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81. How the War in Ukraine Shapes Iran’s Strategic Gains and Ambitions

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine War has strengthened military-industrial ties between Moscow and Tehran. Most concerning is their deepening collaboration in dual-use technologies and disruptive weapons systems. Moscow has provided technical assistance to Tehran in key areas, including its space program, which can help the Islamic Republic develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Iran’s interest in Russian anti-stealth radars and air-superiority fighters is worrying. Russia’s extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones has allowed the Iranian defense technological and industrial base to advance its drone warfare systems, collect large amounts of operational data, and improve its loitering munitions designs and production. A Russian victory in Ukraine would likely accelerate such cooperation, given the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions, among other factors. So far, the Islamic Republic has been the winner of the Russia-Ukraine War. Below are some key highlights from this policy memo: The Russian military’s reliance on using munitions from Iran to exhaust Ukraine’s combat capabilities has provided Tehran with unprecedented opportunities. In the absence of adequate deterrents in place, Iran has already become a combat drone supplier to the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the Russian Federation, turning the Islamic Republic into a menacing threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance’s eastern and southern fronts. Open-source intelligence tracks a meaningful rise in the Russian military’s use of Iran-supplied Shahed baseline loitering munitions, indicating that the joint Russo-Iranian drone plant in Tatarstan, Russia, is capable of producing scores of kamikaze drones annually at low cost. Such facilities can soon mushroom across the Russian Federation. With Tehran demonstrating growing control over its airspace while the country moves closer to obtaining military-grade nuclear capabilities, Russia can help the Islamic Republic make its airspace more dangerous than ever. A combination of anti-stealth radar, the Su-35 air-superiority fighter squadrons protected by underground basing, and a large number of layered strategic air defenses can prove lethal even against fifth-generation, stealth combat aircraft. Accordingly, the Western intelligence community should remain vigilant over any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran involving anti-stealth radars and space program assets, keeping in mind that the latter can easily translate into intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, Iran is now investing in infrastructure within Russia—including dredging the Volga River and establishing shipping companies in the port city of Astrakhan—allowing the two countries to further expand the strategic route across the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

82. Beyond the counter-offensive: Attrition, stalemate, and the future of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a war of attrition – which on current projections Russia is set to win. Ukraine can only achieve its war aims if it moves to a war of manoeuvre; without this, it cannot regain its lost territory. Western supplies and efforts at defence-industrial consolidation are failing to provide Ukraine with the replacement armaments it needs to survive the war of attrition, let along switch to manoeuvre warfare. The West and Europeans in particular need to overhaul their financial regulations and create economies of scale to radically stimulate the production of drones, ammunition, armoured fighting vehicles, and more. Only if they carefully absorb the lessons learned from this war will Europeans be ready for the types of great power confrontation that are becoming more likely in the 21st century
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

83. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

84. Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sovereignty, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

85. Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects

Author:
EUROPEUM
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 18th, EUROPEUM’s Brussels Office in partnership with PISM Brussels Office under the Think Visegrad platform hosted a discussion titled “Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects”. This event was attended by 15 experts from think tanks and representatives of EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe

86. Refugees and Return: Resolving Ukraine's Human Capital Crisis

Author:
Markus Ziener and Dariia Mykhailyshyna
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Ukraine is facing a human capital crisis of enormous proportions. Here, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presents the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees about their intentions to return to Ukraine or remain in their host countries. The report contains some recommendations for encouraging Ukrainians to return. Millions of its citizens fled the country after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. To share best practices and generate possible solutions, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), along with its partners—the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), hosted a conference titled “Toward a Skilled Workforce: Rebuilding Ukraine’s Human Capital” in Berlin on April 25–26, 2024. To set the stage, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presented the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees. Those findings, as well as some recommendations, are detailed in this report.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Refugees, and Human Capital
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

87. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

88. Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
For some 20 years after regaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine wavered in how far to take its relationship with NATO. That changed following Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea and engagement in fighting in Donbas in 2014. Ukraine’s leaders and people increasingly came to view the alliance as the best answer for their country’s security needs. A growing number of NATO allies support Ukraine’s membership as important for Europe’s security and are ready to extend Kyiv an invitation to join. Other allies, however, are reluctant to take that step now, particularly while Ukraine remains at war with Russia. Division within NATO over this issue broke into the open in the run-up to the alliance’s July 2023 summit in Vilnius. Allies seemed determined to avoid a repeat at the July 2024 summit in Washington. That summit described Ukraine’s path to membership as “irreversible,” and NATO decisions focused on providing Kyiv the military wherewithal to defend itself against Russia’s continuing assaults. The “when” of Ukraine’s membership remains a question for the future.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

89. Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

Author:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

90. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine