Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Ukraine Publication Year within 3 Years

71. Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO

Author:
Maksym Skrypchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. Ukraine recognises that while it is unlikely to be invited to join NATO any time soon, there is much it can do to prepare itself in advance of a formal invitation. In the final brief of the series, Maksym Skrypchenko describes Ukraine’s progress in implementing its defence reform agenda, focusing on its record of adopting NATO standards, and outlines the challenges of doing so in wartime. The continuing support of NATO Allies will be essential to these efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Reform, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

72. Russia’s War in Ukraine Series: War and Industry

Author:
Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has needed huge volumes of weapons and ammunition for a war that is inherently asymmetrical, largely relying on the capabilities that it had—Soviet and domestically produced weapons—and on donations from partner countries. However, it has become clear that the approach is inadequate, especially if there are interruptions in supplies from outside, and that the restoration of Ukraine’s own military-industrial complex is vital to ensuring its security and defence capability, independence, and victory. In the fourth brief of the series, Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi discusses how ammunition and equipment supply shortages provided the impetus for the revival of the national defence industry and for the repurposing of civilian industry to meet the wartime needs of the armed forces. He also highlights the importance of harnessing the potential of Ukraine’s vibrant high-tech innovation ecosystem, and attracting foreign investments to expand the country’s defence industrial base and integrate it with the European defence industry.
Topic:
Markets, Weapons, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation

Author:
Maryna Vorotyntseva
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia conducts information and psychological operations to undermine and discredit Ukraine’s mobilisation, damage the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and weaken their willingness to defend their state. In support of these efforts, the Russian military and special services distribute both real and fake photographs and video content on social networks. In addition, the Russian special services use current and former male citizens of Ukraine who have voluntarily switched sides to produce malign content. The recent discussions about and promulgation of new laws related to Ukraine’s mobilisation have offered Russia further opportunities to spread disinformation.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Disinformation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

74. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Artificial Intelligence in Defence of Ukraine

Author:
Vitaliy Goncharuk
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine is the first international conflict in which the opposing sides have actively developed and used artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes. AI solutions for geospatial intelligence, operations with unmanned systems, military training, and cyber warfare have been key to success on the battlefield. This brief explores the state of defence AI in Ukraine and highlights the main lessons that can be learned from the Ukrainian experience.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

75. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

76. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

77. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

78. Russian Women in the Face of War Against Ukraine

Author:
Egle Murauskaite
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Consider the following pieces of a puzzle. Russia’s war against Ukraine has revealed stories about the heroic resistance efforts of Ukrainian women[1]: from a grandmother launching a pickle jar against a drone[2] to volunteers with territorial defense units.[3] However, comparable stories have been entirely lacking on Russia’s side: How come? Here is another piece: the stories of rape and abuse in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have shaken the world, with male Russian soldiers featured as systematic perpetrators of war crimes.[4] Were there any female soldiers or pro-Russian civilians involved? The historical background of multiple conflicts across continents does suggest an active women’s role as perpetrators of war crimes (including rape) and terrorism, not only victims.[5] Perhaps it is only a matter of time until stories of Russian women involved in these crimes start to emerge. How do these pieces fit together? I delve into these narratives in an information environment that is still extremely limited (particularly in terms of Russian-language sources)
Topic:
Women, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

80. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova