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202. Our Future, Our Justice: Young People Taking Action
- Author:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Abstract:
- This guide is designed to engage young people who are interested in or are working on transitional justice issues in their communities. Intended to serve primarily as a training tool, it provides basic information about transitional justice and related principles and offers tips and strategies for trainers who are interested in working with Syrian youth to pursue truth, accountability, acknowledgment, reform, redress, and justice.
- Topic:
- Reform, Transitional Justice, Youth, Accountability, and Participation
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
203. 'You Can Change the Course of a Country:' Report on the International Gender Symposium
- Author:
- Sibley Hawkins
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Abstract:
- In February 2019, ICTJ hosted an international symposium on gender and transitional justice in Tunisia that brought together representatives from eight countries where ICTJ has been actively engaged in implementing a gender-focused approach to its programming. This briefing paper presents the lessons learned and key strategies that came out of this conference, as well as recommendations to international organizations, donors, and the media.
- Topic:
- Gender Issues, Women, Media, and Transitional Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Syria, and Tunisia
204. U.S. Complicity in the 2014 Coup in Kiev as a Violation of International Law
- Author:
- A. Vyleghanin and K. Kritsky
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- FIVE YEARS AGO, a coup d’état took place in Kiev. Following demon- strations and arson attacks, a mob seized several government institutions, including the administration building and residence of the constitutional- ly elected president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich. Some members of the Ukrainian president’s security detail who were protecting his residence from illegal seizure were wounded and killed.1 Alexander Turchinov, one of the coup leaders, began serving as the president of Ukraine even though no Ukrainian presidential election had been held. The coup in Kiev led primarily to the U.S. assuming a leading role in Ukraine’s governance – something it had neither during the period of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet era. The February 2014 overthrow of the president in Kiev that took place without elections and in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution de facto divided the country into regions that recognized the new authorities in Kiev and those that opposed the coup (primarily the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine). This occurred not only because the Ukrainian presi- dent was unconstitutionally removed from power but primarily because the “installation” of the putschist government was accompanied by vio- lence, and ethnic and linguistic persecution. In March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea left the new, “post-coup” Ukraine in accordance with the provision of the UN Charter on the right of peoples to self-determination. Subsequently, following a referendum in Crimea, a treaty on Crimea’s reunification with Russia was signed. A confrontation between the new regime in Kiev* and residents of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions turned into a protracted armed conflict. The forcible replacement in Kiev of a constitutionally elected head of state (Yanukovich) with an unconstitutional leader (Turchinov) directly impacted Russia’s national interests. Russians and Ukrainians lived together within a single state, the Russian Empire, from the 17th century until 1917. During the Soviet period, the border between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did not have international legal significance. It was an administrative bor- der. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent UN member states (Russia and Ukraine) that replaced them continued to maintain close economic and other ties. Their continued integration, including through joint participation in the Customs Union, objectively met the strategic interests of Ukraine and Russia. A friendly Ukraine is also important to Russia from a national securi- ty standpoint, considering NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders that began in the early 1990s – i.e., NATO’s absorption of all former member states of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland and even the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Russia’s leadership has repeatedly stressed the inadmissibility of dragging Ukraine into NATO. Words about “fraternal” relations between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine are no exaggeration: Millions of family members (both Russians and Ukrainians) live on opposite sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border,2 and at least one-third of Ukraine’s population speaks Russian as a native language. In this context, it is not surprising that Moscow considered the U.S.- orchestrated seizure of power from the head of state in Kiev an event affecting its vital interests. Something else is remarkable: The U.S. administration said that the events in Ukraine, far away from the American mainland, “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”4 Westerners promulgated a very different assessment of the forced ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. The U.S. called it a “people’s rev- olution” and said that the mob action organized in part by the U.S. ambas- sador in Kiev (including the killing of Berkut fighters, the state guard of the Ukrainian president) was a legitimate way of expressing the will of the “Ukrainian people.”
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Law, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, South America, Syria, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America
205. For-Profit Humanitarians: IKEA's Partnership with the Jordan River Foundation
- Author:
- Ammar A. Malik, Hamutal Bernstein, Edward Mohr, and Yasemin Irvin-Erickson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Urban Institute
- Abstract:
- As the Syrian refugee crisis enters its eighth year, leveraging the private sector’s financial capital and capacity for innovation has emerged as an attractive solution to protracted displacement. But little evidence exists on the feasibility and effectiveness of this approach. This case study highlights a unique type of private-sector engagement in which mainstream business interests align with the needs of refugees and host communities. The IKEA–Jordan River Foundation (JRF) partnership demonstrates how diverse stakeholders can identify synergies, overcome legal and practical barriers, and sustain collaborations through effective management structures.
- Topic:
- Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Business, Displacement, and Private Sector
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and Jordan
206. Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria
- Author:
- Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, Susan Cersosimo, and Kamaran Palani
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
- Abstract:
- There are major security events, issues and trends within Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011, that have influenced and impacted Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. In this policy paper we deconstruct the causal mechanisms that act as the primary drivers impacting bilateral relations. We then compare and contrast Ankara’s and Brussels’ current security interests, priorities and perceptions toward security threats originating in this troubled neighbourhood. Finally, we classify opportunities as culminating in three possible discrete or combined security policy scenarios: conflict, cooperation and/or convergence and make recommendations to improve Turkey-EU relations. To address how Iraq’s and Syria’s security environment evolved to its current state and predict the subsequent outcomes and impacts on EU-Turkey relations, we look back and critically analyse Ankara’s and Brussels’ views on the following key events, issues and trends: security and political dynamics following the second term of al-Maliki, the withdrawal of the US forces in 2011, the 2011 Syrian revolution, the war against the Islamic state (IS), The Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD) backing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood in Iraq and autonomy in Syria, the enhanced influence of Iran in Iraq and the growth of IS with subsequent mass displacement of person across both Iraq and Syria. Iraq is now largely free of IS reign, yet is still threatened by terrorism, mass population displacement and weak governance, among other ills. In parallel, now that the Syrian civil war enters its seventh bloody year, generating large numbers of casualties and millions of displaced persons, Brussels and Ankara are strongly incented to converge and/or cooperate on security policies which mitigate the escalating humanitarian crisis and ease the path to a durable peace agreement. However, finding durable solutions to address high value, high impact problems stemming from Iraq and Syria requires identifying and mitigating the causes vs symptoms of these countries’ instability and insecurity affecting Ankara’s and Brussels’ own security interests, priorities and threat perceptions. Central security priorities for the EU in post-IS Iraq include stabilization, the return of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating violent jihadist organizations and ideologies. While Turkey shares these objectives in principle, Ankara’s security interests concentrate primarily on neutralizing the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates’ presence and influence. Since 2014, Ankara and Brussels have mostly bifurcated on how they perceive security threats in Syria. Turkey-EU leaders continue to disagree on the Kurd’s role in the Syrian war and how Turkey should control its borders to cut flows of foreign fighters into Syria. As the IS invaded parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, European states began providing PKK affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria with both intelligence and military support. Alternately, since the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held its referendum for independence on 25 September 2017, EU and Turkish leaders have mostly converged on how they perceive security threats in Iraq with both staunchly supporting the country’s territorial integrity, thus, both refused to recognize the referendum’s legitimacy. We consider the issue of terrorism as a highly relevant driver of EU and Turkish security policies, perceptions and priorities. Though we see both countries as highly concerned with this issue, they diverge on which organizations pose the greatest threat. Ankara places the PKK at the top of its terrorist list – both within its borders and across the region – while Brussels prioritizes neutralizing jihadi terrorist threats on its soil, thus, the probability of convergence and cooperation and positive impact on EU-Turkey relations is moderate for this issue. Moreover, the IS is not given the same degree of priority by the two sides in the neighbourhood, including Iraq and Syria. Unlike the EU, Turkey considers the threat posed by the IS equal to the one posed by the PKK, but not as strategic. Here, the two sides diverge. In sum, dissent between Brussels and Ankara is highly likely given the Turkish Armed Forces’ broad kinetic engagement in both Iraq and Syria which negatively impacts EU and US efforts to roll back terrorism, stabilise the region, deliver humanitarian aid and help displaced persons return to their homes. Thus, regardless of whether Baghdad and/or Damascus formally grant Ankara permission to launch assaults, the EU views these actions as bellicose destabilizers competing with its own interests, thus, degrades EU-Turkey relations. Ultimately, this study calls for the EU and Turkey to prioritize mending cracks and fissures in their relationship and focus on the gains to be made through rapprochement on security issues originating in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the EU can use its tremendous mediating capacity as an honest broker to settle entrenched disputes between warring parties in Iraq and Syria and for Turkey restart the peace process at home. More than ever, both must develop a long-term strategic security framework to ensure that bilateral security interests, priorities and interventions do not derail current stabilisation and reconstruction procedures in Iraq and/or progress toward a durable peace in Syria.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria
207. Charities and Terrorism: Lessons from the Syrian Crisis
- Author:
- Rodger Shanahan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- Terrorists have manipulated the humanitarian crisis in Syria to create a cover for foreign fighters and to raise funds for terrorist groups under the guise of charitable donations. While terrorist abuse of charitable donations is a limited problem, even small amounts of funding can have disproportionately large effects. Early government intervention in setting due diligence standards for humanitarian aid groups operating in, or raising funds for use in, high-risk conflict zones is essential. The Australian Government should use the ‘declared area’ legislation more widely to raise the risk threshold for those seeking to use humanitarian assistance as cover for supporting terrorist causes overseas.
- Topic:
- Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Conflict, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Australia, and Syria
208. The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia
- Author:
- Gregory Waters
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces' capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Middle East, and Syria
209. The primacy of praxis: Clerical authority in the Syrian conflict
- Author:
- Shiraz Maher
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- A close look at the competing claims, actors, and movements for authority within the Syrian civil war reveals three distinct periods of political and religious influence: that of Syrian scholars, who were the first to inject religious language into the revolution; that of Salafi scholars predominantly from the Gulf; and lastly, that of jihadi organizations like ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, who were active on the ground. This paper focuses on which figures relied on action—rather than theoretical abstraction—to establish legitimacy and authority on the ground in Syria. Tracing the conflict from the first clerical attempts to coordinate the Syrian opposition to the conflict’s regionalization, and, later, internationalization, this paper demonstrates that the words of actors on the ground are more likely than those of far-off figures—however popular—to resound effectively.
- Topic:
- Politics, Religion, Syrian War, Islamism, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and Gulf Nations
210. The Fatemiyoun Division: Afghan fighters in the Syrian civil war
- Author:
- Tobias Schneider
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- Originally styled as a small detachment of volunteers and refugees mobilized to defend the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab outside Damascus, the Fatemiyoun formation’s size and presence across Syria has slowly expanded throughout the war. At home, the IRGC began cultivating a narrative of Afghan “resistance” to transnational Sunni jihadism. Joining the Syrian jihad was increasingly promoted as a path to legal and social recognition within the Islamic Republic at a time when thousands of desperate young Hazaras were setting out to emigrate to Europe. This paper analyzes the origins and expansion of the Fatemiyoun Division, its recent role in the Syrian civil war, and the impact its Syrian jihad has had on the Hazara community in Iran as well as transnational militancy in Afghanistan. As the Syrian conflict winds down, the future of the Fatemiyoun as a fighting force remains unclear. But even if the formation were to be disbanded, the networks, narratives, and capabilities developed in Syria could help the IRGC raise a similar formation again in the future.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Refugees, Syrian War, and Shia
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, and Syria