Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Ukraine Publication Year within 3 Years

471. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:
Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

472. Sustaining Democratic Unity for Ukraine’s Victory and South Korea’s Roles in This

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The war situation regarding Russia and Ukraine seems to be changing, as Kherson has recently returned to Ukraine. Yang Gyu Kim, a principal researcher at the East Asia Institute, considers the Russia-Ukraine war a “war of value,” and stresses that Ukraine’s victory is highly important, since it involves the restoration of global governance and has strategic implications in various regions around the world. Considering the post-war measures, Kim argues that the most contentious issue to be addressed is the genocide committed by Russian troops toward Ukraine civilians. While various reports confirm the allegations of genocide, he explains establishing its allegations and filing the case to the International Court of Justice remain challenging. Finally, Kim suggests three things that the Korean government can consider to help Ukraine: closely cooperating with the United States and Japan to sanction Russia, providing further humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and supporting Ukraine to win the legal fight in proving the war crimes as genocide.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, Democracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Asia, and South Korea

473. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

474. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Paul Dibb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

475. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:
Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:
Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

476. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost. Although Moscow will lose political, economic, and diplomatic influence, observers should not overlook the Russian push to strengthen its military presence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

477. Walking the tightrope towards the EU: Moldova’s vulnerabilities amid war in Ukraine

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the Council of the European Union decided on 23 June 2022 to grant Moldova the status of EU candidate country, it boosted the morale of a beleaguered government in Chișinău trying to circumnavigate a daunting series of crises. Since Maia Sandu ousted Socialist President Igor Dodon in the presidential election in 2020 and her reform-oriented Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained a parliamentary majority in 2021, Moldova has barely had a chance to catch its breath. In the year that followed, the country experienced an energy crisis that almost deprived it of gas in the winter of 2021-2022, a budding economic crisis with rampant inflation, and a security and refugee crisis as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war in its immediate neighbourhood, with Russian troops advancing in the spring along Ukraine’s southern coast to barely over 100 kilometres of Moldova’s borders, has further complicated the already difficult geopolitical balancing act of successive Moldovan governments. It has also aggravated existing security risks. For years, Moldova has balanced its aspirations to join the EU with its constitutional neutrality and its many dependencies on the Russian Federation. While President Putin was quick to congratulate Maia Sandu on her election and has so far refrained from open hostility towards her government, there are still many vulnerabilities that Moscow already leverages and could further exploit if it chose to destabilise Moldova. Not only is Moldova’s economy highly fragile and dependent on Russian energy, there are also political forces and regions that see their interests threatened by the reforms of the PAS government in Chișinău – and over which Moscow has different degrees of influence. Two of such regions are the separatist region of Transnistria in the east and the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the south of the country. A better understanding of these key vulnerabilities could help the EU and the Netherlands to assist Moldova in reducing them and to increase the stability and resilience of the EU’s newest candidate country. The central question of this research report therefore is to what extent Russia’s influence over Moldovan domestic politics as well as the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia poses risks to the internal and external stability of Moldova.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

478. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

479. The instrumentalization of migration: A geopolitical perspective and toolbox

Author:
Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Myrthe Wijnkoop
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
As armies and weapons cross borders, geopolitics re-enters the western mindset. With his full-scale invasion of Ukraine President Putin attempts to redraw the borders in Europe, and carve out a Russian sphere of influence. Whereas his armies’ achievements on the battlefield fall short of Putin’s initial expectations, they did succeed in making his fears relevant. They more tightly united the West, increased support for further enlargement of NATO, convinced Europeans that massive defence investments make sense and energy dependency is a strategic mistake. This is a geopolitical turn that was deemed impossible only one year ago. After the COVID-19 shock, the Russia-shock has made western countries realize in full that economic globalization and interdependence create vulnerabilities (e.g. dependence from medical masks imported from China, and gas imported from Russia). Adversary states can use these economic vulnerabilities as geopolitical weapons. The growing awareness and scrutiny of our vulnerabilities extends to the field of migration as well. As Ukraine is fighting back, millions flee to Europe. UNHCR has counted almost 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine that have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in EuropeSee https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. Last updated: 29 November 2022. as a direct consequence of Putin’s geopolitical aspirations. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Ukraine reminds one of the Russian strategy in the war in Syria. NATO’s top commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, warned back then that Putin and Assad were trying to create a massive displacement of people. He suggested that refugees are the war, and the target of this destabilisation strategy was Europe. That interpretation of the indiscriminate bombing is deemed farfetched by some, but recent examples of the instrumentalization of migration abound. Libya used it against EU Member States, Morocco against Spain, Turkey against Greece, and Belarus against EU Member States. In this context there is an increased interest in understanding the phenomenon of the instrumentalization of migration. The aim of this paper is to use a geopolitical perspective to better understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of migration. Such a perspective is helpful to analyse the points of vulnerability of target countries, and to initiate a discussion about possible strategic responses to prevent, deter and combat its use. These insights could contribute to more resilience of potential target countries and better protection of potential victims.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

480. Different Choices, Divergent Paths: Poland and Ukraine

Author:
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Eduard Hochreiter, and Tadeusz Kowalski
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
We compare the economic growth trajectories of Poland and Ukraine since 1990 to try to understand the extent to which the observed growth differentials can be traced to increased efficiency in the use of capital and other factors (intensive growth), rather than to simple accumulation of capital (extensive growth). We stress the role of qualitative factors such as education, governance and institutions. We ask whether the EU perspective and NATO membership played a role. We discuss the closely related histories of the two countries and note the stark differences between them, including their different approaches to the EU vs Russia, full vs incomplete transition to a market economy, and democracy vs anocracy, as well as different initial conditions. We compare key determinants of growth and growth trajectories, using economic as well as social indicators, and trying to disentangle efficiency and accumulation and combine path dependence and the role and scope of creative destruction. While Poland had the shortest and mildest transformation recession among CEE countries, Ukraine has been stagnant, or in decline, since 1990. The statistics we report and the stories we tell suggest that both countries have a complex relationship with democracy and that the nearly threefold difference in per capita GDP at PPP in 2021 in Poland’s favour, with the ratio of investment to GDP similar in both countries, can most plausibly be traced to: (a) Poland’s more extensive and diversified exports, and fewer restrictions on trade, in addition to more comprehensive and quicker restructuring of the national economy inspired by the EU perspective; (b) Poland’s more extensive and better-quality education; (c) Poland’s greater democracy and longer experience of democracy, lower levels of corruption, better governance, and freer press; (d) Poland’s smaller agricultural sector and greater emphasis on manufacturing; and (e) Poland’s lower inflation and higher level of financial development. Furthermore, Poland built market-friendly institutions to EU specifications and joined NATO. Against all this, Ukraine had more economic equality and lower unemployment as well as, from the early 1990s, a lower initial level of income per person, but was hampered by political divisions, path-dependent corruption and poor governance. During the global Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine apparently suffered fewer deaths than Poland, despite fewer vaccinations.
Topic:
Economics, Education, Governance, Reform, European Union, Economic Growth, Inflation, Exports, Transition, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Poland