Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Ukraine Publication Year within 3 Years

391. Partnership for Enlargement: A new way to integrate Ukraine and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Author:
Piotr Buras and Kai-Olaf Lana
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine puts the entire future European order at risk. It is already forcing a profound reconsideration of the EU’s and its neighbours’ interests. To address this, the EU needs to devise a new approach to its neighbourhood, similar to the way in which it has rapidly enhanced its security and economic policies to respond to the threat. The EU should establish a Partnership for Enlargement that offers Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Western Balkans states concrete steps towards deeper integration – and a pathway to eventual membership. This new partnership should include three ‘pillars’: single market integration and the reconstruction of Ukraine; a reinforced commitment to energy security and climate transition; and stronger political cooperation in security matters. As countries with key interests in the Ukraine war, Germany and Poland should work particularly closely to drive this new project forward.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

392. Green peace: How Europe’s climate policy can survive the war in Ukraine

Author:
Susi Dennison
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has weakened European governments’ commitment to EU climate goals. European leaders should intensify their efforts to build clean, sustainable energy security in practice – not just in theory. They should also address the climate challenge as a matter of EU – rather than national – energy sovereignty. Europeans will be locked into longer-term carbon dependency and unable to benefit from economies of scale if they only operate nationally. Strong thought leadership will be needed to achieve this change of mindset. France has an opportunity to build bridges between groups of member states, working alongside the upcoming presidencies of the EU. Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Austria are all willing partners in this, as they are already cooperating to implement the European Green Deal.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Leadership, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

393. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

394. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

395. Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence

Author:
Hanna Shelest
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression in 2022 holds valuable lessons for the EU and its member states. Since 2014, Ukraine has transformed its armed forces, mobilised a network of reservists, and coordinated military and civilian defence agencies to prioritise cross-society resilience to crises. It has done so by adopting NATO best practices and through a unique movement of volunteers who help fund the war effort. The Ukrainian armed forces have also found innovative ways to use new technologies in mounting an asymmetric response to their much larger adversary. EU member states can learn from Ukraine’s experiences, but this should be a two-way street – with European countries continuing to supply weapons and provide training to Ukraine, and gaining real-world wartime insights in return.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

396. EU – Pacific Talks: H2 – Hydrogen Hype

Author:
David Plhák
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Czechia is in many respects similar to Japan in its limited ability to rely fully on renewables. It is therefore in the interest of Czechia to increase hydrogen imports and its use in the energy mix. In order to ensure a steady supply of hydrogen the gas system operators of Czechia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Germany launched in 2021 joined initiative to create a Central European Hydrogen corridor in an effort to create a supply of hydrogen from Ukraine. Unfortunately, given the Russian aggression on Ukraine, this project must be stopped, until Ukraine will be free of war again.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Economy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Japan, Ukraine, Germany, Asia-Pacific, Slovakia, European Union, and Czechia

397. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:
Rico Chandra
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:
Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

398. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

399. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

400. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:
Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe