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2. Online Narratives and Manipulations: Tunisian and Regional Panorama
- Author:
- Arab Reform Initiative
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- In the wake of the presidential elections of October 2024, the first since the coup d'état in July 2021, Tunisia has seen a resurgence of suspiciously sponsored political content, both pro- and anti-regime, on online social media networks. These included advertisements denouncing the refusal of the president of the electoral body, Farouk Bouasker, to reinstate certain candidates. We also saw “locked” profiles with Egyptian-sounding names reacting with likes or "laugh" emojis to publications on the Facebook page of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia. With the proliferation of anti-Saied pages garnering thousands of likes in the space of a few days, pro-regime influencers have multiplied their videos to denounce the spread of these pages and content, calling their audiences to witness the truth of the plot hatched by dark forces, which is the mainstay of the new regime's narrative. It is hard to overlook the importance of Facebook in Tunisia. It remains the most widely used network1 and continues to be a major platform for political life.2 While it has long been the site of disinformation campaigns3 in Tunisia, in recent years the issue has taken on a whole new dimension: the sector has gone from being a local, cottage industry to a veritable industry run by specialized companies operating on an international scale. This industrialization of disinformation goes hand in hand with a phenomenon of opinion manipulation, taking the form of troll profiles dictating the political agenda, or fake profiles creating a false sense of popularity for certain ideas. Both disinformation and manipulation raise questions about the future of democracy, in Tunisia and globally, in a context where for many, these networks continue to represent a faithful reflection of reality. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of disinformation from the Tunisian digital space, exploring the different narratives conveyed, forms of manipulation, and the role of social media platforms in their amplification. The paper also shows that certain disinformation narratives circulate between different countries in the region. The aim is to broaden reflection on these forms of manipulation while proposing a regional research and action agenda that can help reduce the impact of these activities, known in the Arab world by the general name of "electronic flies".4
- Topic:
- Elections, Media, Misinformation, and Narrative
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
3. European and Tunisian Migration Policies: A Recipe for Failure and Suffering
- Author:
- Refugees International
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- After several months of significant increase in irregular migration from Tunisia to Europe, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, along with several other European Union leaders, have set their sights on what they seem to believe is the best way to produce immediate results: increasing the provision of cash, equipment and training to the Tunisian security forces (TSF) to diminish the country’s booming irregular migration industry. In the last two months, the European Commission announced it wants to agree to “new anti-smuggling operational partnerships” with Tunisia[1] that would significantly scale up border controls, police and judicial cooperation, as well as cooperation with EU agencies (for example, Frontex). An “International Conference on a global alliance to counter migrant smuggling” was also convened in Brussels on 28 November.[2] As one top EU official in Tunis put it to Refugees International, “There is a strong desire by some in Europe to get the maximum amount of resources possible to the Tunisian government and security forces as soon as possible to stop the boats, now and in the future”.[3] The EU intended strategy, however, appears destined for failure, falling short of its narrow objective of suppressing irregular migration and lacking in the broader – and more important – criteria of adherence to legal commitments, human rights principles and effective overall migration policy. This approach is riddled with four primary deficiencies.
- Topic:
- Migration, European Union, Refugees, and European Commission
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Africa, Tunisia, and Mediterranean
4. Charting the Course: European Perspectives on EU–Tunisia Relations
- Author:
- Akram Ezzamouri, Colin Powers, and Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Over the past year, a surge in migrant people arriving from Tunisia to Europe has thrust the North African country into the heart of European political agendas, sparking concerns across the continent’s capitals about its hardships and risk of economic and social collapse. The immediate policy response involved a frenzy of Euro-Tunisian diplomatic activity guided by the Italian government – itself needing to demonstrate some kind of answer to increased migratory arrivals to its shores – and culminated in the signing of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2023.[1] The MoU, structured around five key areas of collaboration – macroeconomic stability, trade cooperation, green energy transition, people-to-people contacts, and migration and mobility – is said by so-called “Team Europe” to aim fostering a strategic and comprehensive partnership between the European Union and Tunisia. However, observers highlighted its detrimental shortsightedness, the flaws in its legal nature, as well as the necessity to allocate political and financial resources beyond migration management to truly diversify the agreement.[2] Against this backdrop, three European experts offer here considerations on challenges and prospects in EU–Tunisia relations and propose alternative avenues where cooperation can evolve, emphasising the creation of a stable and equitable political environment in both Europe and Tunisia.
- Topic:
- Migration, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Migrants
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Africa, and Tunisia
5. Unemployment and Social Crisis in Tunisia
- Author:
- Vasco Molini
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The decade since the 2010–11 Jasmine revolution has been particularly difficult for Tunisia. The trend of poverty reduction that started in the early 2000s has lost steam, with poverty rates increasing again in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and spatial inequalities remaining high. Moreover, the labour market is afflicted by persistent structural problems: high unemployment, high informality and low levels of participation among women and youth. Given the limited opportunities offered by the local labour market, Tunisians increasingly find in emigration the solution to cope with their dire economic and social situation.
- Topic:
- Migration, Economy, Unemployment, Labor Market, and Social Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia
6. Seeing Tunisia’s Civil Society During Un-civil Times
- Author:
- Larbi Sadiki and Layla Saleh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Tunisia’s dramatic democratic reversals since July 2021 warrant an in-depth reflection on how and where its once-promising democratisation momentum went wrong. Much attention is given to the top-down demolition of democratic institutions by the country’s (democratically) elected President Kais Saied. However, just as the popular revolution that ousted the dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and the subsequent democratic transition was to a great extent a bottom-up process, so civil society too is an important piece of the de-democratisation puzzle. In a bid to compare and contrast trajectories of degeneration and regeneration, the paper explores the contributions and constraints of Tunisian civil society vis-à-vis Tunisia’s difficult experiment with democratisation.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Democratization, Democracy, Institutions, and NGOs
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
7. Tunisia’s Transformation Into a Transit Hub: Illegal Migration and Policy Dilemmas
- Author:
- Hamza Meddeb and Fakhreddine Louati
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Due to structural economic, climate, and social crises in the Sahel, Tunisia has emerged as a key transit point for sub-Saharan African migrants and asylum seekers aiming to reach Europe. This has fueled a migration economy in Tunisia. Caught between Tunisia’s attempts to leverage migration to pressure the European Union (EU) on the one hand and the EU’s securitization of migration on the other, sub-Saharan African migrants find themselves trapped in a complex web of challenges.
- Topic:
- Migration, Politics, Reform, European Union, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
8. The Buildup to a Crisis: Current Tensions and Future Scenarios for Tunisia
- Author:
- Ishac Diwan, Hachemi Alaya, and Hamza Meddeb
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Tunisia has been living beyond its means since 2011. External support and credit flowed into the country after the 2010–2011 uprising to support its nascent democracy, but this funding ended up largely financing a consumption boom that is unsustainable. To make matters worse, macroeconomic and political instability have begun to deeply harm the country’s productive capacity. The risk of a serious financial crisis has risen and corrective action is needed to ward it off. Tunisia’s political system should be able to avoid such catastrophic outcomes. Most reasonable people agree that the risks are rising and that something needs to be done. However, the disagreement is over magnitude, timing, and the type of program required to address the country’s problems. A hard economic adjustment risks unleashing a sociopolitical crisis. Not engaging in a correction, however, may well engender a future economic meltdown. Buying time is easiest politically, but it often means only postponing the crisis, leading to an even larger explosion. The challenge is to find the narrow path to escape a crisis by generating confidence in a national program that is politically acceptable and that can lead to a brighter future. Faced with these negative dynamics—the lack of sustainability and economic regression—economic agents might not merely adjust to the new normal. Instead, they might try to push the burden elsewhere in the economy and by so doing unleash more destructive forces. Think of society, with its networked organizations, as a hydraulic system. As pressure mounts, weaker parts of the network are at risk. Pushing pressure out from one part, instead of addressing the root cause of the problem, only leads to more pressure on other parts. Ultimately, the system will burst at its most vulnerable point. Typically, deterioration is not linear. Pressure builds up in invisible ways until the system explodes in a generalized crisis. There are several ways in which this can happen: foreign exchange reserves are used up slowly until a run takes place and the currency collapses; financing the state’s losses drains the private sector, reducing investment, until there is a collapse in growth; taxes are raised or services reduced, or both, leading to a social explosion; fiscal losses are financed with new loans (or arrears) until creditors dry up, and printing money remains the only solution, leading to hyperinflation; or banks keep lending to the state until depositors lose confidence in the banking sector and there is a bank run. What is destroyed will have to be rebuilt from scratch at great cost. It is in this context that Carnegie’s new Tunisia Sustainability Lab is beginning its work. The objective is twofold. First, the lab will monitor the risks ahead and alert the public about developments. It will do so by preparing a regular scorecard of Tunisia’s economic, financial, fiscal, external, and sociopolitical domains. Second, the lab will track proposals advanced by national and international parties on possible pathways to progress, reporting on and analyzing initiatives to avoid the worst of them. So far, several International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposals have been rejected by the Tunisian authorities. There are alternative proposals, some outlined by civil society actors, but they have not materialized. To support social dialogue, we will highlight the various initiatives and try to evaluate their impact. We will also develop scenarios to assess macroeconomic trends, which we will update over time.
- Topic:
- Crisis Management, Macroeconomics, IMF, and Economic Crisis
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
9. Tunisia: Public Opinion Report 2023
- Author:
- Arab Barometer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arab Barometer
- Abstract:
- Over the past dozen years, Tunisia has experienced dramatic political change. In 2011, the Jasmine Revolution led to the fall of its long-standing leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, ushering in a period of political instability. Following the rewriting of the constitution, free and fair elections were held but yielded only weak and largely ineffective governments. Although Tunisians enjoyed far greater political rights, economically the country regressed. A decade after the revolution, GDP per capita had declined significantly. Stories of corruption within government institutions remained common, yielding an increasingly frustrated public. Elections may give voters a say, but the outcomes of the system often appeared no better than in the days of Ben Ali. Citizens demanded radical change and looked for a leader who they believed could deliver actual results. In the 2019 presidential elections, many Tunisians turned to Kaïs Saïed as a solution. Saïed ran a populist campaign as a political outsider, calling for ending corruption and reforms to the electoral system. In the final round of voting, he captured nearly three-quarters of the vote for an overwhelming victory and strong electoral mandate. In July 2021, Saïed dismissed the prime minister and suspended parliament. Ruling by decree, many members of the judiciary were dismissed and many opposition politicians were arrested. Despite international criticism of these actions, results from the 2021 Arab Barometer demonstrated that most Tunisians were in favor of his actions.1 Just three months after the events of July 25, 2021, most Tunisians had confidence in the president, a majority were optimistic about their economic future for the first time in years, and most believed the government was finally tackling the problem of corruption. In short, many Tunisians had hope for their country’s future. In late 2023, Tunisians remained more optimistic than they had been before the election of Saïed, but Arab Barometer’s survey suggests that some are starting to lose hope. Promises of economic improvements have not been realized—just one-in-ten rate the economy as good, which is largely unchanged since 2013. Economic optimism has also fallen, dropping by 14 points since 2021. During this period, hunger has also increased dramatically, with twothirds of Tunisians saying they have gone without food at least once in the previous month. Moreover, the most common perception is that government mismanagement is the source of food insecurity. Views of most political institutions are relatively weak. Just over a third have confidence in the government while less than a quarter trust parliament. However, trust in President Saïed remains strong, with about three-quarters expressing confidence in their leader. Still, this level is a six point decrease from 2021.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Corruption, Environment, Migration, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, Institutions, Freedom, and Gender
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
10. What if…? 12 Dragon King scenarios for 2028
- Author:
- Florence Gaub
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- At first glance, this publication appears to be a collection of Early Warning essays – they are, to some extent, but they should not be exclusively read as such. Conventional Early Warning systems have a much shorter time horizon – normally hours, perhaps months at most – than these scenarios, and they are solely mitigation mechanisms, that is to say they provide no insight into how the event they are warning of can be avoided. They are thus not an intellectual thought exercise, but solely an alarm bell. Our Dragon Kings in this volume provide insight into how they can be avoided, but they also challenge our assumptions in more ways than one. They are therefore awareness-raisers no matter how credible or plausible you will find them. Just reading them will have a readiness-increasing effect. (In fact, the more absurd you find them, the more pronounced this is because your mind will learn more when the emotion they generate is greater.) These scenarios can become even more useful, however, if you use them for simulation exercises in a team. You can use them as a blueprint for a wider scenario exercise, whether one wishes to adopt a blue or red team approach to them, and ask questions such as: how could this have been prevented, what would have to be done? What are alternative pathways of this scenario that are even worse, and how can we prevent those? The most important aspect is that every exercise of this kind must lead to some concrete policy steps. Merely thinking about improbable futures is never enough – doing something about them is what makes them a useful policy-tool. In that case, they lead to active, rather than passive, engagement with the content, foster collaboration, encourage innovation, practice decision-making, provide a space for failure and experimentation with alternative courses of action. It is precisely because of this that scenarios are a common feature in military education, but they work just as well in any other strategic context – provided, time and space is made for it. If yes, they contribute to increasing preparedness and readiness, and accelerate the response time to surprise. What’s more, generally engaging in fringe thinking about the future will strengthen these capabilities no matter what kind of surprise eventually occurs. Much like how vaccines teach the immune system, disruptive thinking strengthens our neural networks, making us more resilient for extreme situations.
- Topic:
- NATO, Natural Disasters, Elections, Crisis Management, Coup, UN Security Council, Biological Weapons, Resilience, Arctic Council, and Readiness
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iraq, Europe, India, Taiwan, Latin America, Nigeria, and Tunisia