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331. Moldova, land of the European Union's partnership mission

Author:
Florent Parmentier
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Sharing 939 kilometres of borders with Ukraine, Moldova is closest to the epicentre of the war that began on 24 February 2022. From the very first weeks onwards, the Moldovan authorities had to build reception facilities for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the fighting in the south and east of the country. In diplomatic and strategic terms, this war has also played a role in accelerating events, since in June 2022 Moldova was, against all expectations, recognised as candidate country to the European Union. The credit for this European rapprochement goes largely to the leadership team headed by President Maia Sandu. He later, with her party (Party of Action and Solidarity, PAS), has led the nation's dynamic forces along this demanding path of transformation, despite the many difficulties that the country faces. The war has already changed Moldova’s geopolitical situation, which has to contend with a great number of hybrid threats from Russia. In other words, beyond the success of the European Political Community Summit, organised at Castelul Mimi on 1 June last, and the many political signals received on this occasion, Moldova still needs assistance on the road to European transformation. This is why the Europeans decided to launch a partnership mission on 31 May last in Chisinau together with the High Representative Josep Borrell, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Nicu Popescu and the then Home Affairs Minister, Ana Revenco.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Hybrid Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

332. Displaced Ukrainians in European Labor Markets: Leveraging Innovations for More Inclusive Integration

Author:
Maria Vincenza Desiderio and Kate Hooper
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has led millions of displaced Ukrainians to seek protection in European countries since February 2022, and welcoming new arrivals has put enormous pressure on reception and integration systems. But with the right supports, displaced Ukrainians could also potentially help address some of Europe’s pervasive skill shortages. Many newcomers have a tertiary education, and the EU decision to activate the Temporary Protection Directive has provided swift access to clear residence and work rights. Early evidence suggests that displaced Ukrainians’ labor market entry is progressing well, with many working-age adults finding jobs. However, challenges such as language barriers, difficulties getting foreign credentials recognized, and trouble securing child care have limited some Ukrainians’ ability to enter the labor market and find a job commensurate with their skills. A desire among many to return to Ukraine, as circumstances allow, is also shaping their decisions about finding work and participating in integration and training programs. This report explores how displaced Ukrainians are faring in European labor markets, including what is known about their early labor market outcomes and the barriers they face when seeking work. It also examines how governments can work together with civil society and employers to help new arrivals find quality jobs and, in doing so, help European societies benefit from their skills.
Topic:
Education, Employment, Refugees, Innovation, Integration, Labor Market, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

333. 2023 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment

Author:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment serves as a guide for academics and practitioners in the defense community on the current challenges and opportunities in the strategic environment. This year’s publication outlines key strategic issues across the four broad themes of Regional Challenges and Opportunities, Domestic Challenges, Institutional Challenges, and Domains Impacting US Strategic Advantage. These themes represent a wide range of topics affecting national security and provide a global assessment of the strategic environment to help focus the defense community on research and publication. Strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China and the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remain dominant challenges to US national security interests across the globe. However, the evolving security environment also presents new and unconventional threats, such as cyberattacks, terrorism, transnational crime, and the implications of rapid technological advancements in fields such as artificial intelligence. At the same time, the US faces domestic and institutional challenges in the form of recruiting and retention shortfalls in the all-volunteer force, the prospect of contested logistics in large-scale combat operations, and the health of the US Defense Industrial Base. Furthermore, rapidly evolving security landscapes in the Arctic region and the space domain pose unique potential challenges to the Army’s strategic advantage.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Corruption, Migration, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Partnerships, Weapons, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, Logistics, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

334. VIEWPOINT: IS MILITARY AID REALLY THE BEST WAY TO HELP UKRAINE?

Author:
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Molly Wallace, and Ned Dobos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars worth of military aid since the Russian invasion began one year ago. The international consensus seems to be that supporting Ukraine means financing its war effort. But a few dissenting voices have emerged of late, more ambivalent about the prudence—and ethics—of the current policy. Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a former advisor to the US Secretary of Defence, has warned that the choice of cure could turn out to be worse than the disease. At least 7,000 Ukrainian civilians have already perished in the war. Thousands more have been injured, and millions have been displaced. MacGregor’s primary concern is that the bleeding will continue for as long as the fighting does. Russian forces advance, Ukrainian forces resist with violence, Russia responds with counter-violence, and the bodies continue to pile up. The Ukrainian state retains its sovereignty, but eventually we get to a point where, to quote MacGregor, “There are no longer any Ukrainians left!” This is hyperbole, of course, but that should not distract from the valid point MacGregor is making. States exist for the sake of their citizens, not the other way around. Therefore, if a given method of defending the state is causing its citizens to be killed or to flee en masse, that is a compelling reason to explore alternatives.
Topic:
Resistance, Armed Conflict, Nonviolence, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

335. THE LIMITS OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND

Author:
Costantino Pischedda and Andrew Cheon
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Drone strikes targeted Moscow last week. Though much remains unknown about it, the episode appears to be part of a series of unclaimed coercive attacks that US officials attributed to Ukrainian government personnel, including the killing of the daughter of a Russian nationalist, the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines, and drone attacks on the Kremlin. With unclaimed coercion, perpetrators impose costs on adversaries to signal their resolve to prevail in disputes while denying involvement or simply not making any claim about responsibility. Unclaimed coercion is not unique to the war in Ukraine. Russia launched cyber attacks in 2007 to extract concessions from Estonia, though Moscow denied responsibility, and in 2010 Seoul claimed North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship, Pyongyang’s denial notwithstanding. Unclaimed coercion may have strategic benefits. Without unmistakable evidence about the identity of the perpetrator, the absence of a claim of responsibility creates plausible deniability, which, some argue, allows coercers to send intelligible, credible messages to targets while containing escalation risks. It may also reduce the costs of being seen as a norm violator. For instance, Austin Carson observed that, though both Saudi Arabia and the United States viewed the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities as part of an Iranian coercive campaign, the absence both of conclusive evidence and a claim of responsibility prevented Riyadh and Washington from carrying out a tough military response, which would have looked “illegitimate while jeopardizing allies’ support.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Armed Conflict, Coercion, Russia-Ukraine War, and Plausible Deniability
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, South Korea, North Korea, and Cuba

336. Resolving the Russia-Ukraine Impasse: Lessons from an African Cosmological Viewpoint

Author:
Evans O. Ogada
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This paper makes a case for the utility of Ubuntu philosophy in providing a context within which resolving the conflict and post-conflict stages of the war between Russia and Ukraine may take place. Before speaking to Ubuntu’s conflict resolution utility, it is first necessary to provide an explanation of its basic tenets because it is not likely to be well-known to the readers of Baku Dialogues.
Topic:
Philosophy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Ukraine

337. The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Exhaustion of the 1945 World Order: Tracing the Origins, Examining the Consequences

Author:
Manuel Becerra Ramírez
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I n the early hours of Thursday, 24 February 2022, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what it called a “special military operation” on Ukrainian territory. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized the two selfproclaimed people’s republics that had established themselves in earlier rounds of fighting. This was supposedly based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for legitimate individual or collective defense. Later that year, Russia annexed them outright. Of course, in reality, Russia’s invasion violated the UN Charter and the principles contained therein. This constitutes a disregard for the norms that emerged after World War II as understood by the proponents of the “rules-based international liberal order” and others. The UN Charter privileges the solution of conflicts by peaceful means. Legitimate defense is only permissible in the face of a current attack, not a hypothetical one (this is why, for example, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was termed a “preemptive war” by the George W. Bush Administration). Moreover, the UN Security Council (with what is effectually an endorsement or legitimization function) must always be aware of such actions.
Topic:
History, Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

338. ‘Appeasement’ and the Current Crisis: How ‘Munich’ Impoverishes Western Grand Strategy

Author:
Christopher J. Fettweis
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy loves to remind any Western leader who seems about to go wobbly that appeasing aggressors is not only dishonorable but strategically unwise and dangerous. When Henry Kissinger, for instance, suggested in May 2022 at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos that Ukraine may need to make territorial concessions to end the war, Zelenskyy said this: “It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time.” Indeed, Munich makes an appearance in every speech (and most off-hand remarks) that the Ukrainian president makes, as if the conference happened in 2018 rather than 1938. Zelenskyy knows his audience. The lessons of Munich and appeasement are deeply ingrained in the strategic consciousness of the United States and its allies. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the dangers posed by appeasing dictators is one of the central tenets of the Western foreign policy establishment. Those arguing for staunch opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin employ the analogy as much as possible, accusing anyone who disagrees of being ignorant of the most basic of lessons that history supposedly teaches. The word “supposedly” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. This brief essay begins by providing a historical overview of appeasement and explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers. That infamous conference did not lead to the Second World War, which was coming no matter what British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain did at the negotiating table. The essay then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day, including its influence on the debates regarding Russia’s barbarous invasion of Ukraine. It would be best for everyone involved if the true history of the Munich conference was widely known, or barring that (since it is probably too late), that it was forgotten altogether. This essay provides a historical overview of appeasement, explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers, and then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Grand Strategy, Appeasement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

339. Azerbaijan’s Impending Migration Challenge: How to Get Prepared and What to Expect

Author:
Tamilla Mammadova, Aynur Rahimli, and Parviz Sunatulloev
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s migration policy framework has seen major developments in recent years, including the consolidation of migration-relevant legislation in its State Migration Code. Moreover, close cooperation with the UNHCR on asylum status determination is resulting in overall recognition rates comparable to those founds in some EU member states. All this is to be welcomed. In April 2018, an EU-funded study published by the Viennabased International Centre for Migration Policy Development titled “Baseline Study in Migration in Azerbaijan,” confirmed that the country is home to a large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, and other similar categories of people, due to the at-the-time ongoing conflict over Karabakh and surrounding territories with Armenia. Official statistics provided by the State Committee for Refugees and IDPs in 2017 put the number of IDPs at 789,000 and the number of refugees at 420,000— of these, 350,000 are identified as originating in Armenia and are, presumably, ethnic-Azerbaijanis. The 2016 figures provided by the UNHCR indicate 613,129 IDPs (this UN agency does not classify ethnic-Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia as “refugees” for methodological reasons). The numbers have not changed dramatically in the interim—in June 2022, that UNHCR’s IDP number was 654,839, although Azerbaijan’s flagship “Great Return to Karabakh” strategy aims to reverse the tragedy and hardship of displacement in the years to come, as discussed inter alia in several Analytic Policy Papers published by ADA University’s Institute for Development and Diplomacy as well as in essays appearing in the pages of Baku Dialogues by the likes of Nazrin Baghirova, Fariz Ismailzade, Aybaniz Ismayilova, Ruslan Suleymanov, and others. The UNHCR’s June 2022 report indicated that the number of registered refugees in Azerbaijan was 6,466, with most coming from Ukraine; another 3,585 persons were classified as stateless. Moreover, the number of asylum seekers from abroad has been very low. According to UNHCR data, a total of 2,277 foreigners applied for asylum in Azerbaijan between 2005 and 2015. Also according to the June 2022 UNHCR document, at the time of its publication there were 121 asylum seekers in the country, which is slightly below the annual average and may be a result of the fact that all of Azerbaijan’s land borders are presently closed (as part of a package of anti-coronavirus quarantine measures). Lastly, legal migrant inflows from foreign countries have considerably increased in the past several years, with tens of thousands of temporary and permanent residency permits being issued annually (the numbers decreased as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting worldwide lockdowns). Forecasts suggest those numbers will rise in the years to come.
Topic:
Refugees, Asylum, Migration Policy, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

340. The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Anya Fink
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions. This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war. Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty. In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention. Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine