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1. Rethinking Social Security from a Global Perspective: What Congress Can Learn from the Experiences of Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Sweden

Author:
Romina Boccia and Ivane Nachkebia
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Social Security is projected to reach technical insolvency by 2033, threatening retirees with automatic 23 percent benefit cuts as the program will be unable to pay full benefits on time. The program’s looming trust-fund insolvency creates a legislative forcing mechanism and thus presents an opportunity to reimagine how Social Security could work. Policymakers should consider fundamentally rethinking the program’s structure and transform it into a system that ensures seniors are protected from poverty when they can no longer work, while also freeing up resources for younger workers to save more on their own. With Social Security running large and rising cash-flow deficits since 2010, and given a political desire to protect most current retirees from being affected by benefit reductions, Congress should act now to stabilize the system—not procrastinate any longer, which only ensures that inevitable changes will be more drastic and economically harmful. The longer Congress waits, the more people will be locked into the current unsustainable system, and the higher the burden will be on younger generations to finance it.
Topic:
Poverty, Reform, Fiscal Policy, Social Security, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and New Zealand

2. Identity Continuities, Far-Right Acquiescence, and the “New” and the “Old”: Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession and Neutrality

Author:
Erik Isaksson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
With Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the number of neutral or non-aligned states in the EU has been reduced to three: Austria, Ireland, and Malta. How did Finland and Sweden’s shifts come about? What do these shifting neutrality – alliance membership constellations mean for the concept of neutrality, and for Austria’s position as a neutral state? This paper first examines the Finnish and Swedish debates pertaining to their own respective shifts, with particular attention to the far-right parties in those countries. It argues three things: first, contrary to most commentary, both the Finnish and Swedish policy shifts were underpinned by identity considerations, identities that remain largely the same under NATO membership as under non-alignment. Second, the far right’s acceptance of NATO membership has been a mix of opportunism and broadly engrained views of Russia. Third, par-ticularly in Sweden, neutrality has become seen as a thing of the past, and alliance membership as new and exciting, with possible implications for how neutrality is understood internationally. The paper then examines the state of the neutrality debate in Austria, with particular attention to the notion of neutrality as Austrian identity, the role of the FPÖ, and the potential risks for “neutral Austria” going forward. It concludes with a summary of the paper’s findings; a look at how neutrality in Austria, too, might increasingly be seen as an “old” concept; and by offering examples of how foreign policy con-cepts have been successfully reimagined in the past.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Regional Integration, Neutrality, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

3. Finland's partnerships as a NATO member: Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework

Author:
Iro Särkkä, Minna Ålander, Joel Linnainmäki, and Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden. It studies defence cooperation through key strategic, military, economic and political factors, such as the perceived threat environment, military capabilities, strategic culture, and the role member states play in the multilateral security framework of NATO. The report compares these six countries with Finland and identifies factors impacting potential future cooperation. The report finds that regional defence cooperation can yield positive outcomes for NATO. Bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation can enhance intra-alliance policymaking and serve as a tool to build trust with key partners and allies, thus facilitating defence integration within NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

4. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

5. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

6. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

7. Finger on the Pulse: The State of Primary Care in the U.S. and Nine Other Countries

Author:
Evan D. Gumas, Corinne Lewis, Celli Horstman, and Munira Z. Gunja
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Commonwealth Fund
Abstract:
For many people, primary care is their first point of contact with the health system, and decades of evidence shows it is critical for population health, health equity, and the overall efficiency of health care systems.1 Primary care is also uniquely positioned to screen for social needs and provide integrated behavioral health services.2 Ensuring people have access to high-quality, comprehensive primary care is vital to good health outcomes and positive experiences with the health system at large. Despite the importance of primary care, health systems around the world are facing challenges at the patient and provider level. Many countries struggle to ensure access to care, or first contact; continuity of care; comprehensiveness of care; and coordination of care. These four core components of high-quality primary care are essential to better overall health outcomes.3 Factors like workforce shortages, physician burnout, and dwindling access for patients, driven in part by underinvestment and growing administrative burdens, pose significant barriers to care.4 To better understand how patient care can be improved in a changing primary care landscape, this brief compares the state of primary care in the United States with nine other high-income nations. It updates an earlier Commonwealth Fund study comparing primary care performance in the U.S. with nine peer countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Our data come from the Commonwealth Fund’s 2022 International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physicians and the 2023 International Health Policy Survey of adults age 18 and older. The 2022 and 2023 surveys asked different questions of the participating physicians and responding adults, so this edition includes new measures on access to telehealth, preparedness to treat behavioral health conditions, and care coordination. For more details on our methods, see “How We Conducted This Study.”
Topic:
Equity, Primary Care, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, North America, Sweden, Netherlands, New Zealand, and United States of America

8. Insights into the U.S. Maternal Mortality Crisis: An International Comparison

Author:
Munira Z. Gunja, Evan D. Gumas, Relebohile Masitha, and Laurie Zephyrin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Commonwealth Fund
Abstract:
The United States continues to have the highest rate of maternal deaths of any high-income nation, despite a decline since the COVID-19 pandemic. And within the U.S., the rate is by far the highest for Black women. Most of these deaths — over 80 percent — are likely preventable.1 With policies and systems in place to support women during the perinatal period, several high-income countries report virtually no maternal deaths. As policymakers and health care delivery system leaders in the U.S. seek ways to end the nation’s maternal mortality crisis, these countries may offer viable solutions. This brief updates an earlier Commonwealth Fund study of differences in maternal mortality, maternal care workforce composition, and access to postpartum care and social protections between the U.S. and other high-income countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.2 In this edition, we have also included data on Chile, Japan, and Korea — all high-income countries with universal health care systems. For our analysis, we used the most recently available data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which the U.S. is a member. Where country-specific data are more than five years old, we note whether more recent published data from other sources are available for that country. Readers should be aware that because the methods we used to derive updated numbers from other sources may be different from methods the OECD uses, data points may not be comparable to the U.S. rates. For complete details on our methods, see “How We Conducted This Study.”
Topic:
Development, Inequality, Public Health, and Maternal Mortality
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, France, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, North America, Sweden, Netherlands, New Zealand, and United States of America

9. CTC Sentinel: July/August 2024 Issue

Author:
Devorah Margolin, Gina Vale, Kristina Hummel, Samuel Bowles, and Noah Tucker
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Ten years ago, in August 2014, the Islamic State began its genocidal campaign against the Yazidi community. In our cover article, Devorah Margolin and Gina Vale evaluate how the group’s gendered violence has manifested during and after its caliphate years. “Even without its caliphate,” they write, “the Islamic State’s gendered violence continues, as its supporters and ideology remain. Arguably, the lack of timely and appropriate responses has perpetuated this violence.” Our interview this month is with William Braniff, director of the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships at the Department of Homeland Security. In it, he describes his office’s efforts to utilize a public health-informed approach to preventing targeted violence and terrorism. Edward Lemon and Noah Tucker examine Central Asians’ prominent role in recent global terror plots and attacks. They argue that analysis should focus more on “the factors that led to mobilization to Syria and Iraq a decade ago and that have been exacerbated in recent years, especially in Tajikistan, including crackdowns on religion, corrupt ineffective governance, high levels of migration, and well-established terror networks that are holdovers from the peak of the Islamic State” as a way to understand this evolving threat area. When news reports appeared earlier this summer suggesting that the leader of the Islamic State in Somalia, Abdulqadir Mumin, may have quietly become the “worldwide leader” of the Islamic State last year and may have been killed in a recent U.S. airstrike, the news created far more questions than answers. Austin Doctor and Gina Ligon take a nuanced look at what the developments—if true—could mean for the group. Jessica Davis provides analysis of the Islamic State’s post-caliphate financial strategies. “The future of the Islamic State’s financial infrastructure,” she writes, “is networked, resilient, and adaptive.” This reality, she warns, portends “a grim future for efforts to combat the group’s international presence.” Finally, in June, the U.S. State Department designated the Nordic Resistance Movement, the largest neo-Nazi group in Sweden, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, only the second white nationalist organization on its terrorist list. Peter Smith outlines the development of the group and considers what the designation could mean for its future.
Topic:
Genocide, Migration, Terrorism, Women, Islamic State, Gender Based Violence, Public Health, Yazidis, and Neo-Nazis
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, Tajikistan, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

10. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe