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431. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

432. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

433. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:
Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

434. German strengths and weaknesses in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The Russian attack on Ukraine has activated a series of tropes about the international balance of power in Europe. Most mainstream opinion outlets have published criticisms of Germany for supposedly being dependent on Russia and threatening the European security system by hesitating when decisive action is required. The following points serve to reintroduce some facts into the conversation. The current war in Ukraine is primarily the result of German-Russian rivalry. The war is a case of an established power, Russia, miscalculating in its efforts to prevent a rising power, Germany, from absorbing a nation within its sphere of cooperation: Ukraine. Germany’s strategy has been subtle, seeking to manage through economic interdependence an international conflict predicated upon balance of power considerations. Since circa 1900, Turkey has also played a key role in the German security system in the Black Sea region. With the benefit of hindsight, Germany’s strategy has been the most appropriate to the situation, given that Russia has been completely isolated while Germany is surrounded by allies. Germany’s problems today are not in its Russian policy, but rather in self-defeating ideologies which include the “Green” movement and economic statism.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

435. Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: The Effect of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Turkey’s position in a “post-Western world” is widely debated as Asia emerges as the world’s new demographic and economic focal point. Turkey’s drive for strategic autonomy is crucial to all considerations of Eurasianism as a result of the rise of emerging powers worldwide and the transition to a multipolar international system. The emergence of a revisionist Russia, threatening to destroy the global order in place since the end of the Cold War, sent out a powerful warning to its neighbors, including Turkey. Russian-Turkish relations have not been shaped by shared identity, interest and threat perceptions; instead, they have remained largely instrumental and driven by necessity. The Turkish government cannot afford consistency in its discourse on Turkey as the “protector of the oppressed” when it comes to defending Uyghur rights against the Chinese regime. Ukraine and the West’s response to Russian aggression refuted Turkish Eurasianist claims that Ukraine was “helpless” and that the West had entered a “serious and irreversible decline”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

436. The Ukraine Crisis: There Is Still Room for Diplomacy

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Confronting each other over the future of Ukraine, NATO and Russia are engaged in complicated diplomatic bargaining over security, power and the limits of the transatlantic alliance in Europe. Diplomacy can work toward a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis, in spite of the heated public rhetoric. The US and the EU share a common objective in preventing a war in the short term and reaching an understanding with Russia in the longer term. The EU may not be at the negotiating table, but it is still actively involved in the diplomatic discussions. It plays an important role via deterrence and diplomacy in several fora, while France is steadily upgrading its geopolitical standing and pursuing a modus vivendi with Russia. Greece is closely monitoring the Ukrainian crisis and supports all de-escalation efforts. The presence of Greek diaspora communities in Ukraine is an important factor. So are Turkey’s efforts to assume a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia with a view to upgrading its own NATO standing.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

437. Adapting to New Realities: Israel’s foreign policy in post-Netanyahu times

Author:
Gabriel Haritos
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Israel had to adapt to the revised objectives of the Biden administration in the Middle East and to update its coordination with Russia on the Syria front. The war in Ukraine has reconfigured Israel’s relations with the US and Russia. Israel’s reluctance to provide arms to Ukraine has allowed Russian-Israeli coordination to continue in Syria. The energy crisis triggered by the Russo-Ukrainian war led the US to revise its stance towards Saudi Arabia. The US-Iran talks ground to a halt in Vienna in the light of the growing ties between Iran and Russia. Israel took advantage of the new state of affairs, encouraging the rapprochement between Washington and Riyadh and countering the possibility of the US reopening its consulate in East Jerusalem. In coordination with the US, Israel has promoted the deepening of the Abraham Accords and drawn India into the new Middle East reality through the new I2U2 mechanism. Thanks to carefully managed communication, the Bennett-Lapid government was able to restore diplomatic relations with Turkey while maintaining close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. It would seem advisable to put in place additional safeguards to maintain the quality of Athens-Nicosia -Jerusalem relations, similar to those which are expected to accompany the revamped relations between Israel and Turkey.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and United States of America

438. Transformation Challenges for the International Humanitarian Law System: Migration Crisis as the Latest Tool For Hybrid Warfare. (A Vision From Ukraine)

Author:
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Zharovska, Mykhailo Mykievych, Malvina Hrushko, and Mykhailo I. Hrabynskyi
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The article tries to present a theoretical-legal and international-practical analysis of the migration crisis as a tool for hybrid warfare, analysing the features of such a war and the peculiarities of using the flow of migrants and refugees as "living" weapons in a military conflict. The authors try to prove that a migration crisis can be provoked by an aggressor country using the hybrid warfare methodology attempting to destabilize the political situation, avoiding the resistance of the civil society of the target country without engaging in open hostilities. The authors stress the uncertainty surrounding the term "hybrid warfare" and propose their own classification of the modern hybrid warfare´ features. Based on the analysis of the use of migration crisis in Syria, Venezuela and Belarus, the article singles out the stages of employment of such a tool for warfare.
Topic:
Migration, Refugees, Conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

439. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose

Author:
Guillaume Van der Loo and Peter Van Elsuwege
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In an extraordinary session of the European Parliament on 1 March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested from a bunker in Kyiv, while Russian missiles bombarded Ukraine, the EU to give the war-ravaged country a clear path towards EU membership. The day before, Ukraine had submitted its official application to the EU, followed shortly by Georgia and Moldova. The European Parliament already supported Ukraine’s membership application and called on the EU institutions to work towards granting Ukraine EU candidate status, in line with Article 49 TEU. Offering such a status would be a historic token of support for Ukraine in its self-defence against Russian military aggression. The Versailles declaration, adopted by the heads of state or government of the EU member states on 10 and 11 March, acknowledges that Ukraine belongs to the ‘European family’ without explicitly mentioning the country’s candidate status. Nevertheless, the Council already invited the European Commission to submit its opinion in accordance with Article 49 TEU. Despite this support for – and recognition of – Ukraine’s application, the road to EU membership remains a long one. Several member states have concerns about Ukraine’s readiness and eligibility for the pre-accession process, the EU’s absorption capacity, and the geopolitical consequences of the Union’s further eastward enlargement. Moreover, the economic consequences of the war will also complicate Ukraine’s concrete progress in its accession process. With Russian tanks and missiles still on Ukrainian soil, discussing actual membership is arguably premature. This may create unrealistic expectations and lead to frustrations in the applicant countries. It will therefore be important to remain clear and transparent about the EU accession procedure and offer concrete and credible incentives for reform and gradual integration in the Union throughout the long and winding pre-accession procedure. Paired with an unprecedented assistance package and new forms of sectoral integration in key EU policies (e.g. the twin green and digital transitions), the current EU–Ukraine Association Agreement remains the most appropriate instrument to develop this bilateral relationship further. The dynamic nature of the agreement, combined with its open-ended accession perspective, implies that both the EU and Ukraine can reorient it to new and more ambitious forms of political association and economic integration and accommodate it to a pre-accession context on the basis of a staged approach.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

440. War has returned to Europe: Three reasons why the EU did not see it coming

Author:
Corina Stratulat
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Before 24 February, Europe decidedly defined itself as 'post-war'. But since Putin's full-scale, cold-blooded invasion of Ukraine, war again defines the Union's reality. Damage control is the main priority now — but knee-jerk reactions and moral outrage do not amount to a strategy, argues Corina Stratulat. To create a future that stops perpetuating the past, the Union and its member states must also start to critically contemplate how they got into the current predicament and change course. Three lessons stand out: First, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, overconfidence in its own allure and model has skewed the EU's perspective of itself and the rest of the world. While freedom, pluralism and liberal democracy remain attractive, liberal expectations that the Union would be able to convert even its immediate neighbourhood – let alone the world – to its image have proven illusory. Despite almost two decades of European integration, democratic performance has still not acquired a positive dynamic in the Balkans. And yet the membership card has now been confidently and imprudently put on the table for Ukraine and other eastern countries, posing as a solution to the current crisis. Without practising humility, the EU stands to persevere in its confirmation biases and continue to evade learning. Second, the EU's unrealistic aspirations to global hegemony have long been concealing a policy of double standards both at 'home' and abroad, piling up accusations of hypocrisy. While the EU was pretending to be a shining example of liberal democracy, several member states have taken full pages from Putin's autocratic playbook or put their own interests ahead of the Union's 'sacred' democratic values — faults easily exploited by illiberal actors, like Putin. Dressing up the EU's foreign policy ambitions as efforts to revive global democracy will remain a hypocrisy trap, including in Ukraine now. Third, a misplaced acceptance of the status quo has prevented the EU from getting to the bottom of the many crises it has been grappling with for decades. But the Union cannot wish away systemic risks or escape the fact that dealing with today's enormous challenges will require deep and brave reforms across the board. The stresses of cumulative crises, crowned now by the ongoing war, give the Union a chance to plan the future. The choices that the EU will make in the coming years will determine what the Union truly values and whether it will be able to preserve its own way of life. If the EU is keen to maintain the normative power of its liberal values in an increasingly illiberal environment, it should obsessively focus on making liberalism its sign of distinction from the outside world, not a model to transform others. The Union has to learn to live by example and will have to work hard to become exemplary.
Topic:
European Union, Norms, Russia-Ukraine War, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine