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51. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Author:
Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

53. Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Aleksejeva and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. To research this report, the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified recurring pro-Kremlin narratives over two timeframes: the 2014–2021 interwar period and the seventy days leading up to the 2022 invasion. For the interwar period, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets over the seventy-day pre-invasion period. To understand how these narratives evolved, we catalogued them by themes, sub-narratives, and relationships to pre-invasion escalatory events. This allowed us to produce a timeline of false and misleading Kremlin narratives encompassing the year leading to the invasion, showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war.
Topic:
News Analysis, Conflict, Narrative, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

54. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:
Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. From Kosovo to Ukraine: lessons from the humanitarian response to conflict and displacement in Europe

Author:
Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
While there are many differences between the conflicts in Kosovo and Ukraine, the international humanitarian response to both bears many similarities. For example, both crises triggered record levels of funding and most international humanitarian agencies on the receiving end had limited or no presence and experience in the countries affected. Protection is the dominant need amongst affected communities in both crises as well. This paper – written by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles – highlights key lessons from the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis that could have relevance to the response in Ukraine. The lessons are drawn from the three-volume ‘Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds’ and ALNAP’s meta-evaluation of the Kosovo response, from our 2001 Annual Review.
Topic:
International Organization, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

58. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:
Michael Barnett
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

59. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:
Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine