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91. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

92. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

93. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

95. The caucasus: peace negotiations and the global energy transition

Author:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has set in motion new security and power dynamics across the wider Black Sea region. The conflict, which continues to overwhelmingly preoccupy the Kremlin created a power vacuum in the South Caucasus and, in the aftermath of the recent series of wars over Karabakh, opened up space for peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These negotiations may not only lead to a normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani ties following three decades of conflict but also open the possibility for reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, with ample economic, political, and security effects for the entire region. Russia’s aggression has also created energy supply shortages in Europe, drawn the South Caucasus closer to the continent, and rushed the energy transition in many instances. Azerbaijan is becoming an ever more important energy supplier to European customers. At the same time, Baku is investing in key renewable energy projects, with an eye to becoming a major clean electricity exporter, and is set to host the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in November 2024. This panel discussion brings together two of this year’s Black Sea Program Title VIII research fellows to present their findings on the South Caucasus in the context of new security arrangements, peace negotiations, and the global energy transition. The research fellowships are granted by the US State Department for the Middle East Institute’s Black Sea Program
Topic:
Renewable Energy, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

96. 1,000 days of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine

Author:
Philip Breedlove, Iulia-sabina Joja, and Matthew Czekaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Wednesday, November 20, marks a somber anniversary for Ukraine: 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country. Though the Ukrainians continue to hold out with Western assistance against Russian attacks, the past two-and-a-half years have been devastating for the country and its people. Ukraine now faces another winter at war as momentum appears to be shifting in Russia’s favor. What can the US and its allies do to ensure hostilities end as favorably as possible to Ukraine and in line with American strategic national interests? MEI scholars General Philip M. Breedlove and Dr. Iulia-Sabina Joja join host Matthew Czekaj to discuss the state of the conflict and what’s at stake for the region and the global community.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

97. R2P Monitor, Issue 68, 1 March 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 68 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Cameroon, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, Central African Republic, and Global Focus

98. R2P Monitor, Issue 69, 1 June 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 69 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, Sahel, and Central African Republic

99. R2P Monitor, Issue 70, 1 September 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 70 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sahel, and Central African Republic

100. R2P Monitor, Issue 71, 1 December 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 71 looks at developments in Afghanistan, the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are also available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sahel, and Central African Republic