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11. Atrocity Prevention Under the Obama Administration: What We Learned and the Path Ahead

Author:
Stephen Pomper
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
This report is intended to provide an insider’s view on where the Obama administration’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities succeeded, where they did not, and where future policy makers who wrestle with the challenge of prevention might find useful lessons in the administration’s experience, both positive and negative. The first part of the report summarizes the intellectual roots of the Obama administration’s atrocityprevention policy, identifying the goals and expectations created by two key works—Samantha Power’s “A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide1 and the report of a bipartisan task force on genocide prevention led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen.2 The second part of the report describes how the administration translated those goals and expectations into policy and summarizes the administration’s record on atrocity prevention. It focuses in particular on situations in which policy changes and innovations appear to have had a positive effect, however modest, and on efforts to develop new capabilities under the policy. The third part looks at the two most prominent situations in which the policy was unsuccessful —Libya and Syria. The fourth part offers an “after action” assessment of the administration’s atrocity-prevention policy, drawing from interviews with former senior officials to identify both the strengths and contributions of the policy and its most pronounced shortcomings. The fifth part offers recommendations for future executive-branch officials, legislators and staff, and civil society partners for ways in which they could help the United States improve its performance on atrocity prevention going forward. The report is in many respects a hotwash exercise. The bulk of it was written in the first six months following the end of the Obama administration, drawing from the author’s reflections on his recent tenure as senior director for African Affairs, Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the staff of the Obama administration’s National Security Council, as well as his experience as chairman of the Atrocities Prevention Board. The report also draws extensively from interviews with more than 30 former senior Obama administration officials and others with insight on the administration’s atrocity-prevention efforts.3 Finally, this report owes a significant debt to earlier reports that have also sought to evaluate the administration’s atrocity-prevention record.4 Given the brevity of the report relative to the scope of its topic, both the analysis and recommendations herein are relatively skeletal. The report is offered with humility and as an effort to add one group of recollections and perspectives to a growing historical record. It is hoped that as this record continues to develop, it will provide the next generation of atrocity-prevention proponents new and better options to confront the challenges of the future, having profited as fully as possible from the lessons of the past.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Intervention, Barack Obama, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, Syria, North America, and United States of America

12. Critical Junctures in United States Policy toward Syria: An Assessment of the Counterfactuals

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
More than any other foreign policy crisis during the Obama administration’s eight years, the Syrian conflict has engendered enormous debate about what the United States might have done differently: Could this catastrophe have been avoided? In particular, might different decisions at critical junctures in US policy debates have diminished the level of killing and atrocities? This paper explores these questions based primarily on interviews with former US officials and nongovernmental Syria experts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Atrocities, Chemical Weapons, Bashar al-Assad, Containment, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

13. Evaluating Counterfactual US Policy Action in Syria, 2011-16: A Review of Empirical Evidence from Related Cases

Author:
Daniel Solomon
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
In public and policy debates about the US response to the conflict in Syria, comparisons to past responses to international cases of mass atrocity have become a fixture. In these debates, analysts use lessons from those past responses to forecast the likely consequences of US policy action in Syria or to speculate about the counterfactual consequences of actions not taken at various junctures. Comparisons to historical cases of international response provide important mental models for policy makers seeking to use specific tools and strategies to respond to the risk or occurrence of mass atrocities.2 For example, Barack Obama has said that his unwillingness to pursue military action against the government of Bashar al-Assad in response to its use of chemical weapons in August 2013 resulted in part from his dismay at the instability that followed the military operation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya in 2011.3 For Obama, the risk that even limited military action in Syria could become “another Libya” was enough to remove a range of possible military options from consideration. Which counterfactual US actions, if any, might have prevented or mitigated violence against civilians in Syria? This paper uses a systematic review of empirical studies of international responses to mass atrocities and related phenomena to evaluate these contemporary debates about US policy action in Syria.4 The purpose of this review is to evaluate plausible alternative avenues the US may have taken to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities against civilians in Syria. This analysis centers on “minimal rewrite” counterfactuals, in which a different policy action at a specific, time-bounded juncture in the US policy process on Syria might have led to a different outcome in violence against civilians. “Minimal rewrite” counterfactuals are opposed to socalled miracle world counterfactuals, which would require significant changes to the structural or contextual conditions that shape US policy.5 The paper centers on three policy actions that the US government debated—and in some cases implemented, to a limited degree—at various junctures since the conflict began in March 2011: (a) lethal support to the armed Syrian opposition, (b) limited strikes against Syrian government targets, and (c) no-fly zones. Although those US officials sometimes debated these options during overlapping junctures, the paper addresses opposition support and the direct military options as separate phenomena. The paper uses a review of historical, qualitative and quantitative studies of related cases and policy actions to assess the extent to which these actions may have affected the scope and severity of subsequent atrocities in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Atrocities, Counterfactuals, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

14. A Survey of Expert Judgments on the Effects of Counterfactual US Actions on Civilian Fatalities in Syria, 2011 - 2016

Author:
Lawerence Woocher
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The survey focused on four “minimal rewrite” counterfactuals: (a) President Obama’s not calling publicly for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to “step aside” in 2011, (b) the vetting and arming of moderate rebels in 2012, (c) the use of airstrikes to enforce the “red line” against chemical weapons use in 2013, and (d) the choice of an “Assad first” strategy instead of an “ISIS first” strategy in 2014.1 Respondents were asked to make probabilistic assessments on whether the counterfactual actions would have resulted in fewer civilian fatalities over the subsequent 12 months. They were also asked to cite the most important factors that led to their assessments and to identify other US government actions that would have been more effective in reducing civilian fatalities at the time. The clearest findings are (a) on average, respondents did not rate any of the four main counterfactuals very highly: neither the median nor the mean response on any of the four key counterfactual estimates was as high as 50 percent; and (b) very little consensus existed among respondents about the effect of the counterfactual actions on civilian fatalities over the subsequent year. The data reveal greater consensus on what the “most important factors” were, yet some striking disagreement on key analytical points. Finally, the most frequently cited ideas of other actions that would have helped reduce civilian fatalities were various types of (direct or indirect) military actions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Civilians, Atrocities, Counterfactuals, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America