Engine in reverse gear?

Author:
Iro Särkkä and Minna Ålander
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Germany and France led the European response to Russia’s first war in Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The legacy of the failed Minsk process weighed on their ability to change course in 2022, as the required response went beyond economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiations. In both the French and the German case, there is a mismatch between self-perception and external expectations. France lacks the economic and military resources to substantiate its great-power identity, while Germany’s selective leadership is not on a par with its economic weight. As a result, neither French President Emmanuel Macron nor German Chancellor Olaf Scholz were able to provide convincing leadership in the initial stages of Russia’s second war in Ukraine in 2022. While the Franco-German reconciliation has historically constituted the core of European integration, their response to Russia’s war of aggression and its wider implications in Europe has made it clear that the Franco-German engine is struggling to provide coherent and effective wartime leadership. The two countries should not only acknowledge the enduring central role of the transatlantic link for European security, but also enhance cooperation with groups of smaller countries – and consider following their lead, too.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Leadership, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, France, and Germany

60. A Forgotten Friendship: Serbo-Ukrainian Relations and Pro-Russian Narratives

Author:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
The relations between the two countries from the moment Ukraine gained its independence, in 1991, to date can be marked as formally friendly relations. The peak of friendship and solidarity came with NATO’s bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, which has remained one of the most traumatic episodes in Serbian contemporary history. During that episode, Ukrainian solidarity was demonstrated through Ukraine’s attempts to be an impartial mediator, its condemnation of the military intervention without the mandate of the UN Security Council, as well as through provided assistance. Today, that episode is easily forgotten in Serbia’s political discourse, especially by political leaders. Besides, although the relations between the two countries continue to be formally friendly, they are still burdened with stereotypes prevailing in Serbian society as a product of very stench pro-Russian narratives in the past few years, which have made Russia and its leadership very popular in Serbia. This popularity, along with the Serbian policy of balancing between the West and Russia, makes the relations between Serbia and Ukraine not hostile but relations charged with contradictions.
Topic:
NATO, History, Bilateral Relations, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Serbia