Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Taliban

11. Afghanistan: Meeting the Real World Challenges of Transition

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The more one looks at the current situation in Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces. There is no sign that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan. This has made every aspect of Transition is a high-risk effort.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Development, Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban

12. Afghanistan: Withdrawal Lessons

Author:
Jack Devine and Whitney Kassel
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
World Policy Journal
Institution:
World Policy Institute
Abstract:
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to be followed by a civil war between a predominantly non-Pashtun security apparatus and Pakistan-backed Taliban forces. As we confront this reality, we would be wise to look closely at the experience of the Soviet Union following its occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980s. The prime lessons from that ill-fated moment are the need to provide continued economic and military support to the leadership in Kabul and to obtain the support of Pakistan, while maintaining sufficient intelligence and covert action infrastructure on both sides of the frontier the two countries share. A sustainable relationship with Pakistan is critical today because of the country's important role in any political solution in Afghanistan and the significant risks to the international community posed by Pakistan's own instability.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban

13. Justifying sacrifice: Barack Obama and the selling and ending of the war in Afghanistan

Author:
Trevor Mccrisken
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Just a month after entering office, US President Barack Obama spoke at the US Marine Corps base at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. His remarks focused on his plans to 'responsibly' end the war in Iraq and to deepen the commitment of the United States to the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of the key motifs that Obama used in his speech was that of 'sacrifice'—the need for all Americans to continue the age-old tradition of paying a price for the freedoms they enjoy. As he told the audience of US Marines: 'The consequences of war are dire, the sacrifices immeasurable. You know because you have seen those sacrifices. You have lived them. And we all honor them.' He then characterized this notion of sacrifice for one's country as being part of a long tradition that was responsible for the very existence of the United States and an essential guarantor of its domestic freedom:
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Taliban, and North Carolina

14. An Explosion of News: The State of Media in Afghanistan

Author:
Peter Cary
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
After the ouster of the Taliban from power by U.S.-led coalition troops in November 2001, the media scene in Afghanistan exploded. Under the Taliban, only one government radio station was allowed to operate, and there were no independent media. Ten years later, the Afghan media scene is a lively place, with more than 175 FM radio stations, 75 TV channels, four news agencies, and hundreds of publications including at least seven daily newspapers. Internet cafes can be found in major cities, and 61 percent of Afghans have mobile phones, which some use to listen to radio.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Development, and Mass Media
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Central Asia, and Taliban

15. Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A negotiated political settlement is a desirable outcome to the conflict in Afghanistan, but current talks with the Taliban are unlikely to result in a sustainable peace. There is a risk that negotiations under present conditions could further destabilise the country and region. Debilitated by internal political divisions and external pressures, the Karzai government is poorly positioned to cut a deal with leaders of the insurgency. Afghanistan's security forces are ill-prepared to handle the power vacuum that will occur following the exit of international troops. As political competition heats up within the country in the run-up to NATO's withdrawal of combat forces at the end of 2014, the differing priorities and preferences of the parties to the conflict – from the Afghan government to the Taliban leadership to key regional and wider international actors – will further undermine the prospects of peace. To avoid another civil war, a major course correction is needed that results in the appointment of a UN-mandated mediation team and the adoption of a more realistic approach to resolution of the conflict.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Islam, Treaties and Agreements, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

16. Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The predominant image of the Taliban is a military organization bent almost exclusively on wreaking havoc on the Afghan state and whoever sides with it. However, for all their reputation of “warrior mullahs,” the Taliban have not altogether neglected the civilian dimensions of power. In the early post-9/11 period, as an insurgent organization, they were indeed little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs who were trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency. They did not have the resources or capacity to develop a shadow government structure. After 2003, however, the situation gradually changed and the Taliban started investing greater resources in their shadow government. Apart from the increased availability of financial resources, what might have driven the Taliban's desire for building their own shadow government was their thirst for legitimacy. They wanted to show that they were the authentic government of Afghanistan and not merely an opposition military force. Another reason appears to have been that the Taliban actually realized that a shadow governance structure brought them some practical benefits, such as a greater ability to interact with the population. Particularly since the Taliban started entering relatively heavily populated areas in 2006, their commanders were no longer skilled enough to deal with the villagers. In a sense, the Taliban realized that they could not outfight the forces arrayed against them, which included the strongest military on the planet and a series of allies, also of respectable military capability. They tried, therefore, to outgovern their rivals, identifying the ineffectiveness of Kabul's government as their greatest opportunity.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

17. A Strategy of "Congagement" toward Pakistan

Author:
Zalmay Khalilzad
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Pakistan undertakes a comprehensive review of its relationship with the United States, the United States should similarly review its approach to Pakistan. In the ten years since the 9/11 attacks, the key threat in South Asia has been the nexus between the Pakistani military as well as security services and the syndicate of violent extremist groups al - Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar - e - Taiba, and other insurgents operating against the United States, Afghanistan, and India. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States has sought to induce Pakistani leaders to break with these groups. While Pakistan has cooperated to a degree against some of them, the U.S. strategy has failed to transform Pakistan's behavior.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Taliban

18. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:
Harsh Pant
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

19. Afghanistan's Civil Order Police

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In 2006, a day of deadly riots in Kabul dramatized the need for an Afghan constabulary force capable of controlling outbreaks of urban violence. In response, the U.S. military and Afghan authorities created an elite gendarmerie, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). Although ANCOP was conceived of as a riot control force, it was assigned to the Focused District Development Program to replace district-level Afghan Uniformed Police who were away for training. The high demand and constant transfers required by this duty resulted in rates of attrition among ANCOP units of 75 to 80 percent. In 2010, ANCOP's superior training, firepower, and mobility were recognized in its assignment, along with a “surge” of U.S. military forces, to reverse the Taliban's hold on key areas in southern Afghanistan. In heavy fighting in Marja, Helmand province, ANCOP was demonstrably unprepared to serve as a counterinsurgency force, particularly in areas that had not been cleared by coalition and Afghan military forces. Subsequent improvements in training and partnering with U.S. forces improved ANCOP's performance in Kandahar, where ANCOP was used to hold areas that had been cleared by the military. By 2011, ANCOP had firmly established its place as an elite rapid reaction and counterinsurgency force with a positive reputation among coalition troops and Afghan citizens.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

20. What It Will Take to Secure Afghanistan

Author:
Max Boot
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Afghanistan is approaching a major inflection point in its long and turbulent history. In 2014 most of the foreign military forces are due to pull out. With them will go the bulk of foreign financing that has accounted for almost all of the state's budget. Twenty fourteen is also the year that Afghanistan is due to hold presidential elections. Hamid Karzai, the only president the country has known since the fall of the Taliban, has said he will not seek another term in office. Thus Afghanistan is likely to have a new president to lead it into a new era. This era will be shaped by many factors, principally decisions made by Afghans themselves, but the United States has the ability to affect the outcome if it makes a sustained commitment to maintain security, improve the political process, and reduce Pakistani interference so as to build on the tenuous gains achieved by the U.S. troop surge since 2010.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban