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11. Game of Proxies – Towards a new model of warfare: Experiences from the CAR, Libya, Mali, Syria, and Ukraine

Author:
Cyprian Aleksander Kozera, Paweł Bernat, Cüneyt Gürer, Błażej Popławski, and Mehmet Alper Sözer
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The objective of the study is to carry out a meaningful comparison that demonstrates the similarities and differences of various conflict theatres where proxy forces were employed. The analyses of the discussed cases focused on different aspects of the conflict and nature of the proxy use. The analyses presented on the following pages were conducted on the basis of the literature on the subject, governmental research and reports, and supporting sources reporting recent developments that complemented academic sources. Various non-state actors such as ethnic militias, paramilitary units, and private military companies have become more and more visible on contemporary battlegrounds. Modern states employ those actors to further their objectives, as this limits their own political and financial costs. This increasingly visible phenomenon points to an emerging new model of warfare where state actors are relying ever more on proxies of various character and nature. It is highly likely that any future conflict will be characterised by a proxy-based model of warfare, which will consist of a limited footprint made by regular forces (or none at all) and, consequently, the extended use of proxies supported by special forces. Because such an approach is less costly, proxies will be more often employed by low-budget states, previously reluctant to carry out such costly military endeavours. Denying the actions and affiliations of these proxies will inevitably follow and, in turn, a lack of political accountability and responsibility for the conflict’s outcome.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, Proxy War, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Mali, and Central African Republic

12. Toward Empowerment and Sustainability: Reforming America’s Syrian Refugee Policies

Author:
Sahar Aziz, Joanna Gardner, Tamara Anaie, and Omar Rana
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
The number of refugees and displaced people worldwide has reached unprecedented levels. Of the world’s 68.5 million refugees and displaced people, by far the largest number are Syrian. The nearly 13 million Syrian refugees and internally-displaced persons account for sixty percent of Syria’s pre-war population. While media coverage has focused on Syrian refugees seeking asylum in third countries, such as Europe and the United States, eighty percent of the seven million externally displaced Syrians have sought refuge in the countries neighboring Syria: Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon resulting in an enormous strain on government services and the local economies. As an influential player in Middle East politics, the United States has a national interest in sustaining the capacity of international systems to respond to protracted refugee crises. Toward Empowerment and Sustainability: Reforming America’s Syrian Refugee Policies examines Jordan as a case study for informing U.S. Syrian refugee policy. Jordan’s experience exemplifies the myriad challenges facing neighboring countries that warrant a rethinking of America’s approach to the Syrian refugee crisis.
Topic:
Civil War, War, Refugee Issues, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, Displacement, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

13. What Is the Endgame in Syria?

Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
World Politics Review
Abstract:
What does victory on President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal terms look like? How has the rise and fall of the Islamic State changed Syria’s political map? How will U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from northeastern Syria and the subsequent Turkish invasion of the area change the situation?And what about reconstruction, let alone reconciliation? This WPR report provides a comprehensive look at those questions and several others that will determine what’s to come in Syria, with impacts far beyond the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Proxy War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

14. Russia’s Strategy and Interests in MENA Conflicts: An Overview

Author:
Luigi Narbone
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As 2019 comes to close, Russian mercenaries are allegedly shifting the balance of forces in Libya, helping General Haftar to reignite his efforts to take Tripoli. Only a few weeks ago, Russia’s brokered ceasefire had successfully stopped Turkey’s advances in the Syrian northeast, pushing Kurdish forces away from the Turkish border and allowing the return of Bashar Al Assad’s forces to the region from where they had been absent since the beginning of the conflict. Similarly, in Idlib, Russia’s position will be essential to determine the course of the conflict.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, Syria, and Idlib

15. Don't Write Off Iraq

Author:
Bilal Wahab and Barbara A. Leaf
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Even as Baghdad works to rein in militias that invite outside attacks, Washington needs to be patient with the country’s contradictions in the near term and give space for it to exert sovereignty in the long term. As President Trump met with Iraqi president Barham Salih today on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, they were no doubt buoyed by their governments’ mutual conclusion that the recent attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq did not originate from Iraq. Initial concerns about that possibility were well founded—a previous attack on a major Saudi pipeline was carried out from Iraqi territory this May, and multiple Iraqi militia facilities have been struck since June, reportedly by Israel. Each of these developments was linked to Shia “special groups” with known ties to Iran. On July 1, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi ordered these and other militias to fold themselves under state authority, but so far he has been unable to impose order on them. The government has also failed to prevent them from threatening neighboring countries at Iran’s presumed behest—an especially dangerous lapse given that Iraqi authorities cannot protect the territory these militias hold from external retaliation. To keep other countries from turning Iraq into a proxy battleground, Baghdad needs to rein in the unruliest militias. This is a tall order because Tehran has spent fifteen years building them into a parallel force of its own. Given the willingness these “special groups” have shown when asked to attack U.S. troops, fight on the Assad regime’s behalf in Syria, or secure other Iranian interests, they risk implicating Iraq in Tehran’s regional confrontations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and/or Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

16. Iran's Use of Shi'i Militant Proxies: Ideological and Practical Expediency Versus Uncertain Sustainability

Author:
Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Since its 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has incited violent, radical, and often sectarian nonstate groups across the Middle East to serve as proxies in its military campaigns to influence regional and international politics. This “proxy model” has become increasingly salient since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more recently in Iraq and Syria, and is now Iran’s primary tool for advancing its regional intersts. The U.S. and the West in general have largely paid attention only to radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. With a few exceptions, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, nonstate Shi‘i militant groups have generally avoided the same intense Western scrutiny. This study compares and contrasts regional conflicts that have been shaped by Iranian proxies and Iran’s successful—and unsuccessful—attempts to recruit to its militant groups. It also identifies the key forces that have shaped Iran’s ideological and operational sponsorship of nonstate militant groups, both Sunni and Shi‘i, as well as its motivations and preferred modus operandi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Conflict, Ideology, Shia, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

17. Who Controls the Rimland: Competition and Rivalry in the Mediterranean

Author:
GianLuca Pastori
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The dynamics of the Mediterranean region are increasingly affected by the interplay of the US, Russian, and Chinese efforts to strengthen their respective regional positions. Since the years of the second Obama administration, the US disengagement has led to a greater Russian and Chinese presence and to the growth of their influence at political, economic, and military levels. Today, Russia is heavily involved in the Libyan struggle for power, a role that the reception of General Khalifa Haftar onboard the flagship of the Russian Fleet, the Admiral Kuznetsov, already highlighted in January 2017. Since then, Moscow’s role has progressively increased, culminating in the deployment of Russian PMC’s personnel in support of Haftar’s troops, in September 2019, during the operations on the Tripoli front. Somewhat reminiscent of the role assumed in Syria since 2016, Moscow’s activism has been, in recent years, the main source of concern for both the US military establishment and NATO. Moreover, the increase in military assertiveness has gone side by side with a greater economic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, favored by the planned enhancement of the shipyard facilities in Tartus[1]. Moscow’s political weight has been re-affirmed in the region by the role that Russian President Vladimir Putin played as peace broker during the crisis triggered by the announcement of the US’ withdrawal from Northern Syria in October 2019. The so-called ‘Sochi agreement’ (October 22, 2019) has been, to a large extent, a product of the role that Russia has assumed as the bulwark of the Bashar al-Assad’s regime and main military force in the region.
Topic:
Security, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Libya, Syria, and Mediterranean

18. Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Life on the Margins

Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
The outbreak of civil war in Syria led to a mass exodus of refugees to neighboring countries and beyond. Many of these refugees fled to Jordan and Lebanon where they face a myriad of challenges, including of how to provide services for such a vast population increase. Overall, while Jordan has taken a number of steps to address some of the key challenges faced by refugees,1 Lebanon has taken fewer steps. Perhaps this is due to Lebanon’s unique history and fears that a large influx of refugees could change the country’s fragile sectarian balance and even lead to a renewed civil conflict.2 Against this background, the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer reveals that refugees in Jordan and Lebanon show different feelings about the degree to which they feel secure in their host country and how they the degree to which available services are meeting their needs. Overall, the findings reveal significant differences in the degree to which Syrian refugees feel safe and secure in the two countries. For example, while a majority of refugees in Jordan (59 percent) are not very worried or not worried at all about being harassed or threatened in street, only 25 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same. This result shows similarities with citizens of their host countries: while 58 percent of Jordanians are not very worried or not worried at all, only three-in-ten (29 percent) of Lebanese have such concerns. However, Lebanese tend to see Syrian refugees as a greater challenge to their country than Jordanians: 44 percent of Lebanese as opposed to 35 percent of Jordanian cite Syrian refugees as one of the two most important challenges that their countries face today. Perceptions of Syrian refugees toward the quality of public services also diverge to a great extent. Although the vast majority in Jordan are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system (86 percent) and the education system (81 percent), only 53 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same about the educational system, and just 28 percent in Lebanon are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system. Economic conditions are even more challenging for refugees in both countries. Most face with difficulties in meeting their household expenses. However, Syrian refugees in Jordan are more likely to show greater optimism toward economic conditions than those living in Lebanon. Notably, support for democracy remains strong among the refugee population in both countries, with 79 percent in Jordan and 85 percent in Lebanon agreeing or strongly agreeing democracy is better than other forms of government. At the same time, refugee communities in both countries define democracy based primarily on socioeconomic terms instead of political outcomes. Moreover, most believe that political reform should be instituted gradually instead of once (85 percent in Jordan and 80 percent in Lebanon).
Topic:
Civil War, Refugee Issues, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

19. Facilitating a Political Transition in Syria

Author:
Omar Sheira
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The Arab Spring shook the fragile foundation of Syria, effectively highlighting the pre-existing sentiments of conflict and separatism along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines. Refusing to respond to the calls of nationwide protests, President Bashar al-Assad responded with unrestricted force, effectively plunging the country into a fully-fledged civil war, very similar to what Hobbes described as the state of nature. Five years later, the war has all but damaged Syria's security, political, economic and social domains, causing more than $200 billion of losses (Abdul Razzaq, 2015) and spilling over to cost nearby countries an estimated $35 billion (World Bank, 2016). In terms of human suffering, it has claimed the lives of 250,000-470,000, injured over 1-2 million Syrians, and forcefully displaced 54% of the pre-war population, including 4.6 million people who fled the country and 6.6 million others who were internally displaced by violence (UNOCHA, 2016). The intensifying conflict, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has transformed Syria into an international stage for the proxy confrontation between local, regional and international powers, including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon, as each of them supports various Syrian players in the conflict. This has led to the inability of any party to achieve an absolute military victory and prolonged the conflict, risking the expansion of its military dimensions and political consequences.
Topic:
Syrian War, Crisis Management, Proxy War, and Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

20. External Actors in the Syrian Civil War. Clash of Interests and Strategies / Los actores externos en la guerra civil siria. Choque de intereses y estrategias

Author:
José Luis Calvo Albero
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The civil war in Syria has become a classic example of proxy war, in which different regional and global powers defend their interests through third parties. That explains its long duration and the high level of violence without reaching exhaustion. This article describes the motivations of the different external actors in the conflict and the strategic lines they follow to achieve their objectives.
Topic:
Syrian War, Proxy War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria