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141. Russian Aggression in the Black Sea: Regional and International Responses

Author:
Gonul Tol, Philip Breedlove, Iulia Joja, Yoruk Isik, and Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Russia’s largest military buildup since the 2014 annexation of Crimea is taking place along the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea. Moscow has resorted to escalatory measures, announcing the closing of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea to foreign ships and cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export. In response, the West has reacted with warnings and invitations to dialogue while Turkey is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine. To prevent further escalation of the crisis, much will depend on the Biden administration’s response. What are possible conflict scenarios of Russia towards Ukraine and the Black Sea? What options does the West have in deterring Russian aggression in the region? In what ways is this significant to the long-term US regional strategy? How is Russian military buildup significant not only for Ukraine, but also for the broader stability of the Black Sea region?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Black Sea

142. Ukraine’s Sanctions Against Pro-Russian Oligarch Medvedchuk—All About Oil and Coal

Author:
Alla Hurska
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 19, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) imposed sanctions on Ukrainian tycoon and politician Viktor Medvedchuk and his wife, Oksana Marchenko (Pravda.com.ua, February 19). Medvedchuk is a leader and people’s deputy of the pro-Russian party Opposition Platform–For Life, the largest opposition faction in the Ukrainian parliament. Moreover, he is a close acquaintance of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The NSDC sanctions list also includes five Russian nationals and Ukrainian national Nataliya Lavreniuk. The latter is Marchenko’s friend and the common-law spouse of Taras Kozak (already under sanctions), a people’s deputy from the same political party and Medvedchuk’s business partner. Apart from targeting those eight individuals, sanctions were imposed on nineteen associated businesses, including firms that own aircraft and operate direct flights from Kyiv to Moscow as well as a number of joint stock companies registered in Russia, Moldova and Portugal (Pravda.com.ua, February 20). These measures came two weeks after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered the shutdown of several television channels—ZIK, NewsOne and 112—connected to Kozak. The move was described by Zelenskyy as a necessary step to fight Russian propaganda. But according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and the NSDC, these actions were motivated by more complex issues. Specifically, the three aforementioned TV channels were being financed by limited liability company trading house Don Coal (Rostov, Russia), which receives revenue from smuggling coal out of the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR/DPR) (Pravda.com.ua, February 4).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Sanctions, and Coal
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

143. #NATO2030: Credible Deterrence in the Baltic Region

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO put renewed focus onto its primary task of collective defence and deterrence. It has taken several important steps, but it would be a mistake to believe that NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic region is complete. In the fourth of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Mārtiņš Vargulis of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs looks at how NATO has responded since 2014 to the threat from Russia to enhance deterrence in the Baltic region, and proposes what more needs to be done to ensure a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, International Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

144. Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?

Author:
Rob Lee
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
During March and April 2021, the Russian military conducted a large-scale buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media sites showing Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The United States Department of Defense’s spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Russian buildup was even larger than during the peak of the fighting in 2014. Ukrainian officials estimated that the Russian military buildup would reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops with more than fifty-six battalion tactical groups (BTG). United States defense officials gave a lower estimate that 48 BTGs had moved into the border area and 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders. To put this in perspective, the Russian military has approximately 850,000-900,000 servicemembers in total, and 168 constant readiness BTGs, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. If these estimates were accurate, the Russian military massed roughly 10-15% of its total manpower and approximately one third of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. In response to the buildup, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all called their Russian counterparts to discuss the situation. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status to its highest level. The buildup also coincided with an increase in fighting along the line of contact, with at least 36 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in 2021. The movement of Russian forces led to intense speculation about Russia’s intentions, including fears of a large-scale ground invasion. However, U.S. intelligence indicated that a large-scale ground invasion was unlikely because of a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics necessary for such an operation. Likewise, EUCOM commander General Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks. On April 22, after the end of a large-scale exercise at the Opuk training area in Crimea, which included an amphibious landing, a helicopter air assault operation with two companies, and a multi-battalion airborne operation with more than two thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the winter verification tests for the Western and Southern Military Districts had been a success and the troops would return to their permanent bases. However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and other heavy equipment, would remain at the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise in September. Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly whether all of the equipment and units deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside of Crimea would also return to their bases, nor how those units were employed during the snap inspection. Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, U.S. defense officials said that Russia had removed only “a few thousand” troops and that there were approximately 80,000 servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, despite Shoigu’s order for most of those units to return to their permanent bases by May 1. Thus Russia can still escalate rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the immediate threat of a serious escalation of fighting in the Donbas appears to have passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

145. Ukraine’s Policy Towards Turkey

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The current revival of Ukrainian-Turkish contacts stems from Ukraine’s efforts to win over Turkey as an economic and defence partner in the face of Russian aggression. Both countries share the common goal of limiting Russian domination in the Black Sea. Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and stands up for the Crimean Tatars, persecuted by Russia. Close bilateral relations may make Turkey—after the EU and the U.S.—one of Ukraine’s most important partners. However, the intensity of the political dialogue will depend on the state of Russian-Turkish relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

146. Ukraine's Foreign Policy Strategy

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, approved in August this year the first Foreign Policy Strategy in the country’s history. According to the document, Ukraine’s main goal is membership in the EU and NATO and an end to the conflict with Russia. Like in the National Security Strategy, Ukraine included Poland in the second group of strategic partners. Cooperation with Poland is to be deepened and developed, not only bilaterally but also as part of multilateral formats in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Volodymyr Zelensky
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

147. The Montreux Convention and Its Importance for Georgia

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Montreux Convention signed on July 20, 1936 strictly regulates the presence of naval warships of non-Black Sea nations (including the United States) in the Black Sea, limiting their aggregate tonnage (thereby limiting their number), their maximum period of stay within the Black Sea and so on. Such a regime creates a problem of access by Western powers to the Black Sea which negatively influences Georgia’s security environment. However, much has changed in the Black Sea after the Convention was signed – the Second World War took place, the Cold War was concluded, the Soviet Union collapsed and new states arose in its place – Russia, Ukraine and Georgia while Romania and Bulgaria became member states of NATO, Russia annexed Crimea, Turkey distanced itself from the West and so forth. In such conditions, a document signed in the 1930s remains a militarypolitical anachronism, unable to address new requirements and realities. That said, the issue of reviewing it remains problematic as it depends on numerous factors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, History, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia

148. President Zelensky’s first year leading Ukraine: A case of déjà vu

Author:
Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
During his first year as President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky prioritized presidential power-building. In order to do so, he relied heavily on the old system and established practices, such as “hands-on” management and the personalization of state agencies. Institution-building was replaced by the targeted fine-tuning of the dominant system. Some important reforms launched by the government in autumn 2019 were later stalled and reversed. As before, the adoption and implementation of comprehensive reforms will largely depend on Western pressure and conditionality. The major problem is that there are multiple centres of power in the country and the president’s actions only produce an illusion of control, while in reality the system is fragile and unstable. During the rest of his presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky will increasingly depend on oligarchs and govern through situational alliances. In exchange for their support, he may have to acquiesce to their continued dominance over the economy and the restoration of their influence in politics. Instability will intensify as his personal popularity wanes and economic and political crises deepen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Institutions, State Building, Transition, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

149. Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less Than Meets the Eye

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Aleksandar Vladicic
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian foreign policy remains focused primarily on Europe. That said, Moscow’s diplomatic foray into Asia hinges on its burgeoning strategic partnership with China. Much has been written about Russia’s so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific since its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and break with the West, but there is less to this supposed strategic shift than meets the eye. The country is and will remain a European—rather than an Asian—power by virtue of its history, strategic culture, demographics, and principal economic relationships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, History, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

150. Ukraine 2020-2021: Inflated Expectations, Unexpected Challenges (Assessments

Author:
Yuri Yakymenko, A. Bychenko, M. Bielawski, V. Zamyatin, K. Markevych, O. Melnyk, M. Mishchenko, V. Omelchenko, M. Pashkov, O. Pyshchulina, O. Rozumniy, V. Sidenko, A. Stetskiv, P. Stetsyuk, M. Sunhurovskiy, S. Chekunova, L. Shangina, and V. Yurchyshyn
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
Ukraine has entered 2020 with some positive and often inflated public expectations, largely associated with a radical change of government. However, from the first to the last day of 2020, the country was affected by new, unpredictable challenges and by its own problems, both old and new.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Law, Domestic Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe